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Abstract
The value of actual outcomes or states of affairs often depends on what could have been.
Such dependencies create well-known “paradoxes” for decision theory, the best-known
perhaps being the so-called Allais Paradox. The primary aim of this PhD thesis is to enrich
decision theory such that it includes counterfactual prospects in the domains of desirability
(or utility) functions, and show that, as a result, the paradoxes in question disappear.
Before discussing the way in which counterfactual propositions influence the desirability
of actual outcomes, I discuss the way in which the truth of one factual proposition influences
the desirability of another. This examination leads me to reject the Invariance assumption,
which states that the desirability of a proposition is independent of whether it is true. The
assumption plays an important role in David Lewis’ famous arguments against the so-called
Desire-as-Belief thesis (DAB). The unsoundness of Lewis’ argument does of course not make
DAB true. In fact, I provide novel arguments against different versions of DAB, without
assuming Invariance.
To justify the assumptions I make when extending decision theory to counterfactual
prospects, I discuss several issues concerning the logic, metaphysics and epistemology of
counterfactuals. For instance, I defend a version of the so-called Ramsey test, and show that
Richard Bradley’s recent Multidimensional Possible World Semantics for Conditionals is both
more plausible and permissive than Bradley’s original formulation of it suggested.
I use the multidimensional semantics to extend Richard Jeffrey’s decision theory to
counterfactuals, and show that his desirability measure, extended to counterfactuals, can
represent the various different ways in which counterfactuals influence the desirability of
factual propositions. And I explain why the most common alternatives to Jeffrey’s theory
cannot be similarly extended.
I conclude the thesis by using Jeffrey’s extended decision theory to construct an ethical
theory I call Modal Consequentialism, and argue that it better satisfies certain entrenched
moral intuitions than Non-Modal Consequentialism (such as classical utilitarianism and
welfare economics).
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Introduction: Counterfactual Desirability
and Practical Rationality
0.1 Desirability and Counterfactuals
The desirability of what actually occurs is often influenced by what could have been. Suppose
you have been offered two jobs, one very exciting but with a substantial risk of unemploy-
ment, the other less exciting but more secure. If you choose the more risky option, and as a
result become unemployed, you might find that the fact that you could have chosen the risk-
free alternative makes being unemployed even worse. Dependencies of this kind between
what is and what could have been generate well-known paradoxes for the traditional theory
of rational choice, as for instance formulated by John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern
[von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944], Leonard Savage [Savage, 1972] and Richard Jeffrey
[Jeffrey, 1983].
The above example is a simplified version of Maurice Allais’ infamous paradox [Allais,
1953], [Allais, 1979], which has troubled decision theorists for decades. The paradox is
generated by offering people a pair of choices between different lotteries, each of which con-
sists in tickets being randomly drawn. First people are offered a choice between a ‘lottery’
that is certain to result in the decision maker receiving a particular prize, say £2400, and a
lottery that could result in the decision-maker receiving nothing, but could also result in
the decision maker receiving more than £2400. The situation can be represented as having
to choose between lotteries L1 and L2 below, where, for instance, L1 results in the decision
maker receiving a prize of £2500 if one of tickets number 2 to 34 is drawn:
1 2 − 34 35 − 100
L1 £0 £2500 £2400
L2 £2400 £2400 £2400
Having made a choice between L1 and L2, people are asked to make another choice which
we can represent as a choice between lotteries L3 and L4:
1 2 − 34 35 − 100
L3 £0 £2500 £0
L4 £2400 £2400 £0
Although the results are not conclusive, it seems that people tend to choose, and strictly
prefer, L2 over L1 and L3 over L4. (See [Kahneman and Tversky, 1979] for discussion of an
early experiment of the Allais Paradox.) One common way to rationalise this preference,1
1I should emphasise that the reasoning I am about to suggest is by no means the only reasoning that might
generate the preference in question. Some for instance think that what generates Allais’ preference is not regret
aversion, but rather risk aversion. Personally, I think that the reason I myself have the Allais preference has more
8
which I will call ‘Allais’ preference’, is that when choosing between L1 and L2, the chance
of receiving the higher prize as a result of choosing L1 is not worth the risk of ending up
with nothing, since receiving nothing when you could have had £2400 for sure is bound to
cause considerable regret (see e.g. [Loomes and Sugden, 1982] and [Broome, 1991]). When
it comes to choosing between L3 and L4, however, the desire to avoid regret does not play
as strong role, since decision makers reason that if they choose L3 and end up with nothing
then they would, in all likelihood, have received nothing even if they had chosen the less
risky option L4.2
As Wlodek Rabinowicz has pointed out to me, examples like Allais’ are particularly
interesting if we assume that the agent in question knows that she will not remember
having had the opportunity to choose a different option than the one she does, and will thus
not experience the regret, but nevertheless makes choices that are directed at avoiding this
type of counterfactual dependencies. In such cases, one could argue that the agent perceives
these dependencies as being bad independently of the feeling of regret, and that the regret
she would feel if she were to remember the opportunities she had reflect rather than cause
the badness of the situation. And that is roughly how I will, in what follows, interpret the
role of rational regret in this examples; i.e., as a reflection rather than cause of disvalue.
The discussed value dependency between counterfactual and actual outcomes does not
always give rise to regret. Suppose a hospital has a single kidney but two equally needing
and deserving patients, Ann and Bob. Furthermore, assume that Ann and Bob’s situation
is symmetric in all respects that are relevant for deciding who should receive the kidney.
How should we decide who gets the kidney? Most people have a strong intuition that
in situations like these we should toss a coin, or hold some other lottery that gives each
patient an equal chance of receiving the kidney. And they find that such a lottery is strictly
better than giving the kidney to either Ann or Bob without holding a lottery. In other
words, if ANN (BOB) represents a situation (or outcome) where Ann (Bob) has received the
kidney, and H and T partition the space of possibilities into two equiprobable and random
events (e.g. a coin coming heads/tails up), most people are indifferent between F1 and F2, and
also between A and B, but strictly prefer the two ‘fair’ lotteries to the two biased alternatives:
H T
F1 ANN BOB
A ANN ANN
B BOB BOB
F2 BOB ANN
I will call this judgement Diamond’s preference, after Peter Diamond who in [Diamond, 1967]
to do with regret aversion than risk aversion. But others might have the same preference due to risk aversion.
Those who think decision theory should capture, in some very minimal sense, the reasoning behind people’s
preferences, and moreover think that risk aversion is a more common explanation for Allais-type preferences
than regret aversion, might prefer Lara Buchak’s solution to the Allais paradox to mine (see [Buchak, 2013], and
[Stefa´nsson, 2014e] for a discussion of Buchak’s book). For the remainder of this thesis, I will however assume
that the reasoning I suggest explains the Allais’ preference (alternatively, my discussion of Allais’ preference can
be seen as being limited to those who have this preference for the reason I suggest).
2Notice, however, that according to the Minimax Regret Rule (MRR) we should choose L4 over L3 (in contradiction
with Allais’ preference). The rule tells us to look at each state si and determine, for each alternative A, the potential
for regret in that state, as measured by the difference between the prize that A gives in si and the highest prize you
could receive in si (i.e. the outcome of the alternative that is most favourable in state si). When reasoning in the
way I am suggesting, however, agents do not try to figure out the potential for regret state-by-state. Rather, people
seem to reason that even if they choose the slightly more risky option in the second choice situation and get ticket
1, they will ‘forgive themselves’ for having taken the slight extra risk since they know that both choices were quite
risky anyway. (Reasoning of this latter kind is based on aversion to what Luc Bovens and Wlodek Rabinowicz call
probability action regret [Bovens and Rabinowicz, ms].)
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first pointed out that this intuitively reasonable preference causes problems for expected
utility theory (EU theory). Here is a possible consequentialist justification for this preference
(which I defend in chapter 6 and [Stefa´nsson, 2014b]). Suppose we find ourselves in a
situation S where Ann has received the kidney as a result of a lottery. Then unlike a
situation where Ann is given the kidney without any lottery being held, it is true in S that
although Bob didn’t receive a kidney, he at least had a chance of receiving it. And that means,
as I understand it, that things could, in some meaningful sense, have turned out differently,
and if they had, then Bob would have received the kidney. So an outcome, or a situation,3
where Bob is dead as a result of not having received the kidney is somehow made (morally)
better by the truth of this counterfactual.
So in both of the above examples it is the case that the desirability of what actually
occurs is affected by what could have been. These are the two examples that will be the
focus of this thesis. But I should mention that there are multiple other examples where the
truth of a counterfactual makes a desirabilistic difference to an actual outcome or states of
affairs. Richard Arneson [Arneson, 1990] and John C. Harsanyi [Harsanyi, 1977] have for
instance both argued that the moral value of a public policy depends not on how well it
satisfies people’s actual preferences, but the preferences that people would have in certain
ideal circumstances. Similarly, some moral and political philosophers argue that whether
or not someone is being exploited in a transaction depends not only on what she actually
receives from the transaction, but rather on whether what she receives matches up with
what she would have received from the transaction in a morally acceptable world, where, for
instance, her rights have not been violated (see for instance [Ferguson, 2013]).
Both Allais’ and Diamond’s preferences cause trouble for orthodox decision theory (i.e.,
expected utility theory). As I explain more formally in chapter 4, there is no pair of utility and
probability functions relative to which either preference can be represented as maximising
expected utility. It is standardly assumed, at least amongst decision theorists and economists,
that a necessary requirement for a preference to be (practically) rational is that it be possible
to represent it as maximising expected utility. Hence, according to the standard picture,
both preferences must be irrational.
Contrary to what the standard picture suggests, I think there is nothing irrational about
Allais’ and Diamond’s preferences (and will in next section briefly explain why). However,
I do agree with the standard view that a necessary requirement for a preference to be
rational is that it be possible to represent it as maximising the expectation of some value
function.4 The main aim of this thesis is to develop a new decision theory that differs from
standard EU theory in that allows us to express desirabilistic dependencies between actual
and counterfactual outcomes, and, as a result, makes it possible to represent both Allais’
and Diamond’s preferences as maximising the expected value of a particular value function.
The new decision theory, which I discuss in chapter 4 and develop jointly with Richard
Bradley in [Bradley and Stefa´nsson, 2015], is an extension of Richard Jeffrey’s [Jeffrey, 1983]
decision theory to counterfactual prospects. (As I explain in chapter 4, extending expected
utility theory, such as Leonard Savage’s [Savage, 1972], to counterfactual prospects has
3Throughout this thesis I will talk about ‘outcomes’, ‘situations’ and ‘consequences’ more or less interchangeably,
and take them to mean a result of some alternative being realised (or action being performed, choice being made,
etc.)
4A note on terminology: when I speak of a ‘value function’, I mean just any mathematical function that
represents how good something is (usually according to some particular agent). An expected utility function and
a Jeffrey-desirability function are two specific value functions, with some important formal differences (as will
become clear in chapter 4).
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very counterintuitive consequences.) So the value function that can represent both Allais’
and Diamond’s preferences, is a Jeffrey-desirability function defined on a set of factual and
counterfactual propositions.
Before discussing the new decision theory, we must clarify certain issues regarding how to
update desirability functions, what epistemic and logical principles we think counterfactuals
satisfy, and what formal theory of counterfactuals to use to introduce counterfactuals to
Jeffrey’s theory. Chapters 1, 2 and 3 are devoted to these issues.
0.2 A Humean View on Practical Rationality
In this thesis I assume what I call a Humean view on (practical) rationality. The view includes
both a negative and positive thesis. The negative thesis is summed up in the following often-
quoted passage of David Hume’s Treatise of Human Nature:
’Tis not contrary to reason to prefer the destruction of the whole world to the
scratching of my finger. ’Tis not contrary to reason for me to chuse my total ruin,
to prevent the least uneasiness of an Indian or person wholly unknown to me.
’Tis as little contrary to reason to prefer even my own acknowledg’d lesser good
to my greater, and have a more ardent affection for the former than the latter.
In short, a passion must be accompany’d with some false judgement, in order
to its being unreasonable; and even then ’tis not the passion, properly speaking,
which is unreasonable, but the judgement. ([Hume, 1740]: 267)
When Hume says that something is ‘not contrary to reason,’ he is, as I understand him,
simply saying that this something is not irrational. In a more modern terminology, Hume’s
infamous claim is that the contents of our desires are neither rational nor irrational. A desire,
and thus a preference,5 may be mistaken when it is based on a false belief. But even in such
cases, it is, strictly speaking, the belief, rather than the desire, that is at fault. What we might
however call primitive desires, i.e. those desires that are not based on any beliefs, cannot be
mistaken.
The positive thesis of Humeanism says that given any two alternatives, a practically ra-
tional person always prefers the alternative she expect to better satisfy her desires. (Perhaps
we should call this Moderate Humeanism, to distinguish it from the more extreme view ac-
cording to which there is no such thing as practical irrationality.) This in turn implies that the
preferences of a practically rational person satisfy certain axioms, which we can understand
as guaranteeing that the person’s attitudes are internally consistent. Some of these axioms
are relatively uncontroversial, such as Transitivity, which requires that if a person prefers A
to B and B to C, then she must prefer A to C. Other axioms are much more controversial,
such as Completeness, which requires that for any two alternatives A and B, a rational person
either prefers A to B, or B to A, or is indifferent between the two. In other words, any two
alternatives must be comparable with respect to the agent’s preferences. The axiom that
will be of particular interest to this thesis is Separability, which comes in various strengths
and forms, but is perhaps best-known as Savage’s Sure Thing Principle. No preference can
5A note on terminology: I take a person’s preferences to be her overall, comparative judgement of the alternatives
that she is or could be faced with; which, if the person is rational, orders the alternatives from (in her view) ‘best’
to ‘worst’. And I assume that a person’s preferences are determined by her desires and beliefs in the standard way.
For instance, although my strongest desire at the moment might be that I go to a sunny beach, I might nevertheless
prefer staying in to going to the beach, since I believe that it will rain and find it more desirable to stay in than
going to the beach when it is raining.
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be represented as maximising expected utility unless it satisfies Separability. In chapter
4, I formally state Separability and explain how it clashes with Allais- and Diamond-style
preferences. I will argue that the reasonableness of these two preferences suggests that
Separability is not a genuine requirement of rationality. And in fact, like Jeffrey’s original
theory, the new decision theory I discuss does not require Separability (in the strong form
required by EU theory.)
Given the above view on practical rationality, neither Allais’ nor Diamond’s preference
seems to be irrational. Both seem to be preferring the alternative that can be expected to best
satisfy their desires. Moreover, given the explanation I have given for the two preferences,
it seems we can give plausible reasons for these preferences. People who are prone to regret
that they would like to avoid, but, other things being equal, desire more money to less, seem
to have a good reason for preferring lottery L2 to L1 but L3 to L4. In other words, it seems
perfectly possible that someone with Allais’ preference is preferring the alternatives that
best satisfy her desires. Similarly, it seems that someone who is motivated by fairness has a
very good reason for being indifferent between F1 and F2, and also between A and B, while
strictly preferring the first two alternatives to the latter two. So it also seems possible that
Diamond prefers the alternatives that best satisfies his desires.
If to prefer the alternatives that one expects to best satisfy ones desires simply means
having preferences that can be represented as maximising expected utility, then given how
Allais’ and Diamond’s preferences have been described, they do not satisfy the requirement
of Humeanism, contrary to the intuition appealed to in last paragraph. But the intuition is,
I think, quite strong: it seems hard to deny that given my suggested reasoning behind the
two preferences, Allais and Diamond are preferring the alternatives that can be expected to
maximally satisfy their desires. So EU theory does not perfectly capture the positive part of
Humeanism. As already mentioned, one aim of this thesis is to offer a decision theory that
does better than standard EU theory in this regard. And I discuss some new results that, I
contend, undermines the view that EU theory is our best theory of practical rationality.
A common response to the problems Diamond’s and Allais’ preferences create for EU
theory is that we should simply re-describing the relevant outcomes, e.g. in the way John
Broome [Broome, 1991] suggests. Given how intuitive Broome’s solution may be, I will
briefly responding to it at this point, but will expand on this response both in chapter 4 and
6. We might for instance describe the £0 outcome of L1 in Allais’ example as ‘£0 + regret’, and
the outcomes of the fair lottery in Diamond’s example as e.g. ‘ANN + fairness’. And then
these two preferences no longer cause problems for EU theory (as explained in chapter 6).
If descriptions of outcomes should contain everything that is important for their evaluation
(as is necessary when e.g. using Savage’s decision theory), then these re-descriptions should
perhaps be seen as improvements.
There are various theoretical disadvantages of this approach. One technical disadvan-
tage is the tension with the so-called Rectangular Field Assumption, which I discuss in chapter
6. A more intuitive problem with this approach, is that unless we have a principled way
of distinguishing legitimate from non-legitimate re-descriptions of consequences, this ap-
proach threatens to make decision theory ‘empty’ as a theory of practical rationality, since
any preference can be made consistent with the axioms of decision theory if we are clever
enough in how we describe the consequences.
Perhaps the above problems can be solved. Broome and Philip Pettit, for instance,
attempt to solve the second problem mentioned above – the danger of an empty decision
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theory – by respectively suggesting that alternatives should be considered different (and
thus described in a way that distinguishes them from each other) just in case they differ in
a way that makes it rational to have a preference between them [Broome, 1991], or if they
differ in properties that are desired or undesired by the agent whose preferences we are
trying to represent [Pettit, 1991]. The main problem I have with this re-description strategy,
and the main reason I prefer the solution offered in chapter 4, is that it does not explicitly
model the desirabilistic dependencies between actual and counterfactual outcomes that, I
contend, are at the heart of the preferences under discussion.
My solution moreover differs from the re-description solution in that rather than adding
‘regret’ and ‘fairness’ as primitive properties to our set of outcomes, I show that if we
add counterfactual prospects to the domain of a decision theoretic value function, these
properties emerge as a relationship between counterfactual and actual outcomes. Thus, I
claim, my preferred solution explains why Diamond’s and Allais’ preferences have caused
such problems for decision theorists, who have traditionally been very reluctant to admit
that the value of actual outcomes can rationally depend on what merely could have been
(as I further explain in chapter 6).
0.3 Summary of Chapters
In addition to this introduction, the thesis comprises six chapters. Here is a summary of
each chapter, in a slightly more detail than my discussion above:
Before determining how counterfactual propositions rationally influence the desirability
of actual states of affairs, we should clarify how factual propositions rationally influence such
desirability. To this end I defend in chapter 1 a particular measure of conditional desirability,
and discuss its advantages over the measure favoured for instance by David Lewis and James
Joyce. The measure I defend contradicts the so-called Invariance assumption, according to
which the desirability of a proposition is independent of whether it is true. Invariance plays
an important role in Lewis’ famous arguments against the so-called Desire-as-Belief thesis
(DAB), an anti-Humean thesis according to which a rational agent desires a proposition
to the degree that she believes (or expects) the proposition to be good. But I argue that
independently of what measure of conditional desirability we prefer, we have good reasons
for giving up Invariance. The unsoundness of Lewis’ arguments against DAB does not,
of course, make DAB true. In fact, I conclude the chapter with novel arguments against
different versions of the DAB thesis, none of which assumes Invariance.6
When extending Jeffrey’s theory to counterfactual prospects, I assume Richard Bradley’s
recent Multidimensional Possible World Semantics. Before extending Jeffrey’s theory, I discuss
several issues concerning the logic, semantics and probability of counterfactuals, in order
to justify my use of the semantics. The discussion of these issues may seem to occupy too
large parts of this thesis, given that its main topic is decision theory and practical rationality.
However, as I hope will become clear, this discussion provides an important foundation for
the chapters that follow. In chapter 2 I explore the formal relationships between several
principles that we might want conditionals in general to satisfy. In chapter 3 I discuss the
multidimensional semantics. I show that the semantics is more permissive than Bradley’s
original formulation suggested, and show that contrary to appearances, it is consistent with
a particular Humean view on the metaphysics of modality. (Chapter 3 is largely based on
6The arguments against DAB are based on a joint working paper with Richard Bradley.
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[Stefa´nsson, 2014c].)
Chapter 4 contains the main formal results of this thesis. Based on joint work in progress
with Richard Bradley, I show how the multidimensional semantics allows us to extend
Jeffrey’s measure to counterfactuals. The resulting theory, which I will call multidimensional
decision theory, allows us to represent both Allais’ and Diamond’s preferences as maximising
the expected value of a decision theoretic value function, thus dissolving two ‘paradoxes’
that have burdened decision theorists for decades. In chapter 5, I use the result of chapter
4 to propose a general measure of the desirability of conditionals, and show how it can
represent the various different ways in which conditionals influence the desirability of
factual propositions.
The discussed dependency between actual and counterfactual outcomes very often oc-
curs in moral decision-making, as we have already seen in the case of organ allocation. In
chapter 6 (which is based on [Stefa´nsson, 2014b]) I use the the multidimensional decision
theory to formulate what I call Modal Consequentialism. The main attraction of this theory
is that it satisfies certain common moral intuitions, such as the aforementioned intuition
about fair decision procedures in organ allocation and intuitions about fair distribution
of risk of harms and chances for goods, that Non-Modal Consequentialism (e.g. classical
utilitarianism and traditional welfare economics) violates.
0.4 Notation and terminology
Most symbols used in this thesis should be familiar. I use ‘∧’ and ‘∨’ for conjunction
and disjunction respectively, and ‘⊃’ for material implication. In addition, ‘7→’ represents
the indicative conditional connective, ‘’ the counterfactual or subjunctive conditional
connective (which I take to be two names for the same connective), and ‘→’ a variable that
can either take 7→ or  as values. Italic capital letters A, B, etc., usually represent sentence
variables, but non-italic capital letters, A, B, etc., denote factual propositions. I use Greek
letters, α, β, etc., for propositions that could either be factual or modal. v(w,A) = 1 and
v(w,A) = 0 respectively means that sentence A is true at w and false at w.
I will assume that a rational person’s degrees of beliefs, aka her credences, can be repre-
sented by a probability function. P denotes a (subjective) probability function, P+A such a
function on the evidential supposition that A, PA a probability function on the subjunctive
supposition that A, and PA is a variable that denotes either P+A or P

A .
7 Ch however denotes
an objective probability (or chance) function. That is, unlike P, Ch does not represent the
uncertainty of some particular agent, but some sort of objective (physical) uncertainty in
the world. I will also assume that a rational persons’ desires can be represented by a desir-
ability function. Des denotes such a function, and DesB(A) the desirability of A under the
supposition that B.
7To avoid confusion, it might be worth pointing out right away that I interpret P+A as representing what the
agent in question thinks, before learning A, her credence should be if she comes to believe A. Alternatively, one
could interpret P+A as representing what the agent thinks her credence should be if A were true. However, there
are various propositions such that a reasonable agent recognises that she would probably not believe them even if
they were true. Hence, this alternative interpretation does not rule out the possibility that P+A(A) , 1 which means
that P(A | A) , P(A ∧A)/P(A). Since I want to use the standard ration formula for conditional probability, I cannot
endorse this alternative interpretation. But the more general and more severe problem with this interpretation, is
that there is no guarantee that the truth of a proposition by itself affects an agent’s beliefs.
Wlodek Rabinowicz has suggested that instead of either of the above interpretations, we think of P+A as repre-
senting what an agent would rationally believe “on the hypothetical assumption that A is true”. And he suggests
that this interpretation ensures that P+A(A) = 1 for any consistent A. I am happy with putting it that way, but as
far as I can tell, when I hypothetically assume that A is true, I must, if the aforementioned equality is to hold, be
imagining myself to be in a situation where I fully believe A.
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Chapter 1
Conditional Desirability
1.1 Introduction
Before discussing how the truth of a counterfactual proposition can rationally influence the
desirability of a factual proposition, or an actual outcome, it is useful to get clear about
how the truth of a factual proposition can influence desirability. To that end, I defend in
this chapter a particular measure for conditional desirability, which was first suggested
by Richard Bradley. Another reason for starting by discussing measures for conditional
desirability is that I will, in later chapters, assume the measure I defend here.1
The measure for conditional desirability I favour implies the falsity of the so-called
Invariance principle, which states that the desirability of a proposition is independent of
whether the proposition is true. The most common alternative to the conditional desirability
measure I favour, however, implies the truth of Invariance. Hence, the principle can be used
to determine the relative appropriateness of the two measures. Invariance has not received
much critical attention in the philosophical and decision theoretic literature.2 Therefore, this
chapter is mostly devoted to discussing this principle. I will argue that we have reasons for
rejecting Invariance that are independent of the plausibility of the conditional desirability
measure I defend.
Invariance plays an important role in David Lewis’ arguments against the so-called
Desire-as-Belief thesis (DAB), an anti-Humean view according to which a rational person
desires a proposition to the extent that she believes the proposition to be desirable. I conclude
the chapter with arguments against two different versions DAB. Neither argument assumes
Invariance. Although this last part of the chapter may seem quite disconnected from the
other parts, it is important, given the Humean assumptions I make in this thesis, to establish
that even if we give up Invariance, we can still provide plausible arguments against DAB.
1.2 Measuring Conditional Desirability
How should we evaluate conditional desirability in general? That is, taking any arbitrary
propositions A and B, how should we calculate the desirability of A given (or under the
1This chapter is based on [Stefa´nsson, 2014a].
2This is only true of the subjective version of Invariance. After I submitted this thesis, Wlodek Rabinowicz
pointed out to me that a normative Invariance principle (originally formulated by himself), according to which the
normative status of an act is independent of whether it is performed, has received some attention. One of the
future extensions of this thesis will be to look more closely at the normative Invariance principle, and compare the
arguments I make against subjective Invariance to the discussion of the normative version of the principle.
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evidential3 supposition that) B? Although Jeffrey did not say much about conditional
desirability, he did suggest in an exercise to his The Logic of Decision that DesB(A) = Des(A∧B).
Several philosophers have followed Jeffrey in this regard. James Joyce makes the same
assumption [Joyce, 1999] and one of Lewis’ arguments against DAB makes explicit this
assumption as well (see [Lewis, 1996]: 310). Here is the only remark Jeffrey makes in
defence of his suggestion (with a slight change in notation):
Suppose your beliefs and desires change from those characterized by a pair P,
Des to those characterized by a new pair, PB, DesB, simply because you have
come to fully believe a proposition B that you had not fully believed or fully
disbelieved before. Under such circumstances, it is plausible to suppose that
your new evaluation of each proposition A will simply be your old evaluation
of A ∧ B. ([Jeffrey, 1983]: 90)
The reasoning behind Jeffrey’s suggestion that DesB(A) = Des(A ∧ B) is presumably the
following. Since you now fully believe B to be true, then whenever you learn some other
proposition A, you have learnt that both A and B hold true. Hence, you should now evaluate
A as you evaluated A ∧ B before you learnt B. I think this idea of Jeffrey’s is mistaken. The
mistake in effect consists in double counting: B is already believed true, so evaluating A as
A ∧ B in effect counts the value of B twice; first, when the B was discovered to be true, then
again when one evaluates the desirability of A given B.4 Below I provide a few arguments
against Jeffrey’s conditional desirability measure, and in favour of the measure I prefer. In
section 1.4 I will further develop some of these these arguments, but there the focus will be
on the Invariance assumption that these two measures disagree about.
Let us first compare Jeffrey’s suggestion with his own understanding of desirability as
News value: the desirability of any proposition should, on this view, be thought of in terms
of how much one would welcome the news of its truth. Suppose, for instance, that B is the
proposition that you are going to a vacation in Thailand next month – which you find very
desirable, in and of itself – and A the proposition that the weather forecast for Thailand next
month is just about average for Thailand that month. Then it would seem quite odd to find
the news of A given B as valuable as the news of A and B. Since you find it very desirable
to vacate in Thailand, it would be very desirable to learn that you are going on vacation in
Thailand next month and that the weather will be average for the region and time. But the
value of learning that the forecast for Thailand is as can be expected, given that you have
already learnt that you are going on vacation there, is at most slightly positive. For when
evaluating the latter (conditional) piece of news, you should not count again the news that
you are going on vacation in Thailand, since it is being assumed that you already know
that. Instead, it seems, the value of the latter piece of news should be determined by much
3I will assume that when it comes to the effects of suppositions on desirability, counterfactual suppositions do
not need a special treatment.
4This claim depends on my suggested interpretation of conditioning on A as representing an agents commitment
to a particular attitude change in a situation where she believes A to be true. In footnote 7 of last chapter I give one
reason why I think we should interpret conditional probabilities in this way. It would seem strange if this is how
we interpret conditional probability, but think of conditional desirability as reflecting how the agent thinks she
should change her desires if A were true (rather than if she were to believe A). In any case, this is an assumption
about conditional desirability that seems to be standard in the literature, and is for instance shared by both Jeffrey
and Richard Bradley, despite their disagreement on how to formulate conditional desirability (as I explain below).
The interpretation of conditional probability according to which it represents what an agent would believe
“under the hypothetical assumption that A is true” also supports this claim, if we imagine ourselves to believe A
when we hypothetically assume A’s truth, as we must do, I argued in fn. 7 of last chapter, if the ratio formula is to
be appropriate for conditional probability.
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value the news of the conjunction of A and B adds to the value of B only. So Jeffrey’s own
interpretation of desirability does not support his conditional desirability measure.
Let us next compare the above idea of Jeffrey’s with the assumption, common in most
social sciences (in particular economics), that if a rational agent finds two propositions A and
B equally desirable, then she should be willing to give up the same or an equally valuable
good to make A true as she would be willing to give up to make B true. (The argument
works independently of whether we assume that the contents of desires are propositions or
more concrete goods.) In general, what an agent would be willing to give up in order to
make A true, given that B is already true, should certainly not be identical to what she would
be willing to give up in order to make A ∧ B true. To take an example, what I am willing to
give up to have a piece of chocolate, given that I already have coffee, is certainly not as much
as what I would be willing to give up to have the chocolate and coffee, since by assumption,
I already have the former (which I find quite desirable on its own). Instead, it reflects how
much I desire having chocolate and coffee over and above simply having coffee.
The above suggests, that given how we intuitively evaluate conditional desirability, the
following measure (suggested by [Bradley, 1999]) is more appropriate than Jeffrey’s:
Thesis 1 (Conditional Desirability). For any propositions A, B, the conditional desirability of A
given B is given by:
DesB(A) = Des(A ∧ B) −Des(B) (1.1)
This way of calculating conditional desirability is not only more intuitive than Jeffrey’s; it can
also be shown that people are vulnerable to money pumps unless they evaluate conditional
desirability according to Bradley’s formula ([Bradley, 1999]). Assume that the value of
butter, given that you have bread, is the same for you as the value of bread and butter (as
Jeffrey suggests); and suppose you value it as much as you value $x.5 Also assume that you
would rather have bread than nothing, and say you value bread only as much as you value
$y < $x.6 As it happens, you have neither bread nor butter, whereas I have both. I first sell
you the former for $y. Now given that you have bread, you are willing to buy butter for
$x. After having sold you butter as well, I offer you $x plus some amount $z < $y for your
bread and butter, which you happily accept since bread and butter is worth $x to you.7 But
that means that you are in the same situation as before – having neither bread nor butter
– except that you have lost $(y − z) > 0. I could of course repeat the process, thus using
you as a ‘money pump’. In general, you will be vulnerable to such pumping whenever
either DesB(A) > Des(A ∧ B) − Des(B) or DesB(A) < Des(A ∧ B) − Des(B). Hence, if you are
instrumentally rational, and would also rather have more money than less, you will make
sure that DesB(A) = Des(A ∧ B) −Des(B).
Yet another problem with the assumption that DesB(A) = Des(A ∧ B), is that the formula
implies the following symmetry: DesB(A) = Des(A ∧ B) = Des(B ∧ A) = DesA(B). In other
words, the desirability of B given A should in general equal the desirability of A given B.
But that is not true. Suppose I really hate going to the beach. In general I enjoy the sun,
however, and although I would rather do something else than go to the beach when it is
sunny, I certainly would rather go to the beach when it is sunny than when it is not. Now
let A be the proposition that it is sunny, B the proposition that I go to the beach. Then
A is good news conditional on B, but B is bad news conditional on A. So given Jeffrey’s
5In other words if Br represents bread and Bu butter, then for you: DesBr(Bu) = Des(Bu ∧ Br) = Des($x).
6So Des(Br) = Des($y).
7That is, since more money is (let us assume) better than less money, Des($x + $z) > Des($x) = Des(Br ∧ Bu).
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convention that undesirable propositions get assigned a negative desirability value and
desirable propositions a positive desirability value (which I will come back to below), we
have in this particular case: DesB(A) > 0 but DesA(B) < 0. Hence, DesB(A) , DesA(B).
Given the formula for calculating conditional desirability that I have been endorsing, it
will not in general be true that DesB(A) equals DesA(B). (In fact, the equality will only hold
when Des(A) = Des(B).8) And this formula delivers the right result for the example in last
paragraph: since I find the proposition that it is sunny more desirable than the proposition
that I am going to the beach, i.e. Des(A) > Des(B), it is more desirable that it is sunny given
that I am going to the beach than that I am going to the beach given that it is sunny, i.e.
DesB(A) = Des(A ∧ B) −Des(B) > DesA(B) = Des(A ∧ B) −Des(A).
Before discussing Invariance and the role it plays in Lewis’ argument, I should mention
an objection Jim Joyce has made to my claims in this section. He points out that one way
of making sense of Jeffrey’s formula for conditional desirability, is to think of conditional
desirability as measuring total welfare, rather than incremental changes in welfare. I agree
that on that interpretation of conditional desirability, Jeffrey’s formula is very natural, and the
arguments in this section lose their bite. However, I take it that the fact that Jeffrey’s formula
strikes one as having counterintuitive implications, as the counterexamples discussed in
this section show, is evidence that we tend to think of the desirability of A given B in terms
of the incremental changes in welfare that A brings when B is believed true, rather than in
terms of the total welfare when A and B are true.
1.3 Lewis against Desire-as-Belief
The measure of conditional desirability that I have been defending violates the Invariance
principle, according to which the desirability of a proposition is independent of whether
the proposition is true: if DesA(A) = Des(A ∧ A) − Des(A) = 0, then it will not be generally
true that DesA(A) = Des(A). The measure for conditional desirability that Jeffrey suggests
however implies Invariance, since Des(A ∧ A) = Des(A). I believe that we have reasons
for giving up Invariance that are independent of the plausibility of Bradley’s conditional
desirability measure. Moreover, I believe and will argue below that A should neither be
desirable nor undesirable given A. Invariance plays an important role (as an undefended
assumption) in David Lewis’ well-known arguments against the so-called Desire-as-Belief
thesis (DAB). Before defending my claim that Invariance is false, let’s look at the role it
plays in Lewis’ argument against DAB.
Recall that DAB says that a rational agent desires a proposition to the extent that she
believes (or expects) the proposition to be desirable. Lewis took the thesis to be one way
8Are there no A and B such that for some rational agents, Des(A) = Des(B) but nevertheless DesA(B) , DesB(A)?
Possibly, but it is unclear that such examples should count as counterexamples in the present context. Suppose I
find attaining a state of nirvana equally desirable as receiving a billion pounds. Attaining a state of nirvana, given
that I have a billion pounds, is presumably also desirable. However, once I have attained a state of nirvana, worldly
possessions are of no value to me. Hence, when that I have attained a state of nirvana, receiving a billion pounds is of
no value to me. So we have a counterexample to the assumption that whenever Des(A) = Des(B), DesA(B) = DesB(A).
The problem with this purported counterexample is that it is a mischaracterisation of conditional desirability. This
might be best explained by taking an example from conditional probability. I think that conditional on being drunk,
I drive very badly. However, when I am drunk, I think I drive very well. The former evaluation is what is reflected
by the conditional probability I now assign to the proposition that I drive well conditional on being drunk; the
latter is, for these purposes, irrelevant. Similarly, how I would evaluate a billion pounds in a state of nirvana is
not relevant for evaluating the formula for conditional desirability. Rather, what we need to consider is how I now
evaluate a billion pounds given that I have attained a state of nirvana. But when we do that, it is unclear that a
counterexample like this can be made to the formula.
As far as I can tell, there do not seem to be any A and B, such that for a rational agent, Des(A) , Des(B) but
nevertheless DesA(B) = DesB(A).
18
of formulating the anti-Humean theory of motivation. Humeans hold that a belief is not
enough to motivate a person to act: any motivation is at least partly based on a desire (see e.g.
[Smith, 1994]: ch. 4). Moreover, beliefs and desires are independent, according to Humeans,
in the sense that a desire that A is not (even in rational agents) necessarily accompanied
by any particular belief; nor does believing that B, in and of itself,9 produce any particular
desire. If DAB is true, then this Humean view must be false, since then whenever a rational
agent desires that A she believes that A is desirable (and vice versa). So even the most
fundamental (or ‘primitive’) desires of a rational person are not be independent of her
beliefs.
To formally state DAB, and Lewis’ argument against the thesis, let’s use V as a zero-one
normalised desirability function; i.e. a function from propositions10 into the interval [0,1].
Given Jeffrey’s convention of reserving 0 in the desirability measure for propositions that
are neither desirable nor undesirable, his desirability function, Des, is clearly not zero-one
normalised in this way. But we could think of V as an order preserving function that
takes us from the image of Des – presumably from a (not necessarily proper) subset of the
set of real numbers – and into the zero-one interval. Recall that P+A is an agent’s revised
credence function after evidentially supposing A. As I will further discuss in next chapter,
it is generally accepted that the impact of learning A on a rational agent’s credences and
desires should in general be the same as the (hypothetical) impact of evidentially supposing
that A.11 Finally, for any proposition A, we define A˚ as the proposition that A is desirable.
Lewis gave a few arguments against DAB ([Lewis, 1988], [Lewis, 1996]). I will state the
simplest of these arguments, to be found in section 4 of Lewis’ second paper on DAB. First,
we have a formal statement of DAB:12
Thesis 2 (Desire-as-Belief (DAB)). For any A and according to any rational agent:
V(A) = P(A˚) (1.2)
Lewis claims that DAB implies what he calls ‘Desire-as-Conditional-Belief’:
Implication 1 (Desire-as-Conditional-Belief (DACB)). For any A and according to any rational
agent:
V(A) = P+A(A˚) (1.3)
Together DAB and DACB imply:
P(A˚) = V(A) = P+A(A˚) = VA(A) (1.4)
(The last equality holds since DAB is assumed to continue to hold after a rational agent
learns that A.) In other words, A and A˚ are probabilistically independent:
9A means-end belief, such as a belief that φ-ing will produce result X, may on the Humean picture lead an agent
desire to φ, but only if the agent already desires X.
10To state DAB, and his argument against it, Lewis needs to formalise the thesis in a framework, such as Jeffrey’s,
where the content of desires and beliefs are taken to be the same.
11Invariance thus demands that neither evidentially supposing nor learning A should affect A’s desirability.
12I should point out that Lewis also considers and rejects a more plausible version of DAB, which allows for
different degrees of goodness and states that a rational agent desires a proposition to the extent that she expects
the proposition to be (perhaps objectively) desirable (or good) (see equation 17 in [Lewis, 1988]). For now the
difference between these theses does not matter. In section 1.5.2 I provide an argument against the more general
(and arguably more plausible) version of DAB.
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Implication 2 (Independence (IND)). For any A and according to any rational agent:
P(A˚) = P+A(A˚) (1.5)
Below I will show why IND is problematic. But why does Lewis claim that DAB implies
DACB? Strictly speaking it does not. However, given the Invariance assumption, which
Lewis takes as given, DAB does imply DACB. Here is a formal statement of Invariance:
Assumption 1 (Invariance (INV)). For any A and according to any rational agent:
VA(A) = V(A) (1.6)
If we already accept INV, then there is however no need to introduce DACB. For DAB and
INV together imply IND.
Why is IND problematic? It is not hard to show that even if we start with a probability
function for which such independence holds, it is not guaranteed that it will continue to hold
after the agent in question revises her beliefs in accordance with Bayesian conditionalisation
(an example is provided in next paragraph). That is, suppose that an agent’s revised partial
beliefs after she has learnt A, represented by the probability function P′, is related to her
partial beliefs before learning A, represented by P, by the following condition (whenever
P(A) < 0): for any proposition B, P′(B) = P(B | A) = P(A ∧ B)/P(A). Then we cannot be sure
that this agent will satisfy IND both before and after such revision. Why is that a problem?
Because it is generally assumed that Bayesian conditionalisation is how we are rationally
required to revise our (partial) beliefs after learning some new proposition. (Call this norm
BAYES.) Anything implied by a requirement of rationality is rationally required. Hence, if
INV and DAB are both requirements of rationality then IND is rationally required. But then
given certain propositions that an agent could very well learn, and thus revise her beliefs by
conditionalising on, it will be impossible for her to satisfy the requirements of rationality,
since she must either violate IND or BAYES.
Here is an example where IND and BAYES cannot both be satisfied. Assume that there
is some proposition A such that 0 < P(A),P(A˚) < 1. (If we cannot assign both A and A˚
credence strictly between 0 and 1, without undermining DAB, the thesis only holds in quite
trivial cases, as Lewis points out.) This of course implies that 0 < P(A ∨ A˚). Hence, it
should be possible for an agent to learn that A ∨ A˚ and we should have no problems with
conditionalising on this proposition, using Bayesian conditioning. But conditionalising
on this disjunction turns a probability function for which IND holds into one for which
IND does not hold: it leaves the conditional probability of A˚ given A unchanged, but
increases the probability of A (since P(A),P(A˚) < 1)). Hence, when P(A˚) = P(A˚ | A) and
0 < P(A),P(A˚) < 1, PA∨A˚(A˚) , PA∨A˚(A˚ | A). Less formally, if IND holds before an agent has
learnt A ∨ A˚, then she cannot still satisfy IND after having learnt this unless she violates
BAYES.
Lewis’ argument thus shows that an agent cannot satisfy all of BAYES, INV and DAB.
But rationality presumably does not make inconsistent demands. Hence, not all of of
BAYES, INV and DAB can be rationally required. Let us accept, with Lewis, that BAYES is
a requirement of rationality. But then either INV or DAB must go. Lewis takes INV as given
and thus rejects DAB. Below I argue that we should reject both INV and DAB.13
13In his first paper against DAB, Lewis defined Invariance slightly differently ([Lewis, 1988]: 327). Acquiring
new evidence can change the expected value of a proposition A, Lewis claimed, just in case this new evidence
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1.4 Against Invariance
Those commenting on Lewis’ argument against DAB have, so far, not questioned Invariance;
not even those who have tried to save some version of DAB from Lewis’ criticism (see e.g.
[Price, 1989], [Ha´jek and Pettit, 2004], [Bradley and List, 2009]). In this section I present
a number of arguments against the Invariance assumption. I will start with the simplest
argument, which consists in showing that INV is incompatible with Richard Jeffrey’s inter-
pretation of desirability as news value. Although Lewis based his argument against DAB on
the decision theoretic framework developed by Jeffrey, he may not have endorsed Jeffrey’s
interpretation of desirability. But as I show, Jeffrey’s framework is incompatible with INV
on any interpretation of desirability. I will furthermore show that INV is incompatible with
the Efficacy value interpretation of choice-worthiness favoured by causal decision theorists,
and incompatible with the general idea that desirability is revealed through rational choices.
I end this section by responding to the argument that Invariance must hold for so-called
maximally specific propositions.
1.4.1 News value
In arguing against the DAB thesis, Lewis claimed to be basing his argument on Jeffrey’s
“exposition of Decision Theory” ([Lewis, 1988]: fn. 3). Jeffrey himself found it most natural
to interpret his desirability function as measuring news value. That is, desirability, on this
interpretation, is a measure of how good news it is that a proposition is true. To evaluate the
desirability of the proposition that you are going to the beach, to take a simple example, you
should ask yourself how valuable it would be to learn that you are going to the beach, which
should partly depend on your credences in the different ways in which the proposition can
come true; e.g. whether you will be going to the beach and it will be raining or sunny.
It seems clear that Invariance does not hold given Jeffrey’s interpretation of desirability
as news value. The news value of a proposition is highly dependent on whether we take it
to be true; a proposition doesn’t even count as news after we have learnt its truth.
To see more clearly that Invariance fails on the news value interpretation, let us look at
how James Joyce justifies Jeffrey’s convention of assigning a desirability value of 0 to any
tautology. This convention is of course most natural if the desirability function is not bound
by zero and one (as I assumed V is) since there are many propositions less desirable than a
tautology. Here is Joyce’s justification for the aforementioned convention (emphases added
and notation slightly changed):
There is a clear sense [...] in which > [i.e. any arbitrary tautology] cannot really
be news; learning that a tautology is true is not really learning anything, or at least
nothing informative. So, it makes sense to set Des(>) = 0.
This convention has a number of advantages. First, it amounts to assigning
a news value of 0 to any [proposition] whose subjective probability is 1. This
reflects the fact that a proposition no longer counts as ‘news’ for someone who is already
changes our evaluation of whether A is more likely to come true in a good way rather than bad. But this cannot
happen if there is just one way in which A can come true (in which case we can think of A as being ‘maximally
specific’). In such cases, Lewis argued (ibid.), we should find that for any proposition B, VB(A) = V(A). This view
of Lewis’ seems very strange, given that he assumes that VB(A) = V(A ∧ B). But the view implies Invariance, as
defined above but limited to propositions that can become true in one way only, for the aforementioned condition
is supposed to hold also when B = A. As should become clear, my arguments against Invariance, as defined above,
is also an argument against Invariance limited to propositions that can come true in one way only. I come back to
this issue in section 1.4.5.
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certain that it is true. Second, it follows from [Jeffrey’s desirability measure] that
Des(X) > Des(¬X) implies Des(X) > Des(>) > Des(¬X) as long as 1 > P(X) > 0.
This says that an agent who regards X as ‘good news’ will rank X above> and>
above¬X; no news is always worse than ‘good news’ and better than ‘bad news.’
Setting Des(>) = 0 gives ‘good news’ a positive value and ‘bad news’ a negative
value, thereby making it reasonable to think of > as a description of the current status
quo... ([Joyce, 1999]: 122-123)
Relative to the desirability measure DesA, all of Joyce’s justifications for assigning any
tautology zero desirability also justifies assigning the proposition A zero desirability. When
A is already believed (or supposed)14 true, “learning that [A] is true is not really learning
anything”. Moreover, if A is already believed (or supposed) true, then A represents the status
quo just as well as any tautology. Finally, given that A is already believed (or supposed) true,
A should should get a higher value than bad news and a lower value than good news. For
‘no news’ is worse than ‘good news’ but better than ‘bad news’. In other words, whenever A
is good news relative to the desirability function Des, such that Des(A) > >, we should have
DesA(A) < Des(A); but whenever Des(A) < >, we should have DesA(A) > Des(A). Hence, it
is not generally true that the desirability of a proposition, thus understood, is independent
of whether it is believed to be true. As we have seen, the measure for conditional desirability
that I favour satisfies these inequalities, and also guarantees that DesA(A) = 0.
Jim Joyce has made the following objection to the view (implied by his earlier remark)
that DesA(A) should always be assigned a desirability value of 0. The view entails that
we constantly rescale the desirability measure; i.e., constantly change it such that at any
particular time, the desirability of the status quo at that time is 0. But this, Joyce points
out, results in a loss of information. Suppose the status quo at time t is not very good for
agent i, but in the time between t and a later time t+, she wins the lottery. This presumably
makes the status quo at t+ better for agent i. However, the information that i’s situation has
improved since time t is lost when we rescale her desirability function at time t+.
It would certainly be an undesirable consequence of my view if one could not compare the
desirability of the status quo at different times. The right response to this problem, I would
suggest, is that we need to find a way of modelling agents, withing Jeffrey’s framework, as
‘unlearning’ what they have already come to fully believe, so as to compare a new status quo
with an old one. That is, in the example discussed in last paragraph, we need to be able to
ask agent i at time t+ how undesirable it would be to discover that she did not, after all, win
the lottery (assuming that nothing else changed between t and t+). The problem is that once
the agent in question is certain that she has won the lottery, and has thus conditioned on
the corresponding proposition, there is no way back in the standard Bayesian framework.
That is, once we have conditioned on proposition A – using standard Bayesian conditioning,
as opposed to Jeffrey conditioning which is only appropriate when the agent is not certain
that A – we cannot condition on its negation. There are standard ways to ‘subtract’ such
a proposition A when working with non-probabilistic belief revision. But for the present
purposes, we would need to be able to do the same for the type of probabilistic belief revision
that could work in Jeffrey’s decision theoretic framework. As far as I know, this has not been
worked out yet.
14Although A may strictly speaking count as ‘news’ for someone who hypothetically supposes A, learning that A
is true should not (given that the supposition is evidential) make any difference to the set of attitudes to which A
has been hypothetically added. Hence, relative to that set, A does not count as news.
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1.4.2 Jeffrey’s framework
Although Lewis used Jeffrey’s decision theory to argue against DAB, he might not, as already
mentioned, have wanted to take on board Jeffrey’s interpretation of what the theory measures.
However, even without that interpretation, Jeffrey’s theory is incompatible with Invariance.
According to this theory, the desirability of any proposition, A, is a weighted average of
the different mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive ways in which the proposition can be
true, where the weight on each way Ai that proposition A can be true is given by P(Ai | A).
More formally:15
Jeffrey’s Equation. Des(A) =
∑
Ai∈A
P(Ai | A).Des(Ai)
where both Des and P are defined over an atomless Boolean algebra of propositions from
which the impossible proposition has been removed.16
Jeffrey assumes that there is just one tautological proposition, >, which for any proposi-
tion B can be expressed as B∨¬B ([Jeffrey, 1983]: 76), and, recall, gets assigned a desirability
value of 0. From Jeffrey’s equation, it then follows that:
Des(>) = Des(B ∨ ¬B) = Des(B).P(B) + Des(¬B).P(¬B) = 0 (1.8)
Before considering what happens in the limit case when the agent is certain that B, let’s
consider what happens as the agent considers B more and more probable. As P(B) ap-
proaches 1, P(¬B) approaches 0, and therefore Des(¬B).P(¬B) approaches 0; hence, since
Des(B).P(B) + Des(¬B).P(¬B) = 0, Des(B) must approach 0. So the desirability of a proposi-
tion is generally not invariant under changes in its probability.
Now suppose that the agent in question learns (and comes to fully believe) B. Then:
DesB(>) = DesB(B).PB(B) + DesB(¬B).PB(¬B) = DesB(B) (1.9)
When working with Jeffrey’s framework, the desirability of the tautological proposition is
assumed to stay at zero, irrespectively of what the agent may learn.17 (For the following
15Alternatively, since Jeffrey takes a proposition to be a set of possible worlds (as I will also do in this thesis), we
can state Jeffrey’s equation as:
Des(A) =
∑
wi∈A
P(wi | A).Des(wi) (1.7)
I will use this version of the equation in chapter 4. As should be evident, they are formally equivalent, given the
aforementioned understanding of what a proposition is.
16Having the desirability and probability measure on the same set has to some philosophers seemed to be a
disadvantage of Jeffrey’s theory, since it suggests that rational agents can assign meaningful subjective probabilities
to their own actions (see for instance [Spohn, 1977] and [Levi, 2000]). It is certainly true that an agent should not
use such probabilities to decide how to act. Moreover, the technique that is standardly used to determine subjective
probabilities, namely to offer agents bets on the truth of propositions, is in general not appropriate when determining
the subjective probabilities an agent assigns to her own actions (or, more generally, to any propositions whose truth
and falsity is under her direct control). But unless we define subjective probabilities either by the role they play
in the production of actions, or in terms of the bets an agent is willing to take, neither of these arguments show
that agents cannot have subjective probabilities over their own actions. I think we should not define subjective
probabilities this way, since that would mean that, by definition, someone who is either unable or unwilling to act
or take bets can, by definition, not assign meaningful probabilities to propositions. (See [Rabinowicz, 2002] and
[Joyce, 2002] for more detailed discussions of this issue.)
17This convention might for the following reason seem strange. We could see the desirability of a tautology as
a weighted average of the propositions that we find epistemically possible, where the weights are determined by
the probability of each of these propositions. But then the desirability of a tautology should change, when the
probability of other propositions change. Nevertheless, Jeffrey himself suggests the convention of assigning the
zero-point in the desirability measure to any tautology (see e.g. [Jeffrey, 1983]: 82), independently of what the agent
in question believes, which others have followed (e.g. [Joyce, 1999] and [Bradley, ms]). One way to motivate this
convention, is that since rational agents are modelled as knowing all tautologies, a tautology can never be news to
them, nor will they be willing to risk anything to make a tautology true.
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argument against Invariance to work, we however only need to make the following weaker
assumption: there is some B that is not ranked with the tautology, such that learning that B is
true does not change the desirability of the tautology.) So DesB(>) = Des(>) = 0. Therefore,
whenever an agent has learnt (and comes to fully believe) a proposition B, she desires
the proposition to the same degree that she desired the tautological proposition before
learning B. But that means that except for propositions that are ranked with the tautology,
Invariance fails. Suppose that before agent i learnt the truth of proposition B she considered
B more desirable than>. But as she learns (and comes to fully believe) B, the desirability of B
becomes equal to that of>, and hence less than what it was before she learnt B. The opposite
will hold if agent i considered B less desirable than> before learning B. It should be evident
that this argument does not depend on any particular interpretation of desirability. Hence,
Jeffrey’s framework (with the aforementioned convention) is incompatible with Invariance.
1.4.3 Efficacy value
Causal decision theorists have criticised the news value account for suggesting suboptimal
choices in situations where an act is probabilistically, but not causally, related to some
outcome, such as in the infamous Newcomb paradox ([Nozick, 1969]). Although some
such theorists accept that news value is an appropriate interpretation of desirability, they
suggest that the value rational agents’ preferences and choices maximise (which some call
‘choice-worthiness’) should not be thought of as desirability (as news value). Rather, when
deciding what to do, rational agents maximise the causal efficacy that they expect feasible
acts to have in bringing about desirable states of affairs (see e.g. [Gibbard and Harper, 1981],
[Lewis, 1981] and [Joyce, 1999]). Quoting Joyce again: “The quantity U(A), [which according
to Joyce’s causal decision theory rational preferences maximise], gauges the extent to which
performing [some act] A can be expected to bring about desirable or undesirable outcomes”
([Joyce, 1999]: 161).
Suppose for now that V does not measure desirability (as news value), but rather causal
efficacy value. It should then be clear that whatever formal framework is used, V does not
satisfy Invariance. Contrary to what has been done so far, let A in the statement of INV now
refer to an act rather than a proposition. That is, INV, i.e. V(A) = VA(A), says that the causal
efficacy value of an act is independent of whether it has already been performed or not.
But that will certainly not always be true.18 Suppose we could perform the same act twice,
as has to be the case to evaluate VA(A) on this interpretation. Then Invariance says that,
for instance, the causal efficacy that having dinner has in producing in me a pleasurable
physiological state is independent of whether I have already had dinner.
Let us then stick closer to the framework used by Lewis in his argument against DAB, i.e.
let V be defined over a set of propositions but now think of V(A) as measuring the extent to
which the truth of A will cause or bring about desirable states of affairs. In this case we get a
result similar to the one obtained for the news value interpretation. The world can never be
made different by making a tautology come true. Similarly, given that A is true, the world
cannot be made any different by making A true. So on a causal efficacy interpretation of V,
we should have V(>) = VA(A), and if V(A) > V(>) then V(A) > VA(A), but if V(A) < V(>)
then V(A) < VA(A).
18In keeping with the general interpretation of conditional value functions that I endorse in this thesis (see
footnote 3 of this chapter), I am interpreting VA as representing the causal efficacy that the agent in question
expects various acts to have after she comes to fully believe that A has already been performed. I thank Wlodek
Rabinowicz for encouraging me to make that clear.
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To examine the compatibility of Invariance with causal decision theory, we might how-
ever want to formulate the assumption in terms of a contrary-to-factual supposition rather
than an evidential, or matter-of-factual, supposition. Many causal decision theorists suggest
that when evaluating an alternative (typically an act), we should ask ourselves what would
happen if the alternative were realised (or if we were to perform the act), rather than what
happens if it is realised (or if we do perform the act) (see for instance [Joyce, 1999]). It is
well known that these different types of suppositions often lead to different re-distributions
in credence (as I will further discuss in next chapter). But when it comes to evaluating
Invariance, it makes no difference whether we take the supposition to be matter-of-factual
or contrary-to-factual. When I suppose that contrary to fact, A is true, I imagine myself to be
in a counterfactual situation where I believe A to be true.19 But relative to that situation, A
is neither more nor less desirable or valuable (under any of the interpretations considered)
than the tautology. Hence, the contrary-to-factual version of Invariance fails.
1.4.4 Willingness to give up
It is commonplace, in particular in the social sciences, to identify how strongly an agent de-
sires a proposition with how much she would be willing to give up to make that proposition
come true. (In what follows, I will interpret ‘giving up’ very broadly. When working we
‘give up’ leisure, when we take a risk we ‘give up’ safety, etc.) The general idea is that some
sort of choice behaviour should be a guide to how much an agent desires a particular propo-
sition. And many social scientists, in particular economists, think that the type of choice
behaviour that best reveals how much a person desires a proposition A (or a particular good
g, as they are more likely to put it) is how much she willingly gives up to make A come true
(or to attain g).
The proponents of both the news value and the efficacy value interpretation generally
want their interpretation of value to give the same answer as the willingness to give up
criteria. In all normal cases,20 A has more news value than B for a person i if and only if i is
willing to give up more to make A true than than to make B true. The same is true for for
efficacy value. Moreover, this idea should be acceptable to both subjectivists and objectivists
about value. Subjectivists claim that rational agents try to make true those propositions they
expect to maximise some person-relative value.21 Objectivists, however, claim that rational
agents try to make true those propositions they expect to maximise objective value. As long
as both subjectivists and objectivists are willing to call that which rational agents maximise
‘desirability’, they should agree that desirability has a causal role in the production of action.
The greater the desirability of a proposition, the greater causal force it has on action. And
this causal force can be measured by what an agent is willing to go through, risk, or give up
in order to make true the proposition in question.
Given this interpretation of desirability – and in fact, any interpretation that satisfies the
idea that desirability is revealed through rational choice – it seems clear that Invariance
19If you think that contrary-to-factually supposing A involves imagining yourself to be in a situation where A is
true, rather than a situation where you believe A to be true, then Invariance still fails, provided that you think that
the probability of you knowing A increases when A becomes true.
20There might be special cases where you find A more desirable than B but you think that unlike B, the value
of A would be diminished if you make an effort to make it true. Hence, you might be willing to give up more to
make B true than A, even though you find the latter more desirable. I will set such cases aside.
More importantly, when good or bad outcomes depend probabilistically, but not causally, on the alternatives an
agent is faced with, value as measured by willingness to give up might differ from news value, as is well known.
21Some take this one step further, and take value, according to an agent, to be determined by her choice. I will not
discuss such strict behaviourism in this thesis.
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must be false. How much an agent is willing to give up in order to make a proposition A
come true is certainly not independent of whether she takes A to be true already. Suppose
an agent considers A, whose truth she is uncertain about, to be desirable. In other words,
she would be willing to give up at least something of value in order to make A true; let’s call
this something G. What about after having learnt (or under the evidential supposition) that
A is true already? Surely, whatever she would be willing to give up to make A true after
having learnt that A is true already (if anything at all), should be less valuable to her than G.
It might be hard to even understand the question of what a rational agent would be
willing to give up to make true a proposition that she believes to be true already. I would
argue that the difficulty in making sense of the question stems from the fact that the answer
is so obviously ‘nothing’. But we can instead consider the following question: how much
would a rational agent be willing to give up to make a desirable proposition A true when
she is quite uncertain as to the truth of A, compared with how much she would be willing
to give up to make A true when she is almost certain that A is true already? Given Jeffrey’s
framework, the desirability of A is less in the second case (as we have already seen). And
that seems intuitively correct to me. Suppose you desire strongly that person i becomes the
next president and are considering how much money to donate to i’s campaign. You believe
that i might win, and that paying some sum of money would make a positive difference (and
the more money, the greater the difference). You conclude that given how much you want i
to win, it would be rational for you to donate $x to i’s campaign. But before you donate the
money, you see polls that you take to indicate that i will almost certainly win. That should
make you willing to donate less than $x. This seems to hold in general. So the desirability
of a proposition, understood as willingness to give up to make the proposition true, is not
invariant under changes in its probability.
The argument in this section can be made more formal and precise by connecting it to
standard decision theoretic representation theorems. Moreover, the more precise argument
answers the following potential worry.22 A critic might say that these arguments simply
show that what is already believed true, or a good that is already had, should not distinguish
between alternatives. That is, whenever we evaluate some alternatives, a proposition that is
already believed true, or a good that is already had, should be taken into account when
evaluating each of these alternatives. But that, in itself, does not show that the value of a
proposition diminishes when it becomes true, nor that the value of a good diminishes when
it is already had.
In making the argument in this section more precise, I will draw on the representation
theorem of John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern (vNM’s) (from [von Neumann and
Morgenstern, 1944]), except that in keeping with Lewis’ discussion, desirability (which
vNM call ‘utility’) will be a measure on propositions. Let ‘≺’ stand for (strict) preference
and ‘∼’ for indifference (both defined on a set of propositions). And let [pA, (1 − p)C]
represent a lottery (or uncertain prospect) that results in either A (with probability p) or
C (with probability 1 − p). The axioms of vNM’s representation theorem imply that if
C ≺ B ≺ A, then there exists a unique p′ ∈ [0, 1] such that B ∼ [p′A, (1 − p′)C]. A crucial
step in the proof of the vNM theorem is to set the the desirability of B – which I will now
refer to as U(B) and which may neither be zero-one normalised nor normalised around
0 in the way Jeffrey suggests – equal to the desirability of the lottery L with A and C as
prizes such that the agent in question is indifferent between L and B. In other words,
22I thank Robbie Williams for raising this issue.
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U(B)=˙U([p′A, (1 − p′)C]) for the p′ such that B ∼ [p′A, (1 − p′)C]. And since ≺ satisfies the
vNM axioms, U([p′A, (1 − p′)C]) = p′U(A) + (1 − p′)U(C).
Suppose for some agent i, C ≺ B ≺ A and that we have found the value p′ ∈ [0, 1] such
that for this agent, B ∼ [p′A, (1 − p′)C]. Consider now what happens if we ask the agent
in question to suppose that A is already true, and again try to find the value of p such that
i is indifferent between B and [pA, (1 − p)C]; that is, indifferent between a B and a lottery
that has probability p of leading to what is the status quo when the choice is made. (Here
the assumption, shared with Lewis, that the objects of desires and beliefs are propositions
becomes important.) What should we expect to happen now? Since the agent prefers B to C,
we should not find any value such that the agent is indifferent between B and the lottery. For
given that A is true already, the possible outcomes of the lottery is either C, which the agent
finds worse than B, or A, which is supposed true already. Thus the lottery either leads to
the status quo or something that is worse than B.23 Hence, if we let ≺A represent preference
under the supposition that A, we now have that for this particular agent, [pA, (1 − p)C] ≺A B
for any p ∈ [0, 1]. But for rational agents – e.g. those satisfying the vNM axioms – this can
only hold if A ≺A B and C ≺A B.
Let us assume that just as there is a U function representing and agent’s unconditional
preferences, so there is a UA function representing the agent’s preferences under the sup-
position that A. (What is needed for this to hold is explored in [Bradley, 1999].) Then
although U(B) < U(A), UA(A) < UA(B). Moreover, for any β, γ such that γ ≺ β ≺ A and thus
U(γ) < U(β) < U(A), we can similarly show that UA(A) < UA(γ) and UA(A) < UA(β). Given
the framework of von Neumann and Morgenstern, it is not generally possible to directly
compare conditional utility with non-conditional utility, which means that the Invariance
assumption is, technically speaking, meaningless. Nevertheless, the above argument shows
that, given the above assumptions, A is considerably lower in the ≺A-ordering than the
≺-ordering. And since U represents ≺ and UA represents ≺A, this gives an initial reason for
being sceptical about the assumption that U(A) = UA(A).
In certain special cases it might be justifiable to assume that we can compare the condi-
tional utility of a prospect with its non-conditional utility; for instance, if we assume that
we know, through introspection, that the desirability of B, for us, is independent of A. Let
us for now assume this independence between A and B and also between A and C; i.e.
U(B) = UA(B) and U(C) = UA(C). It is standard when constructing a vNM representation,
that two prospects are chosen, satisfying C ≺ A, then it is stipulated that U(C) = 0, U(A)
given some value greater than 0, and the utilities of other prospects constructed based on
these. Let us continue to assume that for the agent we are modelling, C ≺ B ≺ A, and that
we have found the p′ ∈ [0, 1] such that B ∼ [p′A, (1− p′)C], and let us stipulate that U(C) = 0.
In many circumstances, these are perfectly reasonable assumptions. There is some value p′
between 0 and 1 such that I myself would be indifferent between $10 (proposition B) and
a lottery that gives me (with probability p′) a trip to New York (proposition A) if I win but
(with probability 1 − p′) a copy of Time magazine (proposition C) if I lose. But for me the
value of $10 is independent of whether I am going to New York or not; and the same holds
for a copy of Time and the New York trip. After having learnt that I am going to New York, I
would, however, no longer be willing to pay $10 for the lottery [p′A, (1 − p′)C]. Given these
assumptions, we have: U(B) = p′U(A), i.e. U(A) = U(B)/p′; but U(B) = UA(B) > p′UA(A),
i.e. UA(A) < U(B)/p′. Hence, UA(A) < U(A). (And the same of course holds for any zero-one
23In the latter case, A would also be true (unless A is inconsistent with C).
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normalised, order preserving transformation of U.)
The above argument shows that we can have a perfectly reasonable preference for which
Invariance fails. In this special case we can, given the above assumptions, compare U(A)
directly to UA(A), and when we do so we find that these values are not equal. Hence, the
worry that my argument only shows that a proposition believed true should not discriminate
between alternatives is unwarranted.
To sum up, we have seen that Invariance does not hold given three common interpre-
tations of desirability or choice-worthiness: it fails to hold on the willingness to give-up
interpretation commonly used by social scientists, and on the news value interpretation
used by the followers of Richard Jeffrey, and on the efficacy value interpretation of choice-
worthiness favoured by causal decision theorists. Since decision theory is meant to provide
a formal framework for predicting and explaining rational choice, it seems that no plausible
interpretation of the values of decision theoretic value functions can avoid clashing with
Invariance, since a rational agent’s choice behaviour with respect to A is certainly often
affected by the agent learning the truth of A. We might for some other purposes interpret
desirability as a measure of some overall comparative goodness that is not stand-point rela-
tive in any way. But I hope to have shown that if the goodness of a proposition, in this sense,
does not change, according to an agent, when the agent comes to believe that proposition to
be true, then goodness in this sense cannot be the value that rational agents try to maximise.
In other words, this cannot be the value that we refer to when we explain rational choices
on the assumption that rational agents maximise expected utility, desirability, or good.
1.4.5 Maximally specific propositions
The proponent of Invariance might make the following objection to the above argument.24
We want desirability to be defined over propositions that are maximally specific in all respects
that are relevant to their value.25 If A is such a proposition then for any proposition B,
VB(A) = V(A), the defender of INV might argue: since A already includes everything that
is important for its evaluation, conditionalising on B could not possibly make a difference
to the evaluation of A. (Lewis himself makes an argument of this kind ([Lewis, 1988]: 332),
albeit to justify the version of Invariance that he uses in his first paper on the Desire-as-Belief
thesis.)
It might be true that for any maximally specific proposition A, and any proposition B
such that B , A, VB(A) = V(A). But the same does not hold when B = A. Suppose A is a
maximally specific proposition that I find more desirable than what I take to be my current
situation. Presently, I am therefore willing to give up something of value to make A true,
I judge that the truth of A would have desirable causal consequences and learning that A
is actually true would be good. But what happens after I have learnt that this maximally
specific proposition holds true? (Assuming for the moment that we can learn such specific
propositions.) Then A neither counts as news for me nor will I take it to have any more
casual efficacy than the tautology. Similarly, I would then not be willing to give up anything
of value to make A true. Finally, it should be evident that the argument that Invariance is
24I thank Robbie Williams for raising this issue.
25Such propositions need not be atomic. (Indeed, to make this response compatible with Jeffrey’s framework,
we must assume that the maximally specific propositions in question are not atomic.) A proposition A that is
maximally specific in all respects that is relevant to its value might be further divided into two propositions that
differ in the outcome of a hypothetical and completely random coin toss C, provided that the outcome of C is
irrelevant to A’s value. Hence, A may be maximally specific, in the required sense, but not atomic.
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incompatible with Jeffrey’s framework also holds for maximally specific propositions.26
1.5 Is DAB then True?
If Invariance is false, as I have been arguing, then Lewis’ arguments against DAB are not
sound. But that does of course not mean that DAB is true. In this section I will assume
that Invariance is false (and that desirability is stand-point rather than end-point relative),
and show that Humeans still have good reasons for rejecting DAB. I first produce a direct
counterexample to the simple DAB thesis, before giving a formal argument against a more
general and plausible version of DAB.27
1.5.1 A Counterexample to Desire-as-Belief
Suppose we are sailing with our two good friends, Ann and Bob, when suddenly both of
them fall overboard and find themselves in an equally difficult situation and threatened
with drowning. In other words, if nothing is done, both will drown. In that situation, I
think, we would fully believe the proposition that it would be good that Ann is saved. (Call
this proposition A˚.) Or if we can only fully believe tautologies (or perhaps only tautologies
and factual statements about the past), then we at least believe A˚ as, or almost as, strongly as
we believe any contingent proposition (or any contingent proposition that is not about the
past). Nothing in the example hangs on treating Ann and Bob equally, but to simplify the
discussion, let us suppose that our feelings for the two are identical in all relevant respects.
Thus we also believe the proposition that it would be good to save Bob (call this proposition
B˚) as (or almost as) strongly as we believe any contingent proposition. So for us, in that
situation, P(A˚) = P(B˚) is close to 1. To make the discussion that follows more precise, let us
assume that P(A˚) = P(B˚) = 1 − γ (where γ is close or equal to 0).
In the situation we are imagining, we would also desire very strongly that Ann is saved
(proposition A), and would desire equally strongly that Bob is saved (proposition B).28 But
we find it much more desirable – in fact about twice as desirable – that both Ann and Bob
is saved than that one of them is saved. So V(A ∧ B) is roughly twice V(A). But then the
Desire-as-Belief thesis dictates that the probability that it is good that both Ann and Bob are
saved, P(A∧˚B), should be close to twice P(A˚). But since P(A˚) is close to 1, P(A∧˚B) can never
be close to twice P(A˚). Thus assuming that the requirements of rationality never prohibit
what is rationally permissible, and if we take the attitudes towards Ann and Bob expressed
in the above example to be rationally permissible, it seems that DAB cannot be a requirement
of rationality.
To save DAB a proponent of it could argue that, contrary to appearances, the attitudes
towards Ann and Bob assumed in the counterexample are in fact irrational. There are three
ways she could do this. Firstly, she can deny that P(A˚) is rationally permitted to be close to
1. Secondly, she can argue that V(A) = V(B) should be no greater than (1 − γ)/2. Thirdly,
she can argue that V(A ∧ B) should not be much greater than V(A) = V(B). Alternatively,
she could argue that some of the assumptions of the counterexample are meaningless.
26Rather than assuming that A includes everything that is important for its value, we might assume that the
agent whose desires V represents knows everything that is important for determining A’s value. In that case we
might think of V as measuring ‘informed value’. (I should thank an anonymous referee for raising this issue.) But
although it might be true for an informed value function V that for any proposition B such that B , A, VB(A) = V(A),
the same does not hold when B = A, for all the same reasons that have been given above.
27What follows is based on a joint working paper with Richard Bradley.
28Assuming that the probability of them being saved is roughly equal. The significance of this assumption will
become clear at the end.
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Let’s take each response in turn. Since we are assuming that saving both Ann and Bob is
close to twice as desirable as saving one of them, the first response only works if we require
that P(A˚) is no greater than 0.5. So for this response to work, we must be no more certain
about the proposition that it is good to save Ann (or Bob) than the proposition that a fair coin
lands heads up when tossed. It is highly implausible that this is a requirement of rational
belief.
In fact, we can make things much worse. Suppose now we are sailing with not just
two but a number of our dear friends when suddenly all of them fall overboard. For the
first response to the above counterexample to work, the credence we assign the proposition
that it is good to save any one of our friends must get smaller and smaller as we increase
the number of people that we imagine to have fallen overboard. But no matter how many
friends we have, and how many of them we take out sailing, we would always be almost
certain that it would be good to save each of them after having fallen overboard. To take
an example, suppose we are sailing with six friends who all fall overboard. Then to save
the DAB we cannot be more certain about the proposition that it would be good to save
any particular friend than in the proposition that a dice shows side six when rolled! A
conception of rationality that requires this seems very implausible.
The second route to saving the DAB thesis involves requiring that V(A) ≤ (1 − γ)/2.
But however we interpret desirability, it is hard to believe that rationality requires that
saving Ann or Bob be confined to the bottom half of the desirability scale. In any case,
this requirement coupled with the Desire-as-Belief thesis implies that P(A˚) ≤ (1 − γ)/2. In
other words, this response requires us to to be no more certain about the proposition that it
would be good to save Ann than in the proposition that a fair coin comes up heads if tossed.
So this second response to our counterexample in the end comes down to the same as the
first response and is no more plausible. And again, we can make this response even less
plausible by increasing the number of people we are imagining to be in the water.
The third possible response would be to deny that it is permissible to judge it much
more desirable to save both Ann and Bob than just one of them. Ordinary intuition (and
many welfarist theories) suggests that saving both Ann and Bob would be roughly twice
as desirable as saving one of them. Saving both might be more than twice as desirable as
saving just one of them; for instance if we feel guilt for choosing to save one of them over
the other other, or if choosing to save one over the other creates some sort of injustice or
unfairness. Or it might be slightly less if Bob and Ann hate each other and would be happier
if the other were dead. But if we set these complementarities aside then we are left with the
core judgement upon which the example is based: that the desirability of saving Ann (or
Bob) is independent of whether the other is saved or not. But if this is so, then it would seem
to follow immediately from the assumption that saving Bob is equally desirable to saving
Ann, that saving both is twice as desirable as saving one.
Could there be complementarities that we are rationally required to give weight to
and which make assumed judgement irrational? It is hard to imagine what they could
be. But even if there are such complementarities they are unlikely to make enough of a
difference. The problem is that to rescue DAB from our counterexample, it would need to
be demonstrated that the difference between the desirability of saving Ann and of saving
both must of rational necessity be very small. Suppose, for instance, that we are 90% sure
that it would be good to save Ann and 95% sure that it would be good to save both Ann and
Bob, so that by DAB, V(A) = 0.9 and V(A∧B) = 0.95. Then it is just slightly above 5% more
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desirable to save both Ann and Bob than to save one of them. That is implausible: having
saved one of our friends, we would still make a great deal of effort and be willing to risk or
pay quite a lot to save the other. It is hard to see why that would be irrational. We could,
of course, argue about the plausibility of the exact numbers, but so long as the difference in
the probability of A˚ and A∧˚B is not great, the difference in desirability between saving both
friends and just one of them must be very small for this last response to work; much smaller
than what most people would intuitively accept.
Let us consider then the final possible response to the counterexample, which works
by questioning the meaningfulness of the assumption that the desirability of saving Ann
and Bob is twice that of saving Ann. In the decision-theoretic framework in which DAB
is stated, desirability functions are just numerical representations of preferences and only
those properties of desirabilities that are analogues of properties of preferences should be
considered meaningful. But the notion of ‘twice as desirable as’ fails this test, as is evidenced
by the fact that a linear transformation of a desirability function (in particular one based on
a different choice of zero point) will yield another desirability function that serves equally
well to represent the underlying preference relation, but does not preserve properties such
as one prospect being twice as desirable as another. So the counterexample trades on an
unsustainable interpretation of desirabilities.
This objection is half-correct. It is true that a linear transformation of a desirability
function does not preserve the property that we are interested in. But such transformations
are ruled out by DAB which itself forces a particular choice of the zero and unit scaling points
on the desirability function (namely the certainly bad and the certainly good propositions).
One may well object that such a choice of scale is arbitrary, but this would be reason to
object to DAB directly. Here I assume for the purposes of the argument that the scaling of
desirabilities enforced by the DAB thesis is acceptable and examine its implications.
What then does ‘twice as desirable as’ mean within the scope of desirabilities as regulated
by the DAB thesis? Roughly this: the agent who regards prospect X as twice as desirable
as prospect Y is one who is indifferent between Y being true for certain and a lottery which
makes X true with probability one-half and a certainly bad prospect true otherwise. Suppose
for instance that it is certainly bad that both Ann and Bob are not saved. Then it is twice as
desirable that both Ann and Bob are saved as that Ann is saved, just in case the prospect of
Ann being saved is just as desirable as the prospect of either both being saved or neither,
with an equal probability of each.29
To sum up: it seems that the attitudes towards our friends Ann and Bob expressed in the
above counterexample are rationally permissible, and any attempt to save DAB in light of
this example forces us to have attitudes that seem counterintuitive and which are certainly
not rationally required. Hence, the example shows that this simple version of DAB must be
false.
1.5.2 A Generalisation of Desire-as-Belief
The literature that followed in the wake of Lewis’ first paper against Desire-as-Belief focused
almost entirely on the version of DAB presented above, or minor variants of it. But it could
be argued that the DAB thesis is rather implausible as an anti-Humean thesis and that it
29It might be objected that this definition assumes that the agent is risk neutral. But the objection is misplaced.
Lewis formulated DAB within the decision theory developed by Jeffrey. And in that framework, risk attitudes
are built into the desirabilities of propositions in the sense that the method for constructing a cardinal measure of
desirability assumes risk neutrality with respect to desirability (though not with respect to specific goods).
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is not really surprising that there are counterexamples to it. In [Lewis, 1996], Lewis in fact
considered a more general (and arguably more plausible) version of the thesis which allows
for different degrees of goodness, and claimed to show that it was equally susceptible to
his negative results. It could be argued that the counterexample I discussed in last section
shows the implausibility of assuming that desirability or goodness doesn’t come in degrees,
since the example does not undermine the more general version of DAB. Hence, I will in this
section produce an argument against the generalised version of DAB (without assuming
Invariance, as Lewis does).
To state the more general version, let A˚i be the proposition that A is good to degree gi and
assume for simplicity that the number of goodness degrees is finite. Then the generalised
DAB thesis is that:
DAB Generalised. V(A) =
∑
i
gi.P(A˚i).
Again, we can provide an argument against the generalised principle that does not assume
Invariance (unlike Lewis’ argument). The important thing to note about the generalised
thesis is that it implies that the A˚i are probabilistically independent of A (as I show below).
It follows from Jeffrey’s desirability measure and the fact that the A˚i partition the space of
possibilities, that:
V(A) =
∑
i
V(A ∧ A˚i).P(A˚i|A)
According to what we might call the Moral Principal Principle (after the principle [Lewis, 1980]
formulates), V(A ∧ A˚i) = gi. So it follows from DAB Generalised and Jeffrey’s desirability
measure that: ∑
i
gi.P(A˚i) = V(A) =
∑
i
gi.P(A˚i|A)
But this can only be the case non-accidentally, and hold for any proposition A, if P(A˚i) =
P(A˚i|A). This independence implies once again that probabilities of goodness behave dif-
ferently from desirabilities. For in contrast to the fact that A and the A˚i are probabilistically
independent, A is not, as I have already argued, desirabilistically independent of its own
truth (unless it is ranked with the tautology). In particular, the assumption that A is de-
sirabilistically independent of its own truth (i.e. the Invariance assumption) is inconsistent
with Jeffrey’s desirability measure.
With this in mind, let us return to the example from last section to see how the generalised
version of DAB fares. At first sight it seems to do much better than the original DAB thesis.
Without having to specify the candidate degree of goodness it seems quite plausible that
the probability that it would be good to some degree gi that Ann is saved would be just the
probability that it would be good to that same degree that Bob was saved. Furthermore, for
very high degrees of goodness it might well be that it is much more probable that it is good
to that degree that both are saved than that just one is. So the generalised DAB might seem
to conform to our intuitions about the counterexample to the original DAB.
But if we let the imagined situation evolve, new problems emerge. Suppose that after
a few minutes Ann manages to cling to the side of the boat such that it seems certain that
she will be saved. Bob on the other hand remains in difficulty. Now since DAB Generalised
implies that the A˚i are probabilistically independent of A, it remains the case, according to
this thesis, that we should desire that Ann be saved to the same (expected) degree that we
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desire that Bob be. But this is entirely wrong. Since it is nearly certain that Ann will be
saved, it is much more desirable that Bob be saved than that Ann be. This follows, as we
have seen, from Jeffrey’s desirability measure. But we can also intuitively see this by noting
that we would now devote much more resources to saving Bob than we would to saving
Ann.
To sum up, I think the above considerations show that both the original and the more
general DAB is false. However, I am not sure where that leaves the anti-Humean theory of
motivation. Perhaps one could formalise such a theory that does not lead to difficulties like
those discussed above.
1.6 Concluding Remarks
I hope to have shown that Bradley’s conditional desirability measure is a plausible rule for
rational desirability updating, and that its clash with Invariance is actually a good thing,
since we have independent reasons for rejecting the latter. Humeans about motivation need
not worry that giving up Invariance makes it impossible for them to argue against the anti-
Humean DAB thesis, since there are good reasons for believing that DAB is false that do not
depend on Invariance being true.
The remaining chapters of this thesis will be more focused on conditionals. In next
chapter I discuss the relationship between various principles and norms we might want
conditionals to satisfy. In chapter 3, I discuss the semantics of conditionals that I use in
chapter 4 to introduce counterfactual prospects to Jeffrey’s decision theory.
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Chapter 2
Probability and Logic of Counterfactuals
2.1 Introduction
The main aim of this thesis, as already stated, is to explore the ways in which the desirability
of actual states of affairs sometimes depends on the truth of counterfactual conditionals, and
to construct a decision theory that allows for (and can represent) this dependency. In this
chapter I discuss several epistemic and logical principles that we might want conditionals
to satisfy. This will clear the ground for the semantics that I use and the assumptions I make
in chapter 4 when introducing counterfactual propositions to Jeffrey’s decision theory. The
semantics I use, for instance, implies two logical principles known as Centring and Conditional
Excluded Middle, and an epistemic principle called the Ramsey test. These principles are not,
strictly speaking, necessary for the main aim of this thesis. Nevertheless, since the semantics
I use implies these principles, I will devote this chapter mostly to discussing and defending
them.
I will assume, in this chapter, that we intuitively accept certain logical principles and
credence norms for conditionals, independently of any formal semantics for conditionals. That
is, according to the methodology I will be following, we take as a starting point, before
constructing semantical systems for conditionals, certain logical truths about conditionals –
and similarly, norms about credence in conditionals; and make it a requirement on acceptable
semantical systems that they either have these principles and norms as axioms, or generate
them as theorems.1 We might of course find out, by constructing semantic systems, that
it is impossible to create theories that simultaneously satisfy all of the principles we want
to accept. But I will assume that the starting point is to examine these principles pre-
semantically.
It might be worth admitting at the outset that my discussion in this chapter is not
particularly novel. I mainly discuss rationality constraints and logical principles that have
been very much discussed already, and try to get clear about the relation between them and
discuss some objections to them. And, as already mentioned, the main aim of this chapter
is to clarify and justify assumptions I make in the rest of this thesis.
Ordinary language conditionals are generally thought to be either indicative or subjunctive.
The latter kind is also often called counterfactual and for the purposes of this thesis, I will take
subjunctive and counterfactual conditionals to be the same thing. Another methodological
issue that may be worth stressing at the outset is that I do not follow surface grammar when
it comes to classifying conditionals. Thus although I call the conditionals that I will be
1If the semantical system does not include probabilities, then we might make it a minimal requirement on the
system that it is consistent with the credence norms we accept for conditionals.
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discussing subjunctive, it is not the case that they are, in general, expressed in the subjunctive
mood. Nor are they reserved for cases where the antecedent is believed to be false, as the
name counterfactuals might suggest. Instead, I will, roughly speaking, classify conditionals
according to how they are being used (as will be explained below). Unfortunately, classifying
conditionals according to these properties in some cases seems very counterintuitive, as will
become apparent.
The following two conditionals, and the way in which they interact with evaluation and
choice, provide the main motivation for this project.
Conditional 1. If I had chosen the less risky alternative, I would have been guaranteed an ‘acceptable’
outcome.
Conditional 2. If the coin had come up head, Ann would have gotten the kidney.
These counterfactuals create well known problems for standard decision theory (as will be
discussed in chapter 4). The truth of conditional 1 may make a particular situation worse (in
particular a situation where the agent who expresses the conditional gets an unacceptable
outcome as a result of turning down the less risky alternative), whereas the truth of 2 makes
some situations better (namely a situation where Ann is dead as a result of not receiving a
kidney).
As a way of analysing how the above conditionals affect rational decision making and
evaluations, I will in chapter 5 compare them with some other conditionals. Some of these
will be part of straightforward means-end reasoning, such as the following conditional,
expressed by someone who wants to catch a flight:
Conditional 3. If I take the Gatwick Express, I will reach the airport before my gate closes.
Others use backward reasoning:
Conditional 4. If I see my girlfriend tonight, then she must have missed her flight.
Finally, there is a quite problematic class of conditionals that expresses some sort of causal
relationship, such as the following:
Conditional 5. If the Government prints more money, inflation will rise.
All of these conditionals – and, more generally, conditionals with this form – influence the
desirability of some factual proposition. And that is the reason I will discuss conditionals
like these, alongside 1 and 2, in chapter 5.2 The third conditional makes the proposition
that the person in question takes the Gatwick express more desirable, the fourth conditional
presumably reduces the desirability of the proposition that the person expressing the condi-
tional sees his or her girlfriend that night, and the fifth conditional reduces the desirability
of the proposition that the government prints more money.
Although some of the above conditionals are expressed in the indicative mood, many
logicians and philosophers would classify them with counterfactuals; and in fact, it seems
we could just as well express them (without a change in meaning) in the subjunctive mood.
Conditionals 3 and 5 are important for reasoning about how to act (for ‘me’ in 3 but for
‘the Government’ in 5), which according to some makes them counterfactuals. Moreover,
for all of these conditionals it is true that they are not probabilistically independent of their
2The contents of the conditionals that I discuss in chapter 5 differ slightly from the contents of these condi-
tionals. But the form (and desirabilistic import) of each conditional discussed there corresponds to the form (and
desirabilistic import) of at least one conditional discussed here.
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antecedent. Some take all conditionals for which such independence fails to be counterfac-
tuals. However, below we will see an example of an indicative conditional for which that
principle fails.
In any case, in chapter 4 when I extend Jeffrey’s desirability measure to conditionals,
I will treat these conditionals as counterfactuals. But as will become evident, this should
not cause problems for those who see these conditionals as indicatives. When applied to
indicatives, the measure I use for counterfactuals automatically simplifies to the measure
that is appropriate for indicatives (as I explain in chapter 5). Hence, from the perspective of
the main aim of this thesis, not much hangs on how we classify conditionals 3 to 5. However,
to be able to represent Allais’ and Diamond’s preferences as maximising desirability, we need
to treat conditionals 1 and 2 as counterfactuals.
2.2 Probability of Conditionals
2.2.1 The Ramsey test
If two people are arguing ‘If p will q?’ and are both in doubt as to p, they are
adding p hypothetically to their stock of knowledge and arguing on that basis
about q ([Ramsey, 1929]: 155).
The above suggestion of Ramsey’s has been very influential in all areas of logic and philos-
ophy that deal with conditionals and hypothetical reasoning. The suggestion is often called
the Ramsey test. In its most general form, the Ramsey test, as I understand it, says that when
determining whether to believe A→ B, one should first suppose the truth of A, adjust one’s
beliefs as little as is compatible with that supposition, and finally determine whether one
would believe B in the new (hypothetical) epistemic state.
The Ramsey test has considerable intuitive appeal, and has been accepted by many
(perhaps most) people who have worked on the subject. Some have moreover accepted
something stronger, namely that there is an identity between a rational agent’s credence
(or subjective probability) in A → B and her credence in B upon the supposition that A.
Formally:
Thesis 3 (Strong Ramsey test). P(A→ B) = PA(B)
To the strong version of the Ramsey test, some people add the so-called Lockean thesis [Foley,
1992], which says that for any proposition α (factual or modal) a rational agent accepts (or
‘categorically’ believes) α whenever her credence in α is above some (context dependent)
threshold. With this addition, the Ramsey test can be stated thus:
Thesis 4 (Lockean Ramsey test). One should accept A → B just in case (according to one’s
credence) PA(B) is sufficiently high.
Although it seems plausible to me that some version of the Lockean thesis is true of how
people actually reason, I will not assume the thesis in the remaining chapters. The thesis is
known to have some counterintuitive implications, in particular the infamous Lottery and
Preface paradoxes (see [Kyburg, 1961] and [Makinson, 1965]). Given a conditional version of
the Lockean thesis, paradoxes like these show that the Lockean thesis leads to violations of a
principle that is known as Agglomeration, which states that A→ B and A→ C together imply
A → (B ∧ C). Since the semantics that I will use in this PhD thesis, and will defend in next
chapter, implies that Agglomeration is a logical truth, I will assume that Agglomeration is
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also a norm of rational reasoning with conditionals. Therefore, I cannot accept the Lockean
thesis as part of rational reasoning with conditionals.
The Ramsey test does not say very much – or at least nothing very precise – unless we
spell out what it means to suppose a condition. There are different ways one can suppose
something to be true (see e.g. [Joyce, 1999]). In particular, there is a difference between
evidentially supposing that A is true, that is, supposing it as a matter of fact, and subjunctive
supposing A is true, that is, supposing it contrary to fact. The following example illustrates
the difference between these two types of suppositions. When supposing that, as a matter
of fact, Oswald did not kill Kennedy, most people (hypothetically) conclude that someone
else killed Kennedy. After all, they strongly believe that Kennedy was murdered. When
supposing that, contrary to fact, Oswald did not kill Kennedy, most people (hypothetically)
conclude that nobody killed Kennedy, since they do not believe that a group of people was
conspiring to murder the president.
One of the appeals of the Ramsey test is that since it is general enough to allow for
different types of suppositions, it may provide a basis for a unified account of indicative
and subjunctive conditionals. The right way to evaluate the probability of the indicative
conditional A 7→ B, according to a common view, is to evidentially suppose that A and then
figure out the (suppositional) probability of B. To evaluate the probability of the subjunctive
(or counterfactual) conditional A  B, on the other hand, we should subjunctively suppose
A and figure out the probability of B. There is not much agreement on how to formally char-
acterise subjunctive suppositions. However, I section 2.2.3 I will suggest one way of doing
so. It is on, in contrast, generally accepted that evidential suppositions are characterised by
Bayesian conditionalisation, which, as we will see in section 2.2.2, gives us a precise formula
for how to evaluate the probability of indicative conditionals.
Without going into the formal details about the difference between the two types of sup-
positions, let me say in general and informal terms what I take their difference to be. When
we subjunctively (or counterfactually) suppose a condition true, we hold fixed all general
truths we believe (except when their negation is what we are supposing). In particular, we
hold fixed what we believe the laws of the nature to be, what causal relations we accept, what
dispositions (both physical and social) we believe in, etc. When we evidentially suppose
a condition, however, this is not so. The (hypothetical) impact that evidentially supposing
that A is supposed to have on our belief state should (more or less) match up with how we
would change our beliefs upon learning that A is true. And learning A may very well lead
us to update our beliefs about the laws of nature, natural and social dispositions, and so on.
The difference between the two ways of supposing a condition can also be explained in
terms of when we vary our credence in a proposition. Roughly speaking, when we eviden-
tially suppose that A, we vary our beliefs in all and only propositions that are evidentially
related to A. When we subjunctively suppose that A, we vary our beliefs in a proposition
if and only if it is somehow made true by A.3 Evidentially supposing that A thus answers
questions like: what hypotheses do I take A to support? what is A evidence for? what
does the truth of the proposition indicate? Subjunctively supposing that A, on the other
hand, is relevant to questions like: what causal difference would the truth of A make? what
difference would the truth of A make to system S? how would person/society X react to the
truth of A?
3This is not true of the suppositions that are relevant for backtracking subjunctives, such as ‘if the grass had
been wet this morning, then it would probably have rained over night’. Backtracking subjunctives will play some
role in chapter 5, but I will largely ignore them in this chapter.
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The above suggestion does not provide a very clear-cut distinction. Yet, I believe the
above distinction is useful for the task at hand. Some examples may both help in illustrating
and justifying the distinction. Take first the famous Oswald-Kennedy example again. I
believe that nobody else was planning to murder Kennedy at the time, and that Oswald not
murdering Kennedy would not cause anybody else to murder him. When I subjunctively
suppose that Oswald did not kill Kennedy, I hold fixed my belief that nobody else was
planning to kill Kennedy at the time. Thus I believe that if Oswald hadn’t killed Kennedy,
nobody else would have done so. When I, on the other hand, evidentially suppose that
Oswald did not kill Kennedy, I vary my belief in the hypothesis that nobody else was
planning to kill Kennedy. For given that I have previously learnt that Kennedy was in fact
murdered, Oswald not killing him is pretty good evidence that someone else must have.
Thus I believe that if Oswald didn’t kill Kennedy, someone else did. (But I still believe that
Oswald not killing Kennedy didn’t cause someone else to kill him.)
Or consider the set up of the famous Newcomb’s paradox [Nozick, 1969]. When I
evidentially suppose that I choose both boxes, I conclude that the predictor has left the
opaque box empty, since me choosing both boxes provides good evidence for that hypothesis.
Subjunctively supposing that I take both boxes however does not affect my credence in
hypotheses about the content of the opaque box. For what I decide now stands in no causal
relationship to what is in the box; and my now choosing both boxes does not in any sense
make it true that the predictor left the opaque box empty prior to my decision.
Finally, consider the following example. The Aragawa restaurant in Tokyo is apparently
the most expensive restaurant in the world. Learning that someone frequently dines at
such an expensive restaurant provides very good evidence for the hypothesis that the
person in question is rich. Thus when I evidentially suppose, for instance, that my friend
frequently dines at Aragawa, I (hypothetically) conclude that he must be very rich. When I
subjunctively suppose that my friend frequently dines at this expensive restaurant, on the
other hand, I hold fixed my beliefs about how much he owns and earns. Frequently dining
at Aragawa does not cause people to become any richer, and in fact may causes my friend
to go bankrupt. Thus when subjunctively suppose that my friend frequently dines at this
fancy restaurant, I (hypothetically) conclude that he must be quite poor.
As we will later see, evidentially supposing a condition seems appropriate when eval-
uating an indicative conditional in accordance with the Ramsey test, whereas subjunctive
suppositions seem appropriate for counterfactuals. Hence, the Ramsey test suggests differ-
ent credence norms for these different types of conditionals. Before discussing these two
types of conditional credence norms, I will briefly consider some objections to the Ramey
test.
Objections to the Ramsey test
I will in this thesis more or less take the Ramsey test for granted and not provide much
positive evidence for it. But in this section I would like to briefly reply to some common
objections to the Ramsey test. The aim is not to conclusively defend the test against all
possible objections, which would take us too far off topic. And I realise that what follows
will probably not convinced those who are already skeptical of the RT. Nevertheless, I hope
my discussion suggests that the objections that have been raised against the RT are not as
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damaging as they may seem.4
(a) Confusing subjunctive suppositions with evidential Many objections to the Ramsey
test (as well as to Adams’ thesis, as we will see below) conflate evidential suppositions
with subjunctive, and depend on using the wrong kind of supposition when evaluating a
conditional. Here is one such example. Let us suppose we have strong credence in the
following conditional:5
Conditional 6. If the atoms in my desk simultaneously decay, the total amount of energy emitted
would be x.
We believe this conditional, let us suppose, because (and only because) physics tells us it
is true. However, it would be very surprising, given our understanding of physics, if the
antecedent of the conditional were to be realised. In fact, it would be so surprising that we
would no longer trust the physics we have been taught, and would thus no longer have
any reason to believe that the above conditional is true. Hence, we might be tempted to
conclude, the Ramsey test cannot be true. Supposing the antecedent of the conditional
should result in a similar change to our belief state as learning the antecedent. So whereas
we take the conditional to be very likely to be true, we assign low credence to its consequent
after supposing its antecedent.
The problem with the above objection to the Ramsey test is that it evaluates a counter-
factual conditional as if it were indicative. Grammatically, the conditional in question seems
indicative, as I formulated it above. But as already mentioned, we should not let surface
grammar lead us astray, given that we take the logic of conditionals to determine the class
to which they belong. And we could of course reformulate the conditional as: ‘If the atoms
in my desk were to simultaneously decay...’
The justification for calling the conditional in question counterfactual, is firstly that
although we may not be certain that its antecedent will not be realised, we are pretty sure
that it will not. But the fact that it will not does not in any way make it less informative.
Hence, the conditional is certainly not what Jonathan Bennett calls zero-intolerant: “Indicative
conditionals are mostly zero intolerant, meaning that such a conditional is useless to someone
who is really sure that its antecedent is false” ([Bennett, 2003]: 45). Just like counterfactuals
in general, the above conditional can, however, be very informative for those who are certain
that the antecedent is false, since it tells them something about the nature and behaviour of
atomic particles.
Secondly, the counterfactual in question expresses some sort of causal dependency, and
such conditionals are in general classified with counterfactual (or subjunctive) conditionals,
even when they are expressed in the indicative mood and their antecedent is considered
true.
Finally, the conditional in question is not probabilistically independent of its antecedent,
as we have just seen: the conditional probability of the conditional given its antecedent
is lower than the unconditional probability of the conditional. It is widely accepted that
indicative conditionals are usually independent of their antecedent. In fact, as we will see,
4The objections that follow can be found in various places in the philosophical literature on conditionals. The
reason I focus on these objections is that they are the main reasons Alan Ha´jek, a notable critic of the Ramsey test,
tells me he is sceptical of the test.
5Whether this is a realistic example or not does not matter for the present purposes. All that matters is the form
of the argument that conditionals on this kind are problematic for the Ramsey test.
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that must be true if Adams’ thesis is to hold. Unfortunately, we will see an example below
of an indicative where this does not seem to hold.
So conditional 6 is a counterfactual and we should thus evaluate its probability by sup-
posing that contrary-to-fact its antecedent is true. And then we get the result we want. Recall
that we are assuming that physics tells us that the total amount of energy emitted from all
of the atoms in my desk decaying would be x. And when we counterfactually suppose a
condition like the atoms in my desk decaying, we should not, as already mentioned, revise
our credence in what physics tells us. Hence, when we suppose that, contrary to fact, all of
the atoms in my desk simultaneously decay, we should have strong credence in the propo-
sition that the total energy they emit is x. Contrary to appearance, however, we should
not accept the conditional as an indicative, since we would not accept its consequent after
having learnt its antecedent.
(a’) McGee’s counterexample Vann McGee [McGee, 2000] discusses a very interesting case
that he takes to be a counterexample to the Ramsey test. Although it turns out not to be
a counterexample to the Ramsey test, it does put great pressure on Adam’s thesis which I
discuss below.
The background to McGee’s story is that a person called Murdoch has drowned and
there has been an investigation into whether whether his business partner Brown murdered
him. Having followed the case in the media, you find it most likely (although not certain)
that Murdoch’s death was an accident; and even more so if it turns out that Brown didn’t
murder Murdoch. In other words, you give low credence to the conditional:
Conditional 7. If Brown didn’t kill Murdoch, someone else did.
But now a person you believe to be Sherlock Holmes, the great detective who actually has
been leading the investigation, says that after looking at the evidence he is quite confident
that Brown did kill Murdoch. Moreover, he is even more confident that Murdoch was
murdered, for which he claims to have evidence that is independent of the evidence linking
Brown to the murder. Suppose also that you believe that there is some, but (initially) very
small, chance that the person you take to be Holmes is just someone pretending to be Holmes.
But you are quite confident that that is not the case. Hence, having heard the verdict from
the worlds greatest detective, you revise your credence in conditional 7, and now believe
that it is very likely to be true.
Now the alleged problem for the Ramsey test is that if you were to learn, after all this, that
Brown did not kill Kennedy, then you would no longer have high confidence in conditional 7.
After all, you only had high confidence in the conditional since you accepted the judgement
of the person you took to be Holmes. But this person claimed that Brown almost certainly
killed Murdoch. Holmes, you believe, would almost certainly not say this unless it were true
that Brown killed Murdoch. Hence, if Brown did not murder Murdoch, then you believe
that the person you took to be Holmes isn’t the great detective after all. Thus you change
back to your initial judgement – or close to it – and assign low credence to conditional 7.
This example has some similarities to the atom decay example from above: in both
cases, the conditional in question is not probabilistically independent of its antecedent. The
difference between the two cases is that it seems very unnatural to classify conditional 7
with counterfactuals. For on a counterfactual (or subjunctive) reading, you would judge
the conditional to be almost certainly false, even after learning the judgement of the person
you take to be Holmes. For even if you believe then that Murdoch was almost certainly
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murdered, most likely by Brown, the example gives us no reason for thinking that (you
would believe that) someone else would have murdered Murdoch if Brown had not.
All is not lost however for the Ramsey test. The credence in conditional 7 does seem to
correspond to your credence in the conditional’s consequent after supposing the antecedent
in a particular kind of way. Stefan Kaufmann has shown that credence in the conditional
seems to satisfy a formula which is formally equivalent to the so-called Skyrms’ thesis [Kauf-
mann, 2004].6 And as we will later see, Skyrms’ thesis can be seen as a special case of
the Ramsey test when the supposition in question is contrary-to-factual (or subjunctive). So
McGee’s story is not a counterexample to the Ramsey test. What it does suggest, however,
is that sometimes we evaluate indicative conditionals by supposing their antecedent in a
way that is normally appropriate for the evaluation of counterfactuals. And it is hard to
argue, as McGee’s example shows, that such evaluations involve some sort of irrationality.
Moreover, it suggests that Adams’ thesis, which I discuss below, does not hold (neither as
an empirical claim nor normative constraint) for all indicative conditionals.
As already stated, I take all conditionals to satisfy the Ramsey test. It would make life
simpler if we could classify conditionals as indicative or subjunctive depending on whether
the supposition used when evaluating them is matter-of-factual or counterfactual. Unfor-
tunately, McGee’s example shows that that is not feasible. The example also shows that we
cannot always classify conditionals as indicative or subjunctive according to whether their
evaluation goes by Adams’ or Skyrms’ thesis.7
(b) Thomason conditionals Many people have raised conditionals of the following kind as
arguments against the Ramsey test:8
Conditional 8. If my partner were to cheat on me I would not know about it.
We can imagine various reasons why a person might accept the above conditional as true.
However, when supposing that our partner is cheating on us, we must, it seems, assign full
credence to the proposition that we know that our partner is cheating on us. (Otherwise we
might end up assigning high credence to, and perhaps ‘categorically believing’, the sentence:
my partner is cheating on me but I don’t know it.) So, it may seem that the Ramsey test does
not deliver the right result for conditionals like 8.
What conditionals like the one under discussion teach us, I think, is that when evaluating
the probability of conditionals whose antecedent or consequent refer to our own beliefs, we
may have to take up a third persons’ perspective when applying the Ramsey test. When
evaluating the probability of 8, for instance, we should imagine that ‘my’ in the antecedent
refers to some person other than us – let’s call this person ME – who is nevertheless in the
exact same situation as we are, has the exact same beliefs about her partner, has a partner
that (in all relevant respects) is exactly like ours, etc. Then we suppose that ME’s partner
cheats on her, and evaluate from that perspective the probability that ME knows about it;
which we should assign low credence if we accept conditional 8.
6Kaufmann himself does however not seem to realise that the formula he comes up with as the correct way to
measure our credence in McGee’s conditional is formally equivalent to Skyrms’ thesis.
7Another possible response to McGee’s example is to simply deny that we should have high credence in
conditional 7. Richard Bradley (in personal communication) has almost convinced me that this is how we should
treat the conditional, and points out that since this conditional involves a nested supposition – first supposing that
the speaker in question is Sherlock Holmes and then supposing that Brown didn’t kill Murdoch – it should not
come as a surprise if our intuitions about the conditional is mistaken. Although I see the force of that argument, I
will set it aside for now, and take as given the intuition that the above story lends hight credence to 7.
8This type of example is, as far as I can tell, originally due to Richmond Thomason, but seems to have been first
discussed in print by Bas van Fraassen [van Fraassen, 1980].
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The above suggestion of how to apply the Ramsey test when either the antecedent or
consequent of a conditional refers to our own beliefs also solves a problem identified by
David Chalmers and Alan Ha´jek [Chalmers and Ha´jek, 2007]. They point out that according
to some ideas about how to apply the Ramsey test, we should believe any conditional of
the form ‘if A then I believe A’ and also any conditionals of the form ‘if I believe A then A’.
But believing the first means believing that one is omniscient, whereas believing the latter
means believing that one is infallible. A credence norm that implies that rational agents
have such high opinions of themselves seems very implausible.
Given how I suggest we apply the Ramsey test to cases like these, the test does not have
any such implications. In the first example, you should suppose that A is true and on that
basis evaluate the probability of the proposition that someone who is identical to yourself
in all relevant respects (except that he or she has not supposed A) believes A. Only if you
already believe that you are omniscient will you assign full credence to that proposition. In
the second example, you suppose that someone who is exactly like yourself in all relevant
respects believes that A and evaluate, from that perspective, the probability of A. Again,
only if you already believe yourself to be infallible will you now assign full credence to A.
(c) Nested conditionals Nested conditionals are often cited as reasons why the Ramsey test
must be false.Take the following examples:
Conditional 9. If my partner would become mad if missed the dinner, then I would take a taxi rather
than the bus.
Conditional 10. If John isn’t very patient then he will eat before them if they are late.
The first conditional seems to have the form (A → B) → C whereas the latter has the
form A → (B → C). Neither conditional seems mysterious (although expressing them is
somewhat awkward), and it seems we have no more difficulties in intuitively evaluating
their probabilities than most ‘simple’ conditionals (i.e. conditionals with factual antecedent
and consequents). However, people have taken conditionals like the above, in particular
the first one, to be problematic for specific version of the Ramsey test, such as Adams’ thesis
which I discuss below.9
However, if (both indicative and counterfactual) conditionals express propositions, as
they do given the semantics I discuss in next chapter, then nested conditionals pose no prob-
lems for the Ramsey test in its most general form. For then we can suppose a conditional just
like any other proposition, which means that we can perfectly well evaluate (A → B) → C
by supposing that A→ B and from that perspective evaluate C. To evaluate A→ (B→ C),
however, we should first suppose that A and from that perspective evaluate B→ C, which
we do by supposing A, from the standpoint induced by the supposition that B, and from
the final standpoint evaluate C.
(d) Impossibility results Finally, various formal results have been proved that many people
have taken to show that the Ramsey test, and the specific versions of I discuss below, must
9The second (right nested) poses no problem for Adams’ thesis, which says that (for indicative conditionals)
P(A 7→ B) = P(B | A). According to AT: P(A 7→ (B 7→ C)) = PA(C | B) = PA(C ∧ B)/PA(B) = P(A∧C∧B)/P(A)P(A∧B)/P(A) = P(C |
A ∧ B). In other words, the probability that if John isn’t very patient then he will eat before them if they are late is equal
to the conditional probability of John eating before them given that he is not very patient and they are late.
The first (left nested) conditional however causes problems for Adam’s thesis. Or rather, I should say that Adams’
thesis (as presented in [Adams, 1975]) by itself does not determine how to evaluate the left nested conditional.
However, given the multidimensional semantics, we should evaluate it as the probability of B under the evidential
supposition that A ∧ B (see [Bradley, 2011]).
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be false. I will not discuss these results here. In section 2.2.2 I discuss one version of these
results and in section 2.2.3 I discuss another version. At this point I will only say that these
result need not worry us given that we adopt the semantics I discuss and defend in next
chapter. (The impossibility results I discuss are based on probabilistic reasoning. Similar
results have been proved based on non-probabilistic theories of rational belief revision.
Unfortunately, I do not have room to discuss these results.)10
Deriving Adams’ and Skyrms’ theses from the RT
According to the so-called Adams’ thesis (to be further discussed in later sections),11 the
probability of an indicative conditional equals the conditional probability of its consequent
given its antecedent. More formally:
Thesis 5 (Adams’ thesis (AT)). P(A 7→ B) = P(B | A)
(As will become evident, we will have to change or limit the thesis slightly, to avoid well-
known impossibility results, and the semantics I will use and discuss in next chapter suggests
one such way to limiting the thesis.)
The so-called Skyrms’ thesis12 on the other hand (which I also discuss in more detail in
later sections), holds that the probability of the counterfactual A  B equals the expected
conditional chance of B given A. Now if Chw is the objective chance function for world w
– that is, a function that represent the objective probability distribution at that world13 –
and assuming a finite set W of possible worlds, the thesis under discussion can be formally
stated as follows:14
Thesis 6 (Skyrms’ thesis). P(A  B) =
∑
wi
P(Wi).Chwi (B | A)
where Wi is the proposition that world wi is actual. So for each world wi that an agent
considers possible, she calculates the conditional chance of B given A at that world, weighs
that by how probable she finds wi to be actual, and sums the results of this calculation for
all worlds.15
10Another potential problem with the Ramsey test, also suggested to me by Alan Ha´jek, is that the RT may
make it seem strange how we could argue about the probability of a conditional. For the RT seems to suggest
that the probability of a (indicative) conditional is always relative to the suppositional beliefs of the person who
is considering the conditional. I am not, however, convinced that this should worry us too much. Even if there is
no fact of the matter as to the probability of a particular statement, I may be able to give you various good or bad
arguments for thinking that my probability assignment is reasonable. And it does not seem to be too unnatural to
think that that is what is gong on when we argue about conditionals. In any case, expressivists have spent much
effort discussing a very similar question in meta-ethics. It would take me too far from the aim of this thesis to try
to evaluate or contribute to that debate.
11The thesis is named after Ernest W. Adams who famously suggests a version of it in [Adams, 1975]. The version
of the thesis that I will be discussing, where P is taken to measure the probability of sentences’ or propositions’
truth, should perhaps be called ‘Stalnaker’s thesis’, since Robert Stalnaker defended a view of this kind e.g. in
[Stalnaker, 1970]. For Adams himself, however, P in AT should not be interpreted as measuring the probability of
sentences’ or propositions’ truth, but rather something like their degree of assertibility.
12Named after Brian Skyrms who for instance discussed a version of the thesis in [Skyrms, 1981]. Like Adams,
Skyrms himself does not take the thesis to determine the probability of a counterfactuals truth, but rather something
like its assertability. Moreover, Skyrms himself speaks of propensities rather than chance.
13In section 2.3 I briefly discuss the notion of objective chance.
14Assuming a finite set of chance functions.
15In Skyrms’ own formulation, the ‘weights’ (subjective probabilities) are on chance (or propensity) functions,
rather than on worlds. But since I am interpreting each Chwi function as correctly measuring the chances in world
wi, the probability that we are in world wi and the probability that chance function Chwi correctly describes chances
at the actual world, comes (at least formally) down to the same thing.
In William Harper’s ([Harper, 1981]: 24) formulation of Skyrms’ thesis the weights are on chance hypothesis.
(Skyrms’ himself later formulates his thesis in similar fashion ([Skyrms, 1994]).) In other words, the thesis on this
version is:
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With the Ramsey test (and one additional assumption), it is possible to derive these
two thesis from a version of David Lewis’ famous Principal Principle [Lewis, 1980] which
informally states that if an agent knows the objective chance of A, but does not have
information about A that does not come through information about the chance of A, then
her credence in A should match the chance of A. According to both a generalised and
suppositional version of this principle, which we might the Generalised Principal Suppositional
Principle, an agent should set her credence in B under the supposition that A according to
her expectation of the conditional objective chance of B given A (see [Bradley, 2012] and
[Williams, 2012]). Formally, the thesis we need is this:
Thesis 8 (GPSP). PA(B) =
∑
Wi
Chwi (B | A).PA(Wi)
Recall that the version of the RT that I have been endorsing states that PA(B) = A→ B (where
‘→’ represents either the indicative or subjunctive conditional connective). To get AT from
GPSP and RT, we assume that when the supposition is evidential, PA(Wi) equals P(Wi | A).
Then for evidential suppositions, we have P+A(A) =
∑
i Chwi (B | A).P(Wi | A) = P(B | A). By
combining this with RT, we get Adams’ thesis: P(A 7→ B) = P+A(B) = P(B | A).
How do we justify the assumption that for evidential suppositions, PA(Wi) = P(Wi | A)?
It follows from our assumption that evidential suppositions are characterised by conditional
probabilities: if PA(·) represents an evidential supposition that A, then PA(Wi) = P+A(Wi) =
P(Wi | A). But let me give an example to intuitively motivate the assumption. Imagine
that you have a cup in front of you and you don’t know whether it is made of plastic or
glass. Evidentially supposing that it is made of glass should affect what you (hypothetically)
believe about chances in the actual world. In particular, it should affect your views about the
chances of the cup breaking if dropped. More generally, evidentially supposing a sentence
whose truth has implications for the causal structure of (some part of) our world should
affect our beliefs about chances at the actual world. And the same no doubt holds true when
evidentially supposing sentences that do not exactly tell us something about the causal
structure of the world, but nevertheless tell us something about what the chances are.
From GPSP and RT we can also derive Skyrms’ thesis, which, recall says that for any
A, B, and any rational credence function P: P(A  B) =
∑
wi Chwi (B | A).P(Wi). To get ST,
we assume that when the supposition is contrary-to-factual, PA(Wi) = P(Wi). To see why
that assumption is justified, recall that supposing that A is true, contrary to fact, should
not, by itself, change our views about what the actual world is like. (What we infer from
such a supposition can however have drastic impacts on our beliefs about the actual world.)
Instead, we are trying to figure out what counteractual worlds where A is true are like.
Hence, unlike when we evidentially suppose that A, we should not, when we suppose A
contrary to fact, update our credences concerning the objective chances of the actual world.
For instance, supposing that, contrary to fact, the cup in front of me is made of glass, should
not change my views about the chances of the cup breaking in the actual world.
Thus the GPSP and natural assumptions about evidential vs. subjunctive suppositions
deliver both Adams’ and Skyrms’ theses for indicative and subjunctive conditionals respec-
Thesis 7. P(A  B) =
∑
Hi∈H
P(Hi).Chi(B | A)
where Hi is the hypothesis that Chi is the chance function that correctly describes chances in our world and H
is the set of chance hypothesis the agent considers. Again, there is no real difference between this formulation
and mine, if we assume that there is a one-to-one mapping between (conditional) chance functions and worlds,
since the subjective probability that an agent attaches to the hypothesis that her world is correctly described by Chi
should be the same as her subjective probability that the world described by Chi is actual.
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tively. But, of course, the argument may not convince those who were sceptical of Adams’
and Skyrms’ theses; for instance since it relies on the Ramsey test.
2.2.2 Indicative conditionals
Adams’ Thesis and Independence
Let us now briefly check whether the conditionals that I am most interested in for the
purpose of this PhD thesis satisfy Adams’ thesis. Recall that according to Adam’s thesis, the
probability of an (indicative) conditional equals the conditional probability of its consequent
given its antecedent: P(A 7→ B) = P(B | A). Above we saw how the Ramsey test potentially
implies AT, given a version of the Principal Principle. We can however derive AT from RT
without the last principle, if we make certain additional assumptions.
Recall that there are different ways one can suppose something to be true. How to
formally characterise counterfactual suppositions is a vexed issue, which I will come back to
below. But it is generally agreed that evidential suppositions are characterised by Bayesian
conditioning. In other words, rational degree of belief in B upon the evidential supposition
that A is given by:16
P+A(B) = P(B | A) =
P(A ∧ B)
P(A)
(2.1)
It is widely, but not universally, accepted that when evaluating conditionals according
to the Ramsey test, the supposition appropriate for indicative conditionals is evidential.
Combining this assumption with the Strong Ramsey test gives us Adams’ thesis: P(A 7→
B) = P+A(B) = P(B | A).
Adams’ thesis has been used by Adams himself to formulate a logic that invalidates
inference patterns that are classically valid (i.e. valid for the material conditional), but
intuitively invalid for indicative conditionals [Adams, 1975]. But perhaps more importantly,
the principle itself has great intuitive appeal and seems to accord with how we do – and
should – evaluate the probability of conditionals. It seems that one should accept the
(prototypical) indicative conditional
Conditional 11. If Oswald didn’t shoot Kennedy, then someone else did,
exactly to the extent that one would accept that someone else shot Kennedy on the evidential
supposition that Oswald didn’t shoot him. The corresponding counterfactual conditional, on
the other hand, shows that Adams’ thesis does not hold in general for counterfactuals. Most
people attach high conditional probability to someone else having shot Kennedy given that
Oswald did not. However, most people assign low probability to following counterfactual:
Conditional 12. If Oswald hadn’t shot Kennedy, then someone else would have.
So Adams’ thesis is not generally true for counterfactuals. And neither is it true for all con-
ditionals that are of interest to this thesis. Reflecting on conditional 5 (the money-printing-
and-inflation example) illustrates this. This is an ‘interventional conditional’ [Bradley, ms]
where (let us assume) the agent uttering the conditional is herself not capable of making the
16Alan Ha´jek [Ha´jek, 2003] and Branden Fitelson and Ha´jek [Fitelson and Ha´jek, ms] argue against the standard
definition of conditional probability. Instead, they suggest we use a Popper definition of conditional probability;
so take conditional probabilities to be primitive and analyse unconditional probabilities in terms of these. If they
are right, then we can still accept that the evidential supposition is characterised by conditional probability; but
then we should not use the ratio definition of conditional probability. Although the arguments against the ratio
formula are convincing, I will ignore them for now. So keeping with the tradition, I will be using the ratio formula
for conditional probability.
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intervention in question (i.e. she is not part of the Government). Assuming that the speaker
believes the government to be rational, inflation averse and knowledgeable about how to
avoid inflation, it seems clear that Adams’ thesis does not hold for this conditional. Let
M represent the proposition that the Government prints money, and I the proposition that
inflation goes up. Then while P(M→ I) is by assumption high, P(I |M) may very well (and
rationally) be low (since P+M(M → I) is low). While the speaker believes, before learning
that money has been printed, that if the Government prints money inflation will rise, she
also believes that the government is rational and inflation averse. Hence, it may seem most
natural for the agent in question to make room for the supposition that M by changing her
belief in the conditional, rather than taking M it as (hypothetical) evidence that inflation will
rise.
Arguments similar to the one above can be made to show that conditionals 1, 3, and 4 do
not satisfy AT either. Those who take AT to hold true for all indicative conditionals will take
this to justify classifying these conditionals as subjunctives. Unfortunately, McGee’s example
seems to show that AT does not hold for all indicatives. The conditional he discusses clearly
seems to be indicative: the conditional actually seems true, on the most natural reading, but
is false if we read it as a counterfactual. But rational evaluation of McGee’s conditional does
not seem to satisfy AT, as we have seen. Nevertheless, I will take it for granted that Adams’
thesis holds for most indicative conditionals. (Later I discuss how to avoid Lewis’ infamous
triviality results). Hence, I suggest this provides initial reasons for classifying conditionals
1, 3, and 4 as indicatives (but recall that for the present purposes not much hangs on the
classification).
A condition related to Adams’ thesis is probabilistic independence between an indicative
conditional and its antecedent:
Thesis 9 (Independence). P(A 7→ B | A) = P(A 7→ B)
The informal argument that was meant to show that Adams’ thesis does not hold for
conditional 5 also shows that Independence fails in this case. We saw that when P(M)
increases, P(M → I) decreases (where→ represents the conditional operator in conditional
5, whatever kind it is). And in line with symmetry of probabilistic dependence, as P(M→ I)
increases P(M) decreases. So M and M → I are not probabilistically independent of one
another. By similar reasoning, the same holds for conditionals 1, 3 and 4, if we assume, for
instance, that the agents that these conditionals are about are knowledgable, rational and
have the preferences that seem most natural to assume they have.
Independence is often taken to be a characteristic of indicative conditionals. In fact, as I
will show below, Adams’ thesis implies Independence, and Independence implies Adam’s
thesis given Modus Ponens (MP) and the Conditional Excluded Middle (CEM):
Thesis 10 (MP). {A ∧ A→ B} ` {A ∧ B}
Thesis 11 (CEM). ∅ ` (A→ B) ∨ (A→ ¬B)
I leave the proof that given MP and CEM, AT and Independence are equivalent to the
appendix to this chapter (where this is proved as Theorem 11), since the proof relies on some
results that I will prove in next section
Modus Ponens (MP) will be discussed in detail in next section. But for now, it suffices
to say that when it comes to at least simple indicative conditionals – that is, indicative
conditionals with factual antecedents and consequents – MP has much evidence in its
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favour; and it is hard to see what role such conditionals would play in reasoning if MP
were not true of at least simple indicative conditionals. In section 2.3.1 I will prove that
Adam’s thesis implies a condition called Weak Centring which is logically equivalent to MP.
As I prove in 2.3.2, a probabilistic version of CEM is also implied by Adams’ thesis (given a
natural additional assumption).
Since AT holds for most indicatives, and AT implies Independence, most indicatives
should satisfy Independence. But McGee’s example illustrates, as already discussed, that
not all indicatives satisfy Independence.
So some indicative conditionals, it seems, do not satisfy Independence. Moreover, some
counterfactual conditionals do satisfy independence.17 Most authors on conditionals would
agree that the following conditional is a counterfactual conditional (even when its antecedent
is true):
Conditional 13. If a sugar cube is put in water, it will dissolve.18
Nevertheless, this conditional satisfies Independence: the supposition that the cube has been
put in water should neither increase nor decrease the probability of the conditional. So the
fact that a conditional satisfies Independence does not mean that it is not a counterfactual.
Similarly, conditional 2 (the coin-flip-and-kidney example), does satisfy Independence,
despite my wanting to classify it as a counterfactual. (The coin is, let us assume, being
tossed to make a choice procedure fair, and it wouldn’t, for instance, be fair to decide that
Ann gets the kidney if it lands tails up, but then change the decision if one learns that the
coin doesn’t land tails up.) But that does not, in and of itself, mean that this is an indicative
conditional. In fact, conditional 2 fails to satisfy a desirability condition, to be discussed in
chapter 4, that all indicative conditionals should satisfy. Just to give a preview, the condition
is that the truth of an indicative conditional makes no difference to a situation where its
antecedent is false. Given a common conception of fairness, conditional 2 does not satisfy
this desirability condition. In a situation where the coin comes up tails and Ann receives
the kidney, it makes a difference whether or not it is true that had the coin come up heads
Bob would have gotten the kidney.
Zero-tolerance
As a final reason for classifying the conditionals that are of interest to this thesis as counter-
factuals, let me point out that they all fall into this category according to Jonathan Bennett’s
[Bennett, 2003] ‘zero-tolerance rule’. The rule is supposed to conclusively tell whether an
ordinary language conditional is indicative or subjunctive/counterfactual (assuming that
any ordinary language conditional belongs to either of these classes): indicative condition-
als are always what he calls ‘zero-intolerant’ whereas subjunctive conditionals are always
‘zero-tolerant’. Being zero-intolerant, an indicative conditional is never of any use, Ben-
nett claims, in a context where we know the antecedent to be false (i.e. where we attach
zero probability to the antecedent). Subjunctive conditionals, on the other hand, are often
very useful in such contexts – and, in fact, are often especially intended for such contexts
(hence counterfactuals.) The claim is not that an indicative conditional is false whenever its
antecedent is false – if it were, then it would obviously not be completely probabilistically
17The same is true of Adams’ thesis: while some subjunctives obviously do not satisfy the thesis, others seem to
do so. For instance, the causal conditional 13 satisfies AT.
18It sounds of course more natural to simply say D: ‘Sugar cubes dissolve in water’. But I think most would
agree that the logical form of D is the same as that of conditional 8.
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independent of its antecedent – but rather that an indicative conditional is ‘useless’ (i.e.
completely uninformative) in such contexts, Bennett says (p. 45).19
Reflections on the two Oswald-Kennedy conditionals seem to support this view. The
indicative Oswald-Kennedy conditional stated that if Oswald didn’t kill Kennedy, then
someone else did. We know what role this conditional plays if we have at least the slightest
doubt as to whether or not Oswald in fact killed Kennedy. But what is the use of this
conditional, as an indicative, if we learn that Oswald killed Kennedy? In such context, what
does the conditional express? A popular view is that in such contexts, the conditional
expresses nothing (see e.g. [Edgington, 1995] and [Bradley, 2002]). The corresponding
counterfactual, which states that if Oswald hadn’t killed Kennedy then someone else would
have, however clearly expresses a proposition (assuming that counterfactuals ever express
propositions) even if we know that in fact Oswald did kill Kennedy.
I will not here evaluate Bennett’s zero-tolerance (nor Edgington’s and Bradley’s (old)
view). But given this rule, the conditionals that motivate this thesis (i.e. conditionals 1 and
2), in the form that will most concern me, are clearly counterfactuals. For I will particularly
be interested in the way they affect our evaluation of actual outcomes when we know their
antecedent to be false. Since these conditionals have this effect when their antecedent is
false, they are clearly not completely uninformative in such contexts.
Triviality results
In the late eighties David Lewis produced a pair of triviality results [Lewis, 1976] that many
people have taken to be devastating for Adams’ thesis. In this subsection I will discuss
both the first of Lewis’s original triviality result for Adams’ thesis and Richard Bradley’s
argument that triviality results can be constructed for logically weaker theses than Adams’.
Several other triviality results have been produced that I will not discuss,20, since they all
depend on an assumption about how the set of true conditionals is determined by to the set
of true factual propositions that I will later reject.
Lewis’s triviality results can be summarised by the following theorem:
Theorem 1 (Lewis’ First Triviality Result). If Adams’ thesis holds for all probability measures
on a language L, then L is trivial in the sense of not containing three sentences that have positive
probability but are pairwise logically incompatible.
Proof.
Assume the following:
1. P(C | A) = P(A ∧ C)
A
if P(A) > 0 [definition]
2. P(A 7→ C) = P(C | A) holds for any indicative where P(A) > 0 [AT]
Then the rest follows:
3. P(A 7→ C | B) = P(C | A ∧ B) when P(A ∧ B) > 0 [from 2]
4. P(A 7→ C | C) = P(C | A ∧ C) = 1 when P(A ∧ C) > 0 [from 1, 3 and PC]21
5. P(A 7→ C | ¬C) = P(C | A ∧ ¬C) = 0 when P(A ∧ C) > 0 [from 1, 3 and PC]
19James Joyce has pointed out to me that the zero-one rule might not be as decisive as Bennett claims. As an
example, he suggests that when sitting in a room with his dog, he might be certain that Obama is not in the room
with him, but nevertheless believe that that if Obama is in the room with him then he is brilliantly disguised as a
dog. And the latter, Joyce suggests, is an indicative conditional. Perhaps the zero-one rule should thus be used as
a rule of thumb, rather than as a clear-cut and decisive rule for how to classify conditionals. In any case, the rule
does not play a crucial role in my argument. But I will, nevertheless, occasionally use it as a heuristic.
20See [Ha´jek and Hall, 1994] for an overview of many of these results.
21‘PC’ is short for ‘probability calculus’.
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6. P(D) = P(D | B).P(B) + P(D | ¬B).P(¬B) [Law of total probability]
7. P(A 7→ C) = P(A 7→ C | C).P(C) + P(A 7→ C | ¬C).P(¬C) [from 6]
8. P(A 7→ C) = 1.P(C) + 0.P(¬C).P(C) [from 7, 4 and 5]
9. P(A 7→ C) = P(C) [from 8]
10. So P(C | A) = P(C) [from 9 and AT]
In other words, given our assumptions, A and C must be probabilistically independent. But
that seems absurd. And given a non-trivial language – in particular, for the case in question,
one in which¬A, A∧C and A∧¬C get assigned a positive probability – it is easy to construct
a probability function for which this does not hold [Lewis, 1976]. 
Let us now consider Bradley’s argument. From Adams’ thesis it follows that:
Thesis 12 (Preservation Condition).
If P(A) > 0 and P(B) = 0 then P(A 7→ B) = 0.
For if P(B) = 0 then P(A∧B) = 0; and if P(A∧B) = 0 and P(A) > 0 then P(A∧B)/P(A) = 0. So
the Preservation Condition is logically weaker than Adams’ thesis. Moreover, it is arguably
more intuitively plausible than AT, as Bradley points out ([Bradley, 2000] : 220):
You cannot, for instance, hold that we might go to the beach, but that we certainly
won’t go swimming and at the same time consider it possible that if we go to the
beach we will go swimming! To do so would reveal a misunderstanding of the
indicative conditional (or just plain inconsistency).
Unfortunately, it turns out that the Preservation Condition generates a triviality result similar
to Lewis’:
Theorem 2 (Preservation triviality). If the Preservation Condition holds for all probability mea-
sures on a language L, then L is trivial in the sense of not containing three sentences that have
positive probability but are pairwise logically independent.
(I will not provide a proof of Theorem 3, since the proof itself does not, I think, add anything
to our understanding of the problem.)
It would be very restricting to have to work with only trivial languages. Moreover, I
have been treating ‘ 7→’ as an ordinary language indicative conditional and claimed that AT
usually holds for this conditional. But ordinary language is of course not trivial in the above
sense. Hence, some assumption(s) in the above proofs must be false if the ordinary language
indicative conditional satisfies AT. Lewis himself argued we should give up Adams’ thesis,
as a theory of the probability of truth of indicative conditionals, but suggested we should
still accept AT as a criteria of assertibility. (Frank Jackson takes a similar stance [Jackson,
1991]). Others have taken the result to show that indicative conditionals do not express
propositions (see e.g. [Gibbard, 1981]), and thus do not not satisfy the Boolean properties
and/or the probability axioms that are assumed in the triviality proofs. In Lewis’s proof
above, this allows us to reject step 3 and perhaps the use of probability calculus (in Bradley’s
proof, this invalidates Lemma 1).
Later I will argue for none of these ways out of triviality. Instead, I will rely on a
multidimensional semantics (to be discuss in next chapter) for which it is not true that
conditional sentences are connected to factual sentences in the simple way that the triviality
proofs assume. (A result of this is that the semantics implies that (sometimes) P(A 7→ B |
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B) = P+B(A 7→ B) , P(B | A ∧ B). Hence, AT only holds for simple conditionals.) This avoids
triviality in a similar way as denying that conditionals express propositions. However,
the multidimensional semantics shows how this way out of triviality is compatible with
maintaining that these conditionals are propositions (with truth values). Hence, we don’t
have to explain away their apparent truth-aptness. Moreover, it turns out that this way out
of triviality coheres with my argument in subsequent chapters, where my examination of
the desirability of conditionals establishes, or so I argue, that we cannot reduce conditionals
to factual propositions.
2.2.3 Subjunctive conditionals
As already discussed, we can accept the Ramsey test for subjunctive conditionals without
having to accept Adams’ thesis for such conditionals, since the way in which we suppose
the antecedent of a subjunctive conditional, when evaluating the conditional in accordance
with RT, is generally not evidential. Instead, the supposition in such cases is subjunctive
(or counterfactual). Two important attempts have been made at formalising the Ramsey
test for subjunctive conditionals. Firstly, there is the thesis that subjunctive suppositions
go by expected conditional chances, which given the Ramsey test implies Skyrms’ thesis.
Secondly, there is David Lewis’s method of Imaging [Lewis, 1976], which I will discuss in
the next subsection.
First, it might be useful to get Skyrms’ thesis again on the table. Recall that on this view,
for any rational person and any propositions A and B, the probability of A  B equals the
expected chance of B given A:
P(A  B) =
∑
Wi
P(Wi).Chwi (B | A)
where Wi is the proposition that world wi is actual. So for each world wi that an agent
considers possible, she calculates the conditional chance of B given A in that world, weighs
that by how probable she finds wi, and sums the results of this calculation for all worlds.
It is interesting to notice that various authors have suggested ways of measuring rational
credence assignments to counterfactuals that, on a closer look, turn out to be formally
equivalent to Skyrms’ thesis. Robert Williams [Williams, 2012] suggests a way of formalising
the subjunctive Ramsey test, based on what I previously called the Principal Suppositional
Principle, that turns out to be identical to Skyrms’ thesis (on a natural interpretation). And
already mentioned, Stefan Kaufmann [Kaufmann, 2004] suggests a way of measuring our
credence assignment to conditionals that fail to satisfy Adams’ thesis, which also turns out
to be formally equivalent to Skyrms’ thesis. I will not discuss this further here, but one
might take this as suggesting that Skyrms must have been on to something.
Lewis’s Imaging
The second main attempt at formalising subjunctive suppositions (or something like it) is
Lewis’s method of Imaging [Lewis, 1976]. If w is the actual world, let wA represent the world
that would be actual if A were true; for convenience, let’s say that wA is the closest A-world
to w. For any probability function P and any proposition A, the Image of P on A is a new
probability function PA, such that for any proposition B:
Definition 1 (Imaging). PA(B) 
∑
Wi
P(Wi).P(B |WAi )
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(Recall that Wi is the proposition that world wi is actual; in addition, let WAi be the proposition
that wAi is the closest A-world to actuality.) Now if w
A
i < B then P(B |WAi ) = 0, but if wAi ∈ B
then P(B |WAi ) = 1. So in calculating PA(B), each wi only counts for something if B is true in
its closest A-world; and if it does count for something, it counts according to the probability
that it is actual.
An example may make the idea clearer. Assume that we have four possible worlds, w1,
w2, w3 and w4, and that w1,w2 ∈ A but w1,w3 ∈ B. Moreover, assume that wA1 = wA4 = w1
and wA2 = w
A
3 = w2 (i.e. w1 is the closest A-world to itself and also to w4, etc.), and that
P(W1) = P(W4) = 0.3 and P(W2) = P(W3) = 0.2. Then P(B) = 0.5.22 Finally, PA(B) is then
calculated as follows:
PA(B) = P(W1).P(B |WA1 ) + P(W2).P(B |WA2 )
+ P(W3).P(B |WA3 ) + P(W4).P(B |WA4 )
=0,3(1)+0,2(0)+0,2(1)+0,3(1)=0,6 (2.3)
Lewis [Lewis, 1976]) shows that given a particular semantics of counterfactuals, namely
Robert Stalnaker’s [Stalnaker, 1968], we have:
Thesis 13 (Imaging thesis). P(A  B) = PA(B)
Since the semantics I use in chapter 4 to introduce counterfactuals to Jeffrey’s decision theory
entails (given certain additions I endorse) Skyrms’ thesis but not the Imaging thesis, I will
not discuss Imaging further.
Subjunctive triviality
Triviality results similar to those discussed in section 2.2.4 have been constructed for sub-
junctive versions of the Ramsey test. Williams [Williams, 2012] constructs one based on the
assumption that Ch(A  B) = Ch(B | A). I will not reproduce Williams’ proof, since it is
exactly Lewis’ triviality proof that I discussed above, with the exception that it applies to
counterfactuals rather than indicatives, and P is substituted for Ch and P(· | ·) for Ch(· | ·).
Thus what I later say about ways to avoid Lewis’ triviality result applies also to Williams’.
Hannes Leitgeb ([Leitgeb, 2012a], section 2) constructs a triviality result that is based on
the same principles as Lewis’, but whose structure differs from Lewis’ in an illuminating
way (and is directly aimed at Skyrms’ thesis). It is thus worth reproducing it here:
Theorem 3 (Leitgeb triviality). If subjunctive conditional A  B has classical truth values at
world wi (and is determined by the facts of wi), then Skyrms’ thesis (as formulated above) implies
that if P(Wi) > 0, then the conditional chance of B given A in wi must be either 0 or 1; and is 1 if and
only if A  B is true at wi.
Proof.
Lemma 1. First we prove that P((A  B) ∧Wi) = P(Wi).Chwi (B | A)
Proof.
22Assuming that we can calculate the probability of proposition A by:
P(A) =
∑
Wi
P(Wi).v(A,w) (2.2)
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1. P((A  B) ∧Wi) = P(Wi).P(A  B |Wi) [def. of P(· | ·)]
2. = P(Wi).
∑
W j
P(W j |Wi).Chw j (B | A) [Skyrms’ thesis]
3. = P(Wi).Chwi (B | A) [for
∑
W j
P(W j |Wi) reduces to P(Wi |Wi) = 1]

Now either A  B is (a) true or (b) false at wi. Assuming (a) we have:
1. P((A  B) ∧Wi) = P(Wi).Chwi (B | A) = P(Wi) [from Lemma 1 and (a)]
2. Chwi (B | A) = 1 [from 1 since P(Wi) > 0]
Assuming (b) we have:
1. P((A  B) ∧Wi) = P(Wi).Chwi (B | A) = 0 [from Lemma 1 and (b)]
2. Chwi (B | A) = 0 [from 1 since P(Wi) > 0]

So Leitgeb’s proof shows that, given the above assumptions (in particular, that counterfac-
tuals are either true or false at a world), that conditional chances (at worlds) are ‘trivial’ (or
‘crisp’): always either 0 or 1. Leitgeb’s way out of triviality involves making a distinction
between, on one hand, rational degree of belief in a counterfactual, and, on the other hand,
the acceptability of a counterfactual. And he assumes that an agent’s degree of belief in
a counterfactual can come a part from the degree to which she accepts the counterfactual
([Leitgeb, 2012a], section 2).
I will not discuss Leitgeb’s solution in detail, but simply state that I find this assumption
unwelcome and believe it should be avoided if possible. And as I will show in next
chapter, the multidimensional semantics that I will adopt in this thesis invalidates one
of the assumptions of the triviality result: the assumption that any counterfactual is either
true or false in any particular world. But once we give up that assumptions, we can no longer
assume, as Leitgeb does in his proof, that when A  B is true at wi, P((A  B) ∧Wi) =
P(Wi). And indeed, this will not be true in general in the multidimensional semantics (as
we will see in next chapter).
2.3 Logic of Counterfactuals
Independently of any formal semantics, there are various logical principles that we might
want counterfactuals to satisfy (or fail to satisfy). In this section I will only discuss three such
principles: Centring, Modus Ponens and the Conditional Excluded Middle. The motivation
for focusing on these three is that getting clear on what we think about these principles is
important for the discussion of the semantics of conditionals in next section.
2.3.1 Centring and Modus Ponens
The term Centring in the present context comes (I believe) from David Lewis [Lewis, 1986a],
whose semantics has a Centring condition with certain logical implications. I will however
start by discussing these logical implications, and will, for simplicity, refer to them as Strong
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and Weak Centring (and later use the prefix ‘Semantic’ to refer to Lewis’ semantic Centring
conditions). These are the two logical principles:23
Thesis 14 (Strong Centring). For all A, B: (A ∧ B) ⊃ (A→ B)
Thesis 15 (Weak Centring). For all A, B: (A→ B) ⊃ (A ⊃ B)
Below I will first examine the logical relationship between the two Centring conditions and
their relationship to Modus Ponens. I will then consider arguments against Centring and
Modus Ponens.
Logical relations between WC, SC and MP
Recall that Weak Centring states that that (A→ B) ⊃ (A ⊃ B) is a logical truth. Substituting
¬B for B throughout the axiom makes it easier to see the relation to Strong Centring. With
this substitution, the axiom is:
(A→ ¬B) ⊃ (A ⊃ ¬B) (2.4)
By the truth conditions of the material conditional, WC is identical to:
(A→ ¬B) ⊃ ¬(A ∧ B) (2.5)
By contraposition:
(A ∧ B) ⊃ ¬(A→ ¬B) (2.6)
With this formulation of WC it is easy to show how it follows from SC, given that we accept
the following condition (as well as Modus Ponens for the material conditional which is of
course uncontroversial):
Thesis 16 (Conditional Consistency (CC)).
For any consistent A: (A→ B) ⊃ ¬(A→ ¬B)
CC seems to hold at least for the kind of indicatives for which AT is most plausible; i.e.
indicative conditionals whose antecedent gets assigned a probability greater than 0 (the
principle is e.g. endorsed in [Bradley, 2007a]). It should not, however, be taken to hold for
conditionals with inconsistent antecedents, at least if we assume (as is done in classical logic)
that anything follows from a contradiction (sometimes called the Principle of Explosion).
Theorem 4. SC and CC imply WC.
Proof.
(1) A ∧ B ⊃ (A→ B) [SC]
(2) A ∧ B [Assumption]
(3) A→ B [1, 2 and MP for ‘⊃’]
23Both are entailed by Lewis’ strongly centred (semantic) system of spheres, but only the latter by his weakly
centred system. Recall that on Lewis’ semantics, A  B is (non-vacuously) true at a world w just in case B is true
in all the closest A-worlds to w. (A counterfactual is vacuously true at w when its antecedent is impossible at w.)
In Lewis’ strongly centred semantical system, when A is true at w, w itself is the closest A-world to w. Hence, if
both A and B are true at w, then so is A  B, as Strong Centring states; but if A is true and B is false, then A  B
is false at w, as Weak Centring states (by contraposition and given the truth conditions for ⊃). In Lewis’ weakly
centred system, if A is true at w then w is one of the closest A-worlds to w. Hence, if A is true but B is false at w,
then A  B is false w.
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(4) ¬(A→ ¬B) [3 and CC]
Hence, ∅ ` (A ∧ B) ⊃ ¬(A→ ¬B)

How can we then get from Weak to Strong Centring? One way to do so is to ad the Condi-
tional Excluded Middle. Recall from last section that CEM states that for any propositions
A and B, it is a logical truth that either A → B or A → ¬B is true. (So from ¬(A → B)
one can infer A → ¬B.) I will discuss the plausibility of CEM in in section 2.3.2. CEM and
Conditional Consistency may seem closely related, but actually neither principle implies the
other: CEM says that at least on one of A→ B and A→ ¬B is true; CC that (for a consistent
A) at most one of A → B and A → ¬B is true; so together they imply that (for a consistent
A), exactly on one of A→ B and A→ ¬B is true.
Theorem 5. WC and CEM imply SC.
Proof. WC can be formulated as: (A∧B) ⊃ ¬(A→ ¬B). By CEM, ¬(A→ ¬B) entails A→ B.
So by WC and CEM, (A ∧ B) ⊃ (A→ B), which is just SC. 
Finally, let us examine what happens if we give up WC. The main logical consequence of
giving up this axiom is that that Modus Ponens (MP) is no longer guaranteed to hold, even
for simple conditionals (i.e. conditionals with factual antecedents and consequents). In fact,
WC is both necessary and sufficient for MP.
Theorem 6. MP holds for ‘→’ if and only if WC holds for ‘→’.
Proof.
MP implies WC
(1) (A ∧ (A→ B) ` B [MP]
(2) ∅ ` (A ∧ (A→ B)) ⊃ B [from 1]
(3) ∅ ` (A→ B) ⊃ (A ⊃ B) [exp.]
So MP implies WC.
WC implies MP
(1) MP fails only if ((A→ B) ∧ (A ∧ ¬B)) 0 ⊥
(2) (A→ B) ⊃ (A ⊃ B) [WC]
(3) (A→ B) ⊃ ¬(A ∧ ¬B) [from 2]
So WC implies MP (from 1 and 3) 
In next section we will see arguments that suggest that, intuitively, SC may be too strong.
However, since the semantics I use throughout this thesis entails CEM, this section shows
that I cannot abandon SC without also giving up WC. But that is equivalent to abandoning
MP which I think is a too high price to pay (for reasons that will become apparent). Hence,
I must to accept SC.
The plausibility of Centring and MP
Given the role that indicative conditionals play in evidential reasoning, it is hard to deny
Strong Centring for such conditionals. And in fact, SC must hold for indicatives if Adams’
thesis does. The same is true for Weak Centring.
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Theorem 7. AT implies SC.
Proof. Probabilistic SC (for indicatives): P(A∧B) ≤ P(A 7→ B). SC given AT: P(A∧B) ≤ P(A∧B)P(A) ,
which must holds since it is equivalent to P(A).P(A ∧ B) ≤ P(A ∧ B). 
Theorem 8. AT implies WC.
Proof. Probabilistic WC (for indicatives): P(A 7→ B) ≤ P(A ⊃ B) = P(¬A) + P(A ∧ B). WC
given AT: P(A∧B)P(A) ≤ P(¬A) + P(A ∧ B). Thus P(A ∧ B) ≤ P(¬A).P(A) + P(A).P(A ∧ B); and
hence, 1 ≤ P(¬A).P(A)P(A∧B) + P(A∧B).P(A)P(A∧B) ; so 1 ≤ P(¬A).P(A)P(A∧B) + P(A).
This last claim holds if and only if: P(¬A) ≤ P(¬A).P(A)P(A∧B) . To see that that holds, notice that
it can be written as P(¬A).P(A ∧ B) ≤ P(¬A).P(A) which is true since P(A ∧ B) ≤ P(A). 
So given that most indicatives satisfy Adam’s thesis, most indicatives should satisfy both
Strong and Weak Centring. However, in previous sections I suggested that we think of the
conditionals that I will mostly be considering as subjunctive (or counterfactual) conditionals.
Hence, the question we need to ask is whether SC and WC are plausible conditions on
subjunctive reasoning.
Several authors writing on the logic of subjunctive conditionals have rejected Strong
Centring as a logical truth for such conditionals. As pointed out by Hannes Leitgeb, “it is at
least questionable to assume that the mere presence of facts which are described by A and
B is capable of establishing a counterfactual dependence of B on A ... and even so by pure
logic,” ([Leitgeb, 2012b]: 87). It is moreover not hard to come up with examples that seem
to support such rejection of subjunctive SC. Take the following example:
Conditional 14. If I were writing a chapter of my thesis right now, the Universe would have been
created by the explosion of a tiny mass 13.75 billion years ago.
In general, when the antecedent, A, is not in any way connected to the consequent, B, a
counterfactual A  B may sound very strange, to say the least, even when both A and B
are true.
Moreover, it can be even harder to accept conditionals with a true antecedent and a
consequent that are connected, but connected in the ‘wrong way’ (as Alan Ha´jek points out
[Ha´jek, ms]). Take the following conditional:
Conditional 15. If the Labour Party had held on to their seat in the City of Durham in the 2010
General Election, the Conservative Party would have won the election.
The Labour candidate for Durham did hold on to her seat. But in spite of that, the Conser-
vatives won the General election. And this illustrates exactly why SC has implications that
seem counterintuitive: normally when someone utters a subjunctive conditional, we expect
the antecedent to somehow explain, or at least contribute to the truth of, the consequent.
It could perhaps be argued that the aforementioned expectation is due to a rule of
pragmatics rather than the logic (or semantics) of counterfactuals; perhaps the rule that it is
inappropriate to express A  B unless A and B are related in the right way. Thus while the
above two conditionals may be true, their utterance is nevertheless inappropriate or odd. This
seems to have been the view of David Lewis ([Lewis, 1986a]: 28), who reminds us of the
importance of not conflating oddness with falsity. Since I need to accept SC, as previously
mentioned, I will have to use some version of this argument to explain how the last two
conditionals can be true in spite of it seeming inappropriate to utter them.
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Let me briefly mention another implication that SC and WC have together: they imply
two worlds that differ in actual facts must differ in counterfactuals; in other words, actual
(or non-modal) facts supervene on counterfactuals.
Theorem 9. SC and WC together entail that non-modal facts supervene on counterfactuals.
Proof. Let F denote the set of factual sentences that are true at world wi (and suppose F
is closed under conjunction). Let C denote the set of counterfactual sentences true at wi.
Suppose A,B ∈ F. Then given SC, (A  B) ∈ C. Now suppose we change the truth value of
B (but not A); call the new/changed world w′i , let F
′ denote the set of factual sentences true
at w′i and C
′ the set of counterfactual sentences true at w′i . Then B < F
′ and (given bivalence)
¬B ∈ F′. But A ∈ F′ iff A ∈ F. Hence by WC, (A  B) < C′. Thus, if two possible worlds
differ in the truth value of some factual sentence, then they also differ in the truth value of
some counterfactual. 
However, WC by itself does not entail that facts supervene on counterfactuals. Suppose that
B is true at wi, but no counterfactual with a true antecedent and B as consequent is true at
wi, as is consistent with WC being true but SC false. In this case, changing the truth value of
B, but leaving the truth values of all other sentences unchanged, will not necessarily change
what counterfactuals are true at wi. Hence, facts do not supervene on counterfactuals.
It may be natural to think that for any tautology T, and for any sentence A, A and T  A
are logically equivalent, which would mean that (non-modal) facts supervene on counter-
factuals, since then changing a (non-modal) fact would change at least one counterfactual.
But without Centring that is not the case. Any semantics that does not imply the two logical
Centring conditions can be used to show this, but since I haven’t yet presented the semantics
I will use, let me explain this in terms of Lewis’ famous similarity semantics. Although A
is true in the actual world wi, there might, if either (semantic) Centring condition does not
hold, be a world w j such that: T is true at w j, w j is at least as similar to wi as wi is to itself,
but A is false at w j. Hence, if Centring fails, then A might be true but T  A false.
Humeans like David Lewis (whose semantics implies both Strong and Weak Centring)
contend that modal facts supervene on non-modal ones. (Lewis himself called his view
‘Humean’ [Lewis, 1987], [Lewis, 1994], after David Hume.) Some Humeans may want to
make the following stronger claim: modal facts supervene on non-modal ones but the most
fundamental facts, which according to most Humeans (e.g. Lewis) are non-modal, don’t
supervene on any less fundamental facts. But then they cannot accept SC and WC, since
together these two entail that all non-modal facts supervene on counterfactuals (since chang-
ing the truth value of any factual sentence changes the truth value of some counterfactual).
As I point out in [Stefa´nsson, 2014d] (where I first presented the above theorem), it seems
that Lewis himself was only committed to the weaker of the aforementioned Humean views.
(This seems apparent from his [Lewis, 1983]: 358.) I myself am far from convinced that we
should accept the stronger Humean view. Hence, the lesson I take from Theorem 9 is simply
that if we want to accept the stronger Humean view, then we must at last abandon SC.24
24Wlodek Rabinowicz has pointed out to me that the supervenience concept on which the above argument is
based is very thin, and that strong Humeans might have a stronger concept of supervenience, according to which one
fact supervenes on another just in case the latter is true because the former is. Given such a supervenience concept, it
need not be the case that all non-modal facts supervene on modal ones, even if both Strong and Weak Centring are
true. It seems to me, however, that the thin concept of supervenience has become standard in the literature (see e.g.
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/supervenience/), and that the strong Humean that Rabinowicz has in mind would
say that non-modal facts ground modal facts (where ‘grounding’ is understood as an asymmetrical relation). But the
general point of Rabinowicz’s might nevertheless be true; i.e., that the argument presented above does not really
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A few authors on the logic of counterfactuals also reject Modus Ponens and thus Weak
Centring for such conditionals (see for instance [Gundersen, 2004], [Leitgeb, 2012a] and
[Leitgeb, 2012b]). As will become apparent in chapter 5, it makes things much easier if I can
assume MP. But more importantly, it seems that Modus Ponens plays an indispensable role in
our use of counterfactuals in practical deliberation. I claim that one part of the desirabilistic
import of counterfactuals stems from the fact that we use them to reason about the effects of
various interventions (such as actions). The most simple example is when deciding what to
do: if I am trying to make up my mind as to whether I should take the tube or cycle to school,
I try to determine what would happen if I were to make each of these choices. If I believe,
for instance, that if I were to cycle I would become wet, then that reduces the desirability
of cycling (since I dislike being wet). It is hard to see how counterfactuals could play this
role in practical deliberation unless we think that given the aforementioned counterfactual,
a situation in which I cycle is one in which I get wet. So Modus Ponens seems to play an
indispensable role in practical counterfactuals reasoning. Therefore, I will assume that MP
holds for at least simple, or non-nested, counterfactuals.25
Let me finish this discussion of Modus Ponens by pointing out that an argument by
Jonathan Bennett, which on the face of it my seem to be a counterexample to MP for
counterfactuals (or subjunctives), is actually unproblematic for the principle. However, the
example does illustrate the limited applicability of MP for counterfactuals. Bennett says:
Because a subjunctive conditional is zero-tolerant, one can properly accept it
while knowing that one would not be willing to use it in Modus Ponens. Last
year I went to Spain; I am pretty sure that If I had not visited Spain last year
I would have visited France. However, if I consider the implications of my
discovering to my amazement that I did not visit Spain, they do not lead to
the conclusion that I went to France. On the contrary, if I add ’I did not visit
Spain last year’ to my belief system with its multitude of memories and other
evidences of my having done so, the resulting system makes me unwilling to
have any opinion about what I did last year ([Bennett, 2003]: 230).
On a closer look, it is clear that this is not an argument against MP for counterfactuals (nor
is it clear that the example is intended as such). MP would fail as a general rule of inference
if and only if we could consistently simultaneously endorse A  B and A ∧ ¬B. (That is, if
and only if ((A  B) ∧ (A ∧ ¬B)) 0 ⊥.) But that is not what Bennett’s example shows. Let
S represent the proposition that Bennett visited Spain last year and F the proposition that
he visited France. Bennett believes ¬S  F and S. If, however, he were to learn that ¬S, he
force those we would typically call ‘strong Humeans’ to abandon Centring, since such people are not committed
to the view that fundamental facts don’t supervene (in the thin sense) on less fundamental ones. Nevertheless, my
(admittedly quite weak) conditional claim stands: if one endorses strong Humeanism, as the view is defined it in
last paragraph, then one should abandon at least Strong Centring.
25My discussion will only concern simple conditionals; i.e conditionals with factual antecedents and consequents.
Vann McGee was perhaps first to point out, by help of the following examples, that MP fails for even indicative
conditionals with conditional consequents [McGee, 1985]. Opinions polls taken right before the 1980 US Presidential
Election showed that the Republican candidate Reagan had a considerable lead over the Democrat Carter, with
Anderson, the second Republican in the race, as a distant third. Hence, people had a good reason to believe that:
Conditional 16. If a Republican wins, then if it is not Reagan that wins, it will be Anderson who wins.
But despite most people believing (and having a good reason to believe) that a Republican would win, they did
not (and had no reason to) believe:
Conditional 17. If Reagan does not win, it will be Anderson who wins.
since the second most likely presidential candidate after Reagan at the time was Carter.
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would, he says, not be willing to have any opinion about what he did last year. Although
he does not explicitly say so, it seems to me that this must include ¬S  F; in other words,
upon learning that he did, in spite of all evidence to the contrary, actually not visit Spain,
he becomes unwilling to have an opinion about any proposition that concerns what he did
last year, including any subjunctive proposition. So upon learning ¬S, he stops affirming
¬S  F, which means that MP is not violated.
Bennett’s example thus turns out to be very similar to the examples I gave to show that
there may be probabilistic dependency between a subjunctive conditional and its antecedent.
The examples had the following form: I believe that if the Government prints more money
then inflation will rise; but I also believe that the Government is aware of this, is rational,
well informed and inflation averse; hence, upon learning that the Government has printed
money, I drop my believe in the conditional rather than concluding that inflation will rise.
While these examples are no counterexamples to MP, they nevertheless do point to
limitations in the applicability of MP for counterfactuals compared with the more ‘ordinary’
indicative or material MP. As Bennett points out, it would be inappropriate to assert or
even accept an indicative conditional A 7→ B while knowing that one would not be willing
to use it to infer that B upon learning the truth of A (ibid). The same of course holds for
the material conditional (which is only ‘asserted’ in formal logic or mathematics). These
examples however show that this is not the case with subjunctive conditionals. Hence,
while the acceptance of an indicative or material conditional is always a commitment to
use it in MP whenever one learns the truth of its antecedent, this is not so with subjunctive
conditionals. This should perhaps not come as a surprise. For after all, subjunctive (or
counterfactual) conditionals are very often intended to be used in circumstances where their
antecedent is known, or strongly believed, to be false. Hence, it is no wonder that they are
often not intended to be used in Modus Ponens.
Objective Chance, Skyrms’ thesis and Centring
Certain views on chances and how credences in chances hypothesis should change imply
that Skyrms’ thesis is inconsistent with the two Centring conditions. Other views on these
issues however make Skyrms’ thesis compatible with Centring. Below I briefly describe a
view that seems quite attractive, and which together with ST implies that Centring fails.
Since I am, as already mentioned, committed to both ST and Centring, I will have to adopt
another (and, as it happens, more popular) view on chances.
According to a theory of chance that Carl Hoefer has defended [Hoefer, 2007] (and Hoefer
and Roman Frigg have further developed [Frigg and Hoefer, 2010], [Frigg and Hoefer, ta]),
both the future and the past can be chancy. That the future can be chancy, if anything can,
is uncontroversial. But the idea that the past can be chancy is quite controversial. Here is
how Hoefer puts it ([Hoefer, 2007]: 554):
[M]y coin flip at noon yesterday was an instance of a chance setup with two
possible outcomes, each having a definite objective chance. It was a chance
event. The chance of heads was 1/2. So 1/2 is the objective chance of A [the
proposition that the coin I flipped at noon yesterday lands heads]. It still is; the
coin flip is and always was a chance event. Being to the past of me-now does not
alter that fact, though as it happens I now know A is false.
The details of Hoefer’s theory does not matter for the present purposes. But to put it simply,
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the idea is that chances supervene on facts about event-types. So although the outcome of
the event token in question (i.e. the toss of a particular fair coin at a particular time) certainly
was that the coin landed heads, that token event does not, by itself, really affect the chance
of A (given there is a very great number of token events of this type), since the chance of A
is determined by the chance of events of the type in question.
Assuming Hoefer’s view on chance, the following seems a natural view on credence in
chance hypothesis. For some chance hypotheses, e.g. those that concern systems or types
of events that we do not have much experience with or knowledge of, our credence in the
hypotheses should not be very robust with respect to experience. For example, if I am asked
to assign credence to chance hypothesis regarding who of two tennis players, of whom I
have no knowledge, will win the match, then I would presumably assign highest credence
to the hypothesis that they have an equal chance of winning. However, as I observe one of
them easily win two sets in a row, I will, presumably, change my credence assignment in the
aforementioned chance hypothesis.
However, for other chance hypotheses, concerning systems or types of events that you
have great knowledge of, your credence in chance hypotheses about that system or type
of events should be more robust with respect to experience. Suppose you have built an
indeterministic computer that has been programmed to generate either event of type A or B
when button P is pushed, such that the chance of it generating B when the button is pushed
is 1 in a million; otherwise it generates A. You programmed it yourself, and you are very
confident in your abilities as a programmer. Thus the subjective probability you attach to the
proposition ‘the chance that the computer generates B, if the button is pushed, is 0.000001’
is close to 1. That is, if B represents the proposition that the computer generates B at time t+
and P the proposition that the button is pushed at (an earlier) time t−, then you have close
to full credence in the proposition that the actual world w is such that Chw(B | P) = 0.000001.
What happens now if you observe the computer generating B at time t+ after the button is
pushed at time t−? Presumably, that depends on what you have experienced before. If you
just programmed the computer and this was its first output (and you believe that the past
can be chancy) your confidence in Chw(B | P) = 0.000001 need not decrease at all, given how
confident you are in your abilities as a programmer.
When the above view on chance and credence in chance hypotheses is combined with
Skyrms’ thesis, probabilistic versions of both Strong and Weak Centring are violated (and
with the latter, Modus Ponens for subjunctive conditionals). Recall that according to the
former condition, Strong Centring, (A ∧ B) ⊃ (A  B), while the latter, Weak Centring,
states that (A  B) ⊃ ¬(A ∧ ¬B). Stated probabilistically, the two Centring conditions are:
Thesis 17 (Probabilistic Strong Centring). P(A ∧ B) ≤ P(A  B)
Thesis 18 (Probabilistic Weak Centring). P(A  B) ≤ P(¬A ∨ B)
To see how Skyrms’ thesis violates the two Centring conditions, given the proposed under-
standing of chance and its relation to credence, consider again the computer example above.
(Let A be the proposition that the computer generates A at time t+.) Now if you observe
that the button is pressed at time t+ (P) and the computer generates B (¬A), your credence
in P ∧ ¬A should be close to 1 (assuming that you trust your observation). However, given
that you are confident in your programming abilities, and thus still confident that that the
objective conditional chance of ¬A given P is one in a million, you should, according to
Skyrms’ thesis, give very low credence to the subjunctive conditional P  ¬A. So Prob-
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abilistic Strong Centring fails. Moreover, since P(P ∧ ¬A) ≈ 1, P(¬P ∨ A) ≈ 0 even though
according to Skyrms’ thesis P(P  ¬A) ≈ 1. So Weak Centring fails.
Given other views on chance, Skyrms’ thesis is however consistent with both Centring
conditions. According to David Lewis [Lewis, 1980], chances evolves such that whenever
A turns out to be true the chance of A becomes 1 (and the chance of ¬A becomes 0). If
we, moreover, suppose that rational agents’ credence in chance hypothesis evolve in the
same way, then whenever an agent learns A ∧ B, she should, according to Skyrms’ thesis,
assign full credence to A  B (thus satisfying SC) and not accept P  ¬B (thus satisfying
WC). Since I will, in the rest of this thesis, take both Centring conditions as given, and also
endorse Skyrms’ thesis, I will have to assume that chances and rational credence in chance
hypotheses evolve the way Lewis suggests. However, I will not defend this theory of chance.
Chance is currently a very hotly debated topic, a discussion of which would take us too far
afield.
I should, however, add one more thing concerning the view on chance that I will assume.
Lewis famously thought that non-trivial objective chance and determinism were mutually
incompatible. To take an example, coin tosses obey the laws of mechanics, which means
that whether they land heads or tails is fully determined by their initial conditions and
other environmental factors. Hence, some, like Lewis, want to say that the chance of a coin
landing heads or tails on a particular occasion is either 0 or 1. In later chapters (in particular
chapter 6), I will assume that when a fair coin is properly tossed, it has a 0.5 (objective)
chance of landing either heads or tail. In this regards my view is in agreement with Frigg
and Hoefer’s (see in particular [Frigg and Hoefer, 2010]). However, other authors on chance
have modified Lewis’ theory such that it allows for ‘deterministic (non-trivial) chances’
without implying that the past can be chancy (see for instance [Loewer, 2001]).
To sum up: consistency requires that I adopt a view on chance that implies, firstly, that
only the future is chancy, and, secondly, that determinism is compatible with non-trivial
chance. I will not discuss the theory of chance in any more detail. Hoefer and Frigg’s view
on chance will reappear in the next chapter, where I show that contrary to appearances, the
multidimensional semantics is not incompatible with their view on chance. Even though I
do not, at this point in time, endorse Hoefer and Frigg’s view on chance, I don’t think that
our semantics for conditionals should exclude the view, which some find very attractive.
Hence, I do think that it is worth showing that the multidimensional semantics is consistent
with Hoefer and Frigg’s view.26
2.3.2 Conditional Excluded Middle
As already mentioned, the Conditional Excluded Middle (CEM) is the view that, for any
propositions A and B, at least one of A→ B and A→ ¬B is true. More formally:
For any A, B: (A→ B) ∨ (A→ ¬B)
CEM is widely widely held to be true of indicative conditionals. In fact, a probabilistic
version of CEM, P((A → B) ∨ (A → ¬B)) = 1, is implied by Adams’ thesis, if we assume
what I called the Conditional Consistency Condition (CC):
Theorem 10. AT implies Probabilistic CEM (given consistent antecedents).
26As an autobiographical note, it might be worth admitting that I have myself on previous occasions found
myself drawn to their Hoefer and Frigg’s view.
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Proof.
1. P(A→ B) = P(B | A), P(A→ ¬B) = P(¬B | A) [AT]
2. P(B | A) + P(¬B | A) = 1 [Probability calculus (PC)]
3. P(A→ B) + P(A→ ¬B) = 1 [From 1 and 2]
4. P((A→ B) ∧ (A→ ¬B)) = 0 [CC]
5. P((A→ B) ∨ (A→ ¬B)) = 1 [From 3 and 4 and PC] 
More controversial is whether CEM holds for subjunctive conditionals. In this section I will
discuss arguments for and against CEM for subjunctive conditionals (admittedly mainly for);
arguments that do not directly depend on any particular semantics for such conditionals.
But first a terminological note: to simplify the discussion, for any conditional A → B, I
will call A→ ¬B the converse of the first. Given this terminology, the CEM implies that if a
conditional is false, then its converse is true. (In other words, given CEM, the the negation
of a conditional implies the conditional’s converse.)
Intuitive arguments
Intuition seems to go in both directions regarding the subjunctive CEM (SCEM). Here is an
intuitive argument that it holds. Let us assume the ordinary principle of excluded middle
(EM), i.e. that for any A, either A or ¬A is true (I don’t know of any intuitive argument
against EM). Now intuitively, when we express subjunctive conditionals, such as A  B,
we make claims about hypothetical situations where it is true that A but otherwise differ
minimally from the situation in which the conditional was expressed. So to evaluate the
truth of A  B, we ‘zoom in on’ hypothetical situations where it is true that A. Given the
ordinary EM, whatever situation we zoom in on, either B or ¬B will be true in that situation.
Moreover, if we zoom in on more than one situation, and perhaps find no principled way of
arbitrating between them, it will be true in any of these situations that either B or ¬B. So it
seems we have an intuitive argument for CEM for subjunctive conditionals.
Someone might object that the fact that we may have no principled way of determining
whether the A∧ B situations or the A∧¬B situations are relevant for determining the truth
value of A  B, is a reason against CEM for subjunctive conditionals.27 But that thought
is in my view mistaken. There are many factual propositions, in particular propositions
concerning future events and the future acts of free agents, whose truth value is (even in
principle) impossible for us to determine. For instance, there is, as far as I can tell, no
reasonable way for me, or anyone else, to determine the truth value of the proposition that
I have a sandwich for lunch on December 1 2050. Even knowing all the facts of our world
won’t settle the matter, if we admit that people have, at least to some degree, freedom of
will. Nevertheless, either I will have a sandwich for lunch that day or I won’t. The fact that
we have no principled way of deciding between future paths of our world where I do and
where I don’t have the sandwich is thus, in and off itself, no argument against the ordinary
excluded middle: in all of these paths, the proposition in question is either true or false.
Similarly, the fact that we often have no principled way of determining whether the A ∧ B
situations or A∧¬B situations are relevant for determining the truth value of A  B – and
would not be able to do so even if we knew all the facts of our world – is, in and off itself,
no reason against subjunctive CEM.
27I thank Wlodek Rabinowicz for pressing me on this issue.
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David Lewis [Lewis, 1986a] has offered an example which many people seem to find
intuitive as an argument against subjunctive CEM. My view is that Lewis’ argument is an
instance of the mistake discussed in last paragraph. Consider the following conditional:
Conditional 18. If Verdi and Bizet had been compatriots, both would have been Italian.
Since Bizet was actually French and Verdi Italian, it seems plausible that if they had been
compatriots, then either Bizet had been Italian or Verdi had been French. It would be hard
to give an explanation of why, if we add the antecedent hypothetically to our stock of
knowledge, we would hypothetically conclude that they are both of some other nationality.
So if they had been compatriots, either both or neither had been Italian. But is conditional
18 true? No, says Lewis, since when we zoom in on situations just like ours except that Bizet
and Verdi are compatriots, we will find that both are Italian in some of them and both are
French in others. From this Lewis concludes that 18 must be false (since on his semantics,
A  B is true only if B is true in all the situations that we zoom in on to evaluate A  B ).
Does that mean that the following conditional is true?
Conditional 19. If Verdi and Bizet had been compatriots, it is false that both would have been
Italian.
By the same reasoning as before – zooming in on the relevant situations, Bizet and Verdi
are both French in some and both Italian in others – Lewis claims that conditional 19 is
false. If that is the case, then we have ¬(A  B) ∧ ¬(A  ¬B), which means that
¬(¬(A  B) ∨ (A  ¬B)). So subjunctive CEM fails.
I must admit that my pre-theoretical intuition, although not very strong, conflicts with
what Lewis’s theory predicts. In fact, Lewis’ himself admits that this implication of his theory
is not among its most intuitive parts.28 Others have taken the Veri-Bizet example to be a
convincing counterexample to the subjunctive CEM (see e.g. [Joyce, 1999]: 65). However,
what I said about the proposition that I will have a sandwich for lunch on December 1 2050
also holds, as far as I can tell, for the the Bizer-Verdi counterfactuals. That is, although the
facts of our world cannot even in principle determine their truth value, it is nevertheless the
case that they are either true or false.29
So intuition seems to go both ways when it comes to the subjunctive CEM. Moreover,
when evaluating this particular principle, I find it very hard to not first consider the more
general question ‘what makes a (subjunctive) conditional true?’ When one has already
decided on an answer to the latter question, the intuition concerning the former question
becomes much clearer. For instance, given Lewis’ semantics for counterfactuals, the Verdi-
Bizet example does provide a counterexample to the subjunctive CEM. But that, in itself,
does of course not mean that the principle is false. However, if we can derive CEM from more
fundamental (and more widely accepted) principles, then that would, in my view, provide
much stronger arguments for this highly abstract principle than any concrete examples can
be expected to do. In next subsection I will discuss two such arguments.
28Lewis in fact goes so far as saying that what he wants to say about the Bizer-Verdi counterfactual intuitively
sounds like a contradiction ([Lewis, 1986a]: 80).
29Robert Stalnaker suggests that since since the facts of our world do neither determine the truth nor falsity of the
Bizer-Verdi counterfactual, it is indeterminate (see e.g. [Stalnaker, 1984], [Stalnaker, 1981]). Given a supervaluationist
account of indeterminacy, he then salvages CEM. A similar argument can be (and often is) made for propositions
concerning future events, and the actions of free agents, to explain why the ordinary excluded middle is true, even
though the facts of our world don’t often neither determine the truth or falsity of a proposition.
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Formal arguments
Charles B. Cross [Cross, 2009] provides a more formal argument for subjunctive CEM that
relies on a principle Cross calls ‘Maximal Preservation’. Cross (ibid, 178) formulates the
principle as follows:
Thesis 19 (Maximal Preservation). Every self-consistent counterfactual supposition preserves
as much of the actual truth as possible while consistently accommodating the truth of what is
counterfactually supposed.
How much is ‘possible’ to preserve given any supposition is of course relative to the agent’s
total belief, the condition supposed true and the mode of the supposition. But it seems
reasonable that for any particular belief set S and any particular proposition A, it should
at least be determined how much it is possible to preserve of S while counterfactually (or
subjunctively) supposing A. Now suppose that subjunctive CEM fails. Then it must be
possible that there are propositions A and B such that both A  B and A  ¬B are false;
in other words, there exists a possible world where both A  B and A  ¬B are false. For
any particular world w, call the set {α : A  α} the ‘set of A’s counterfactual consequents’
in that world; let {α : A w α} represent that set in world w. Then when subjunctive
CEM fails, there is a proposition A and a world w such that the set of A’s counterfactual
consequents at w neither includes B nor ¬B. Given the ordinary excluded middle, however,
either B or ¬B will be true at w. Now suppose that B is true at w. Then Maximal Preservation
is violated, since {α : A w α}⋃{B} is consistent (none of the αs are ¬B), accommodates
A and preserves strictly more than {α : A w α} of what is true at w. By same reasoning,
Maximal Preservation is violated if ¬B is true at w. If CEM does not fail at w, however,
then Maximal Preservation is not violated, since {α : A w α}⋃{B} will then either be
inconsistent or preserve equally as much as {α : A w α} of what is true at w. So if we want
to accept Maximal Preservation, we must accept subjunctive CEM.
Robert G. Williams [Williams, 2010] discusses another formal argument for subjunctive
CEM based on first and second order logic. Williams’ argument has three premises (which
I have slightly modified):
• First premise: The following are equivalent:
A: No student would have passed if they had goofed off
B: Every student would have failed to pass if they had goofed off.
• Second premise: A and B can be formalised respectively as follows (where S is the
predicate ‘... is a student’, G is the predicate ‘... goofs off’ and A is the predicate
‘...passes’):
A*: ¬∃x(Sx ⊃ (Gx  Px))
B*: ∀x(Sx ⊃ (Gx  ¬Px))
• Third premise: ∀F[¬∃x(Gx ⊃ Fx)↔ ∀x(Fx ⊃ ¬Gx)]
Now by premise 3, A* is equivalent to:
C*. ∀x(Sx ⊃ ¬(Gx  Px))
But then C* is identical to B*: C* is equivalent to A*, which by premise 2 is equivalent to A,
which by premise 1 is equivalent to B, which in turn by premise 2 is equivalent to B*.
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The argument can be generalised:
Proof.
The following seem to be logical truths:
1. ∀F,G,H[¬∃x(Fx ⊃ (Hx  Gx))↔ ∀x(Fx ⊃ (Hx  ¬Gx))]
2. ∀F ,G[¬∃x(F x ⊃ Gx)↔ ∀x(F x ⊃ ¬Gx)]
But from this it follows that:
3. ¬∃x(Fx ⊃ (Hx  Gx))↔ ∀x(Fx ⊃ ¬(Hx  Gx)) [By 2]
4. ∀x(Fx ⊃ ¬(Hx  Gx))↔ ∀x(Fx ⊃ (Hx  ¬Gx)) [By 1 and 3]
Now since 4 holds for all F, G, and H, ¬(Hx  Gx) and (Hx  ¬Gx)
are logically equivalent. 
So we have good general reasons for accepting CEM. Moreover, the conditionals that I use
to motivate this thesis clearly satisfy CEM. Therefore, it might be possible to deny CEM for
some subclass of the set of subjunctive conditionals, but nevertheless accept that they hold
for the conditionals that I am working with. This is fortunate, since the semantics that I use
when introducing counterfactuals to Jeffrey’s decision theory (and discuss in next chapter)
implies CEM for both indicatives and subjunctives.
2.4 Concluding Remarks
I will conclude by just briefly summarising what I have done in this chapter. I have argued
that conditionals in general should satisfy the Ramsey test, Centring and the Conditional
Excluded Middle; and that most indicative conditionals in addition satisfy both Indepen-
dence and Adams’s thesis, but that subjunctive conditionals in general satisfy neither of
these. Instead, subjunctive conditionals satisfy Skyrms’ thesis. In next chapter I will discuss
and further develop a recent Multidimensional Possible World Semantics for Conditionals.
Appendix: AT and Independence (proof)
Theorem 11. Given MP and CEM, AT and Independence are equivalent.
Proof. In proving this theorem I will rely on the following Lemma:
Lemma 2. SC and MP together entail that (A ∧ B) is logically equivalent to (A ∧ (A→ B)).
Proof.
(1) (A ∧ B) ⊃ (A→ B) [SC]
(2) (A ∧ B) ⊃ A [by def. of ‘∧’]
(3) (A ∧ B) ⊃ (A ∧ (A→ B)) [from 1 and 2]
(4) (A ∧ (A→ B)) ⊃ B [by MP]
(5) A ⊃ A [logical truth]
(6) (A ∧ (A→ B)) ⊃ (A ∧ B) [by 5 and 6]
Hence, (A ∧ B) is logically equivalent to (A ∧ (A→ B) [from 3 and 6] 
Since Adams’ thesis implies both SC and MP, the Lemma shows that AT implies that (A∧B) is
logically equivalent to (A∧(A→ B)); which of course implies that P(A∧(A→ B)) = P(A∧B).
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Now notice that we can equivalently state Independence as follows:
P(A ∧A→ B) = P(A).P(A→ B) (2.7)
(since P(A→ B | A) = P(A→ B ∧A)/P(A).)
AT by itelf implies Independence: P(A ∧A→ B) = P(A ∧ B) = P(B | A).P(A) = P(A→
B).P(A) (the second equality follows from the definition of conditional probability; the last
equality from AT).
Independence and MP+CEM together imply AT: We have seen that CEM and Weak
Centring, which as we have seen is logically equivalent to MP, together imply Strong Cen-
tring (SC). Hence, given what was said above, it follows from CEM+MP that P(A ∧ (A →
B)) = P(A∧B). Thus, we have given Independence, MP and SC: P(A).P(A→ B) = P(A∧A→
B) = P(A ∧ B). Hence, P(A→ B) = P(A ∧ B)
P(A)
= P(B | A).
So, given MP and CEM, AT and Independence are equivalent. 
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Chapter 3
Multidimensional Semantics for Conditionals
3.1 Introduction
In this chapter I discuss the semantical system that I will later use to introduce counterfactual
prospects to Richard Jeffrey’s decision theory. The main justification for using this particular
semantics is that it works quite well for these decision-theoretic purposes. But in this chapter
I try to show that the semantics is, independently of such purposes, quite plausible and solves
some of the problems we saw in last chapter. The main original contribution of the chapter
is that I show that the semantics is more permissive and general than Richard Bradley’s
[Bradley, 2012] original formulation of it suggested. Moreover, I show that contrary to
what Bradley’s formulation may have suggested, it is consistent with a particular (Humean)
metaphysical view, which some people find attractive. As I briefly explained in last chapter,
I am myself no longer entirely convinced of the metaphysical view that I discuss in this
chapter. However, I think that our semantics for conditionals shouldn’t be inconsistent
with a metaphysical view that many people endorse. Hence, I think that it is important to
establish that the two are consistent. (All sections of this chapter except 3.6 and 3.8 are from
[Stefa´nsson, 2014c].)
3.2 Probability and Metaphysics of Conditionals
Recall that according to what we might call the ‘Ramsey view’, there is a tight connection
between the probabilities of conditionals and conditional probabilities. Moreover, recall
from last chapter that there are two types of conditionals in ordinary language, roughly
speaking corresponding to two types of probabilities. The probabilities of one type of
conditionals, often called indicative conditionals, equal the subjective conditional probabilities
of their consequents given their antecedents. (In last chapter I called this view on indicatives
‘Adams’ thesis’.) The other type of conditionals is often called subjunctive conditionals, and
the probabilities of such conditionals, according to this version of the Ramsey view, equal
(roughly) the objective conditional probabilities of their consequents given their antecedent.
(Recall that for the present purposes, I take subjunctives and counterfactuals to be the same
kind of conditional.) Of course, one rarely has direct access to objective chances (unlike
subjective probabilities). However, this view says that one should set one’s credence in
a counterfactual according to ones expectation of the objective conditional chance of its
consequent given its antecedent. (In last chapter I called this ‘Skyrms’ thesis’.)
According to a popular view on the metaphysics of modality, which I will call the
‘Humean Supervenience view’, modal facts – i.e. facts about conditionals, objective proba-
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bilities, etc. – supervene on non-modal ones. In other words, if two possible worlds differ
in what modal facts are true at them, then they also differ in what non-modal facts are
true at them. David Lewis, who was the first to give the name ‘Humean Supervenience’
to the metaphysical view under discussion,1 expressed what I take to be the two ideas that
together give the Humeans Supervenience view its intuitive appeal, when he claimed that,
firstly, all contingent facts are implied by the most fundamental facts, and, secondly, the
most fundamental facts concern spatiotemporal relations and local qualities (see e.g. [Lewis,
1994]: 474-4). Together, these two ideas entail that all facts, modal or non-modal, are implied
by a particular class of non-modal facts, namely, those concerning spatiotemporal relations
and local qualities. But if that is the case, then two possible worlds2 that differ in modal
facts must differ in non-modal facts. In other words, modal facts supervene on non-modal
facts.3
According to the version of the Humean Supervenience view that I will focus on in this
chapter, both past and future events can be chancy (for a defence of such a view, see e.g.
[Hoefer, 2007], [Frigg and Hoefer, 2010] and [Frigg and Hoefer, ta]). That is, both future
and past events can have an objective probability that falls strictly between 0 and 1. One
way to motivate the idea that the past as well as the future can be chancy, is to assume
that objective probabilities – or chances, as I will from now on call them – do not supervene
on facts about particular events but on facts about event-types (as I briefly mentioned in last
chapter). Suppose E is a sentence expressing the occurrence of an event e. Then the chance of
e and the chance of E’s truth, on this version of Humean Supervenience, does not supervene
on facts about this particular event e, but on facts about events like e. Hence, it might well
happen that although e did not take place, so E turns out to be false, the chance of E’s truth
is still very high.
When combined with Skyrms’ thesis, the above version of Humean Supervenience has
immediate implications for the relation between non-modal facts and subjunctive condi-
tionals. In particular, as we saw in last chapter, these two views are together incompatible
with both Strong and Weak Centring. On the face of it, it might seem impossible to find a
single semantical system for conditionals that implies the above views for both indicative
and subjunctive conditionals, while being at the same time consistent with Humean Super-
venience. Firstly, many philosophers are of the opinion that David Lewis’ famous triviality
results (proved in [Lewis, 1976] and [Lewis, 1986b]) imply that indicative conditionals can-
not both supervene on non-modal facts and satisfy Adams’ thesis (see for instance [Bradley,
2012]: 557). Thus, any Humean Supervenience view might seem incompatible with the
version of the Ramsey view discussed above. Secondly, we have seen that Adams’ thesis
implies Centring. Hence, it might seem impossible for the same semantical system to imply
both Adams’ and Skyrms’ thesis, while being consistent with the version of the Humean
Supervenience view discussed above.
Below I show that Richard Bradley’s recent Multidimensional Possible World Semantics
(MD-semantics) for conditionals [Bradley, 2012] can simultaneously satisfy the above views.
In other words, I will show that contrary to what e.g. Bradley himself suggests, we can
have a semantics of conditionals that implies both Adams’ and Skyrms’ theses (without
1The view is named after David Hume, “the greater denier of necessary connections” ([Lewis, 1987]: ix).
2Or, on Lewis’ view, two worlds like ours (see e.g. [Lewis, 1987]). For the present purposes, I will treat
supervenience theses as being either necessarily true or necessarily false.
3Various empirical and metaphysical objections have been raised against Humean Supervenience. I will not
try to defend the view against these objections, but will rather focus on trying to make it compatible with the
aforementioned view on the probability of conditionals.
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encountering triviality problems) while satisfying Humean Supervenience. I will do so by
showing that contrary to what Bradley’s own formulation suggests, we can derive the so-
called Ramsey test from the MD-semantics without first adding Centring. Having derived the
Ramsey test, we can, given an additional assumption, derive Adams’ thesis for indicatives
and Skyrms’ thesis for subjunctives. This entails that Centring must hold for indicatives, but
will imply the failure of Centring for subjunctives given the above interpretation of chance.
Finally, I show that we can add a supervenience constraint on the MD-semantics, such that
conditionals supervene on non-modal facts, without having to worry about triviality (again,
contrary to what Bradley suggests).
3.3 The Multidimensional Semantics
Bradley’s MD-semantics is based on the observation that a person’s uncertainty as to the truth
of sentences is of (at least) two kinds: uncertainty about what is the case and uncertainty
about what would be the case under a supposition. In the language of possible worlds,
people are both uncertain as to which world is actual and uncertain as to which worlds are
counter-actual4 under different suppositions. The basic ingredients in the MD-semantics
are n-tuples of worlds 〈wi,wAj,wBk,wCl, ...〉, where wi is a candidate for the actual world, wAj
a counter-actual world under the supposition that A (where A is a factual sentence), wBk a
counteractual world under the supposition that B, etc. Thus we can interpret each n-tuple as
the event that wi is the actual world, wAj a counteractual world under the supposition that A,
etc. I will for now focus on a single supposition, a supposition that A, but the results I state
for the framework hold for multiple suppositions as well (see [Bradley, 2012]: sec. 7). And I
will use an ordered pair 〈wi,w j〉 to represent the event that the first element, wi, is the actual
world and the second element, w j, the counteractual world under the supposition that A.
To keep things simple, let us for the moment assume that there are only four possible
worlds to consider: w1 to w4. Let us moreover assume that sentence A is true at worlds w1
and w2 but sentence B at worlds w1 and w3. The semantic content, or meaning, of the factual
sentence A is then the set of pairs (constructed from these four worlds) whose first element
is either w1 or w2; and the semantic content of the conditional sentence A → B is the set of
pairs whose second member is w1. Putting this information in tabular form makes it much
easier to grasp. The first table represents how we have matched up worlds and sentences:
B ¬B
A w1 w2
¬A w3 w4
The next table represents the semantic content of sentences. The columns of the table give
the content of conditional sentences; the first column the content of the sentence A→ B, the
second the content of the sentence A→ ¬B. Thus, the first column gives the truth conditions
of A→ B; any of the pairs in this column make the conditional true. The rows represent the
semantic content of factual sentences; the first and second row, for instance, the content of
sentence A but the first and third the content of sentence B. Thus the first two rows give the
truth conditions of A; any of the pairs in these rows make this factual sentence true.
4This terminology is borrowed from [Bradley, 2012].
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W1 W2
W1 〈w1,w1〉 〈w1,w2〉
W2 〈w2,w1〉 〈w2,w2〉
W3 〈w3,w1〉 〈w3,w2〉
W4 〈w4,w1〉 〈w4,w2〉
The content of a sentence, on my understanding, is a proposition. Let α represent the
proposition expressed by the sentence A and β the proposition expressed by B. Then the
proposition α is just the set of pairs of worlds in the first and second row and the proposition
α→ β the set of pairs of worlds in the first column.
As the above table indicates, the MD-semantics entails the truth of the Conditional Ex-
cluded Middle (CEM); that is, the principle that for all sentences A and B, either A → B or
A → ¬B is true. For given the ordinary excluded middle, either B or ¬B is true at each
counteractual A-world. But the semantics also respects the intuition, discussed in last chap-
ter, that for some sentences B, the facts of the actual world might determine the truth of
neither A→ B nor A→ ¬B. (For instance, the facts of the actual world might not determine
whether Bizet would be Italian or not, had he and Verdi been compatriots.) In general
it is not necessarily the case, on the MD-semantics, that the (non-modal) facts of a world
determine what conditionals are true (as further discussed in section 3.7). Nevertheless, it
must be true that whatever world is counteractual under the supposition that A, either B or
¬B is true at that world.5
3.4 The Ramsey Test without Centring
Many authors on the logic and semantics of conditionals have taken some version of the
Ramsey test thesis (RT) as one of the desiderata that any theory of conditionals must satisfy.
In this section I will focus on what I called the strong Ramsey test, which, recall, says that
for any (propositions or sentences) A, B, and any rational credence function P:
P(A→ B) = PA(B) (3.1)
In other words, our degree of belief in the conditional A → B should be identical to our
degree of belief in B upon the supposition that A.
In Bradley’s own presentation of the MD-semantics, he derives the Strong Ramsey test
after having added Centring to his semantics (see [Bradley, 2012]: sec. 5). Recall that Strong
and Weak Centring are the respectively following two principles: ∅ ` (A ∧ B) ⊃ (A → B),
∅ ` (A → B) ⊃ (A ⊃ B). Stated probabilistically, the two principles respectively say that for
any A, B: P(A ∧ B) ≤ P(A→ B), P(A→ B) ≤ P(A ⊃ B).
On the MD-semantics, and given our toy-model from above, adding the semantical Cen-
tring condition eliminates the possibility that w1 is the actual world and w2 counteractual
under the supposition that A (i.e. 〈w1,w2〉). For A is true at w1, which with Centring means
that if w1 is the actual world, then the counteractual world under the supposition that A must
also be w1. By the same reasoning, Centring eliminates (from our toy-model) the possibility
5Below I suggest certain generalisations of the MD-semantics. Wlodek Rabinowicz has pointed out to me that
one could generalise the semantics even further, in a way that would not make the CEM come out true: instead of
assuming that given any elementary possibility, each supposition corresponds to a single world, one could assume
that each supposition corresponds to a set of worlds. This is certainly something that I intend to explore further.
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〈w2,w1〉. Thus when Centring is added, the table above which represented the semantic
content of sentences becomes:
W1 W2
W1 〈w1,w1〉
W2 〈w2,w2〉
W3 〈w3,w1〉 〈w3,w2〉
W4 〈w4,w1〉 〈w4,w2〉
Below I show that contrary to what Bradley’s original presentation of the MD-semantics
suggested, the Strong Ramsey test follows from the MD-semantics with or without Centring.
The importance to Humeans of being able to derive the Ramsey test without assuming
Centring will be made clear in next section. But it might be worth noting again that even
those who are not motivated by a Humean metaphysics might find it desirable to be able
to derive RT without assuming Centring. Many authors on the logic of conditionals have
pointed out that the strong Centring condition seems particularly counterintuitive. Are we
for instance willing to infer from the fact that David Cameron was Prime Minister of the UK
in 2013 and England made it to the 2014 World Cup, that “had Cameron been the UK Prime
Minister in 2013, England would have made it to the 2014 World Cup”? As I said in last
chapter, I must assume that the answer to this question is ‘yes’. However, I do admit that
that might be counterintuitive.
Before deriving the Ramsey test, we need some additional assumptions and notation. Let
P be a probability mass function on the set W of worlds that measures the probability of any
world being the actual one; Q a probability mass function on the subset of W where A is true
(which I will call WA) that measures the probability of any world being counteractual under
the supposition that A; and Pr a joint probability mass function on pairs of worlds, where
e.g.Pr(〈wi,w j〉) measures the probability that wi is the actual world and w j the counteractual
world under the supposition that A.
Bradley assumes the following relationship between Pr and P and Q:
Assumption 2 (Marginalisation).
1.
∑
wi∈W
Pr(〈wi,w j〉) = Q(w j)
2.
∑
w j∈WA
Pr(〈wi,w j〉) = P(wi)
Now let Pr( · | wi) be the conditional probability mass function on WA, given that wi is the
actual world. In other words, the function measures, for any w j, the conditional probability
that w j is counteractual under the supposition that A, given that wi is actual. From the two
marginalisation properties it follows that:
Pr(〈wi,w j〉) = P(wi).Pr(w j | wi) (3.2)
Properties like these are standard in probability theory and statistics. I will thus not discuss
their justification. Given Marginalisation, the uncertainty in our toy-model above can be
represented by:6
6Since it follows from centring, like the discussion above illustrates, that Pr(w1 | w1) = 1 and Pr(w2 | w1) = 0,
an agent’s state of uncertainty given Centring can be represented as:
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W1 W2
W1 P(w1).Pr(w1 | w1) P(w1).Pr(w2 | w1)
W2 P(w2).Pr(w1 | w2) P(w2).Pr(w2 | w3)
W3 P(w3).Pr(w1 | w3) P(w3).Pr(w2 | w3)
W4 P(w4).Pr(w1 | w4) P(w4).Pr(w2 | w4)
We can now show that the Ramsey test follows from the MD-semantics with the above
assumption. (Notice that Centring is nowhere assumed in the following argument.) Given
the MD-semantics, and how we have paired up worlds and sentences, the truth conditions
of the sentence A→ B are given in the first column of the table. From the second marginal-
isation property and the marginalisation implication it follows that the total probability of
this column is Q(w1), i.e. the probability of w1 being the counteractual world under the
supposition that A. So P(A → B) = Q(w1). But w1 is the only A-world where B is true.
Hence, Q(w1) simply measures the probability of B under the supposition that A. So the
probability of A→ B is the probability of B under the supposition that A, in accordance with
the Quantitative RT.
The above result holds in general. In the simple example we have been working with,
there is only one A-world where B holds. Dropping that assumption does not undermine
the result.
Theorem 12. The MD-semantics entails the Quantitative RT.
Proof. Assume that there are multiple A-worlds where B holds, call them wi, w j, ... wm. Then
the truth condition of A→ B is given by the columns Wi, W j, ... Wm. Each of these columns
has probability Q(wi), Q(w j), etc. Thus, we have P(A → B) = Q(wi) + Q(w j) + ...Q(wm) =
Q(wi ∨w j ∨ ...wm) (since worlds are mutually exclusive). ButQ(wi ∨w j ∨ ...wm) just measures
the probability of B under the supposition that A. Hence, P(A→ B) = PA(B). 
3.5 Adams’ Thesis, Skyrms’ Thesis and Centring
Recall that there are different ways one can suppose something to be true. In particular,
there is a difference between supposing that, as a matter of fact, A is true; versus supposing
that, contrary to fact, A is true (see e.g. [Joyce, 1999]: ch. 6). The probability of B under the
supposition that A often varies significantly depending on the mode of supposition. When
we suppose that, as a matter of fact, Oswald did not kill Kennedy, most of us (hypothetically)
conclude that someone else killed Kennedy. For we are pretty certain that Kennedy was in
fact murdered. Similarly, we attach high probability to the indicative conditional: “If Oswald
did not kill Kennedy, then someone else did”. However, when we suppose that, contrary to
fact, Oswald did not kill Kennedy, most of us (hypothetically) conclude that nobody killed
Kennedy. For most of us (presumably) do not believe that there was a conspiracy to murder
Kennedy. Similarly, we attach low probability to the counterfactual: “If Oswald had not
killed Kennedy, someone else would have.”
W1 W2
W1 P(w1) 0
W2 0 P(w2)
W3 P(w3).Pr(w1 | w3) P(w3).Pr(w2 | w3)
W4 P(w4).Pr(w1 | w4) P(w4).Pr(w2 | w4)
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One of the appeals of the Ramsey test, as mentioned in last chapter, is that since it is
general enough to allow for different types of suppositions, it can be interpreted such that
it becomes appropriate for either indicative or subjunctive conditionals. Recall that I am
assuming that with indicative conditionals the appropriate supposition is matter-of-factual
– or, as it is often called, evidential – and that such suppositions are characterised by Bayesian
conditioning. Adding this assumption to the strong Ramsey test gives us Adams’ thesis, i.e.
the view that for any A, B and any rational credence function P: P(A 7→ B) = P(B | A).
Bradley shows that we can derive Adams’ thesis from the MD-semantics, when we
add Centring to the semantics and two conditions that are appropriate for evidential sup-
positions ([Bradley, 2012]: 562-563). Implying AT is arguably the main advantage of the
MD-semantics, since it shows that contrary to a popular view, Lewis’ famous triviality re-
sults do not show that it is impossible to give truth conditions for conditionals that satisfy
AT in a non-trivial language. Bradley himself suggests that his semantics can imply AT
while avoiding the triviality results because the semantics, as he formulates it, violates the
thesis of Humean Supervenience ([Bradley, 2012]: 557): what counterfacts are true, on the
MD-semantics as he formulates it, does not supervene on the actual (or non-modal) facts.
However, as I show in next section, even if we add a Humean Supervenience constraint
onto the MD-semantics, it sill implies AT without running into triviality problems. So the
violation of Humean Supervenience cannot be the reason the MD-semantics can validate
AT in a non-trivial language. Rather, it seems the reason simply is that even if we assume
that counterfacts supervene on on the facts, the counterfacts are not, in this semantics, de-
termined by the facts in the particular way that is commonly assumed in the triviality results
(see e.g. overview in [Ha´jek and Hall, 1994]). In particular, the truth of B does not determine
that A 7→ B is true, as these results assume.
If we first add what I have called the “Principal Suppositional Principle” (PSP) to the
MD-semantics, then we can (as we saw in last chapter) derive AT from the semantics without
first adding Centring. For the present purposes, we need to formalise the PSP as follows:
Assumption 3 (PSP). Q(B |Wi) = Chwi (B | A)
Generalised to the case where there is uncertainty about the chances, this version of PSP
says:
Q(B) =
∑
i
Chwi (B | A).Q(Wi) (3.3)
Recall from last chapter that to get AT from equation 3.3 and the Ramsey test, we assume
that when the supposition is evidential, Q(Wi) equals P(Wi | A). We also saw in last chapter
that from an equation like 3.3 and RT we can derive Skyrms’ thesis, if we assume that when
the supposition is contrary-to-factual, Q(Wi) equals P(Wi).
So we have derived Adams’s thesis for indicative conditionals and Skyrms’ thesis for
subjunctive conditionals from the MD-semantics with the addition of the PSP. And we have
done so without adding Centring as a semantic constraint. Nevertheless, it is clear that
Centring must hold for indicatives in this system, given that Adams’ thesis holds for such
conditionals, since Adam’s thesis implies both Strong Centring and Weak Centring, as I
proved in last chapter. The same is not true for Skyrms’ thesis. Without any particular
interpretation of chance, ST is compatible Centring being either true or false.
However, as we saw in last chapter, the view that chances supervene on facts about
event-types, which implies that the past can sometimes be chancy, means that Centring is
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inconsistent with Skyrms’ thesis. This should convince those who accept this particular
Humean view of the importance of being able to derive Skyrms’ thesis from the MD-
semantics without adding first a semantic Centring condition. For this shows that those
who accept the above view on chance and also believe that subjunctive conditionals express
objective-chance dependencies, can view the MD-semantics as providing a semantical un-
derpinnings for their philosophical views. More generally, it is useful to know that we can
accept this intuitively plausible notion of chance without giving up the hope of a unified
theory of conditionals that implies AT for indicatives and ST for subjunctives.
3.6 Avoiding triviality
We have seen that the MD-semantics implies Adams’ thesis while giving truth conditions for
indicative conditionals as well as subjunctives. So it must somehow avoid Lewis’ triviality
result. Considering our possible world toy-model above, we can see why Lewis’ result is
not sound given this semantics: we cannot assume (as Lewis does) that P(A 7→ B | B) = 1
(this is what Hajek and Hall call Lewis’ “key maneuver” [Ha´jek and Hall, 1994]: 89). So
contrary to what is standardly assumed, the truth of B does not determine, according to this
semantics, that A 7→ B is true.
Let’s see more precisely how the model I have been working with violates Lewis’ key
maneuver. With the assignments of worlds to sentences I used above, we have B = {<
w3,w1 >}⋃{< w3,w2 >}⋃{< w1,w1 >}⋃{< w1,w2 >}. But the conditional A 7→ B is neither
true in < w3,w2 > nor < w1,w2 >, so as long as these have a positive probability, then
P(A 7→ B | B) , 1. Now of course, Centring, which I have suggested we must accept, implies
that P(< w1,w2 >) = 0 (given our example). But we have no justification for assuming that
P(< w3,w2 >) = 0. Hence, one of the assumptions of Lewis’ triviality result is not satisfied
in this model.
It follows from the axioms of probability that P(p | p ∧ q) = 1.7 Hence, in the MD-
semantics, the equality between P(A 7→ B | B) and P(B | A ∧ B) must not hold, in general, in
spite of the equality between P(A 7→ B) and P(B | A). Given the last equality, P(A 7→ B | B) is
identical to P(B 7→ (A 7→ B)). So the lesson to be learnt is that while the MD-semantics implies
Adams’ thesis for simple conditionals, it does not do so for conditionals with conditional
consequents.
To see that Leitgeb’s triviality result is unsound for MD-semantics, recall that he assumes
that any counterfactual A  B is either true or false at wi; and that if the counterfactual
is true at wi, then P(A  B ∧ wi) = P(wi). Now given MD-semantics, a counterfactual is
not simply true or false at a world; it depends also on what are the relevant counter-worlds.
Moreover, even if, say, wi happens to be the actual world and A  B is actually true, it
does not follow, on the MD-semantics, that P(A  B ∧ wi) = P(wi). For instance, say that
< w3,w1 > is actually true. Given our toy-model, A  B is then a true counterfactual. But
our model also has the possibility < w3,w2 >, and w2 is an A-world where B is false. So
P(w3) (which I understand as the probability of w3 being the actual world) is not identical to
P(A  B ∧ w3) even though the counterfactual happens to be true at w3.
However, Leitgeb’s proof can be made sound given MD-semantics if, instead of talking of
a counterfactual being either true or false at wi, we assume in the proof that a counterfactual
is either true or false at any pair < wi,w j >. But then we no longer have a triviality result. For
7P(p | p ∧ q) = P(p ∧ p ∧ q)
P(p ∧ q) =
P(p ∧ q)
P(p ∧ q) = 1.
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the triviality consisted in conditional chances at a world being either 0 or 1. However, since
Leitgeb’s proof, to be sound given MD-semantics, can only assume that a counterfactual is
either true or false given any pair consisting of a world and a counter-world, but not true or
false given simply any world, the result is that at any particular world and counter-world pair,
the conditional chance of B given A must be either 0 or 1. But that is as it should be, and
does not trivialise conditional chance: given any pair consisting of an actual world and a
counterfactual A-world, the conditional chance of B given A should be either 0 or 1. For once
we have fixed the attention on a particular counteractual A-world, B is either true or false at
that world. But this does not mean that at any actual actual world wi, the conditional chance
of B given A must be either of these extremes, since wi may take a number of counteractual
A-worlds, and in some of these B may be true but in others B may be false.
3.7 Facts, counterfacts and Supervenience
The strongest metaphysical assumption of the MD-semantics, as originally presented by
Bradley, is that counterfacts do not supervene on non-modal facts. (Nor does the converse
hold.) To be precise, here is how I will be using the term ‘supervenience’:
Definition 2 (Fact/Counter-fact Supervenience). Counter-facts supervene on non-modal facts
just in case no two worlds can differ in counterfacts without also differing in non-modal facts, but
non-modal facts supervene on counterfacts just in case no two worlds can differ in non-modal facts
without also differing in counter-facts.
In our toy-model above, for instance, even after adding centring, we have both 〈w3,w1〉 and
〈w3,w2〉 as possibilities. The first element of these two pairs is the same, and thus these two
possibilities share all non-modal facts. Nevertheless, differ in what conditionals they make
true. For instance, in the first case, A → B is true, but in the second case, A → ¬B is true,
despite no difference in non-modal facts. Thus, conditionals do not supervene on (non-
modal) facts – and hence, given Skyrms’ thesis, chances do not supervene on (non-modal)
facts either8 – contrary to the intuitively plausible Humean Supervenience view.
As I previously discussed, it is the failure of the facts of the actual world to determine
the counterfacts – and hence the failure of the counterfacts to supervene on the facts – that
that explains how the Conditional Excluded Middle can hold even thought the facts of the
world might neither determine the truth of A→ B nor A→ ¬B. Bradley, moreover, seems to
imply that it is this failure of supervenience that makes the accommodation of Adams’ thesis
possible within a truth-conditional semantics for non-trivial languages ([Bradley, 2012]: 557).
However, as I will now show, it is possible to make counterfacts supervene on (non-modal)
facts in the MD-semantics without encountering triviality. Unfortunately, then we no longer
have an explanation for the aforementioned intuition about CEM. But that is perhaps a price
that Humeans are willing to pay.
To show that we can add a supervenience constraint on the MD-semantics without hav-
ing to worry about triviality, I will focus on showing that Lewis’ “key manoeuver” ([Ha´jek
and Hall, 1994]: 89) does still not hold. The key manoeuver, recall, is to show that Adams’
thesis implies that for all A, B, such that P(A ∧ B) > 0, P(A 7→ B | B) = P(B | A ∧ B) = 1.
This is not an assumption that we can, in general, make in the MD-semantics, as we have
8ST implies that two worlds cannot differ in counterfactuals without differing in chances; in other words, coun-
terfactual conditionals supervene on chances. But then if chances supervene on facts, counterfactuals supervene
on facts (since supervenience is a transitive relation). So if conditionals in general do not supervene on facts, then,
given Skyrms’ thesis, chances cannot supervene on facts either.
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seen. Now let us add to the model the assumption that each world is only compatible with
one possible counteractual A-world (but the converse does not hold). In other words, we
assume that counterfacts supervene on (non-modal) facts. Suppose for instance that w4 is
only compatible with w1 as a counteractual A world and w3 is only compatible with w2 as a
counteractual A world. We can represent this by the following table:
W1 W2
W1 〈w1,w1〉
W2 〈w2,w2〉
W3 〈w3,w2〉
W4 〈w4,w1〉
From the above table we should see that we can still not assume P(A → B | B) = 1. For
given our assignment of sentences to worlds (which was perfectly legitimate, given this
semantics), we now have B = {〈w1,w1〉}⋃{〈w3,w2〉}. And recall that A → B is not true in
〈w3,w2〉 (since B is not true in the A-world w2). Hence, P(A→ B | B) , 1. But all ingredients
needed to derive the Ramsey test (and Adams’ thesis) are still in place. So after adding this
supervenience relation, we still have a semantical model for indicative conditionals where
AT holds for a non-trivial language (contrary to what Bradley suggests).
In fact, something even stronger holds: if counterfacts supervene on facts and facts su-
pervene on counter-facts, then the MD-semantics does still not lead to triviality.9 To establish
this stronger claim, I will enrich our toy-model slightly, but use only four basic sentences:
A, B, ¬A and ¬B. The n-tuple 〈w1,w1,w1,w3,w2〉 now represents the possibility that w1 is the
actual world, w1 counteractual under the supposition that A, w1 also counteractual under
the supposition that B, w3 counteractual under the supposition that¬A and w2 counteractual
under the supposition that ¬B. Then for each candidate for actuality, the following table
might represent counter-worlds under different suppositions:
〈W,WA,WB,W¬A,W¬B〉
W1 〈w1,w1,w1,w3,w2〉
W2 〈w2,w2,w1,w3,w2〉
W3 〈w3,w2,w3,w3,w2〉
W4 〈w4,w1,w1,w4,w4〉
The above possibility space satisfies the constraint that counterfacts supervene on non-
modal facts – no two possibilities differ in counter-worlds without differing in actual worlds
– and the constraint that non-modal facts supervene on counterfacts – no possibilities differ
in actual worlds without differing in some counter-worlds. In addition, it satisfies Centring.
But here we should see that we still cannot assume that P(A → B | B) = 1. For instance, if
world w2 is actual, and thus 〈w2,w2,w1,w3,w2〉 is the n-tuple that describes the actual and
counteractual worlds under different suppositions, then B is actually true but nevertheless
A → B is false. Hence, we certainly cannot assume that in general, P(A → B | B) = 1. But
everything needed to derive AT is still in place.
9Given my proof in last chapter that Strong and Weak Centring together imply supervenience in the latter
direction, the possibility of strengthening the result from last paragraph in this way should not come as a surprise,
given that the weaker result holds even with SC and WC.
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Should we then, when using the MD-semantics to represent conditionals and rational
attitudes to them, in general work with models containing either or both supervenience
constraints discussed above? I think not. Firstly, such constraints only make sense if we
are working with models where the worlds are sufficiently fine-grained. Even Humeans
should accept that a description of the actual world only implies what conditionals are true
if the description contains all (non-modal) facts of the world. But even the most rational
agents are of course unaware of some facts of their worlds. Therefore, when constructing
possible world models to represent rational attitudes to conditionals, no harm is done if
the worlds are not specific enough to sustain the supervenience relations that we might
think hold between facts and counter-facts. And indeed such coarse-grained models are
much more realistic, even if the aim is to model the attitudes of perfectly rational agents.
Secondly, I am not convinced that we should think that e.g. conditionals do supervene on
non-modal facts. Indeed, I will suggest in chapter 5 that the desirability of counterfactuals
can in some cases not be determined by the desirability of any factual propositions alone,
which casts doubt on the Humean view that counterfactuals (and perhaps other modal
propositions) supervene on the non-modal facts. Finally, if we add a (modal-on-non-modal)
supervenience constraint, the semantics no longer captures the intuition that for for some A
and B, the facts of our world don’t determine whether A  B or A  ¬B. Nevertheless, it
is good to know that we can use these more fine grained models, if we like, without having
to worry about triviality.
3.8 Concluding remarks
In next chapter I will use the multidimensional possible world semantics for conditionals
to introduce counterfactuals to Richard Jeffrey’s decision theory, in a way that allows for
desirability measures of counterfactuals propositions, as well as conjunctions of counterfac-
tual and factual propositions. I hope to have explained why the multidimensional possible
world semantics provides a plausible theory of conditionals. However, the main justification
for focusing on that particular theory of conditionals in this PhD thesis, is that it allows for
an elegant way to introduce counterfactuals to Jeffrey’s theory.
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Chapter 4
Counterfactual Desirability
4.1 Introduction
As I mentioned in the introductory chapter, the main motivation behind this PhD thesis is
the observation that the desirability of what actually occurs is often influenced by what could
have been. Recall the two examples I discussed in the introduction. Suppose you have been
offered two jobs, one very exciting but with a substantial risk of unemployment, the other
less exciting but more secure. If you choose the more risky option, and as a result become
unemployed, you might find that the fact that you could have chosen the risk-free alternative
makes being unemployed even worse. For in addition to experiencing the normal pains of
being out of job, you may be filled with regret for not having chosen the risk-free alternative.
Not all occasions where what could have been influences the desirability of what actually
occurs involve anything like regret. Suppose that a patient has died because a hospital gave
the single kidney that it had available to another patient. Suppose also that the two patients
were in equal need of the kidney, had equal rights to treatment, etc. Now if we learn that a
fair lottery was used to determine which patient was to receive the kidney, then most of us
find that this makes the situation less undesirable than had the kidney simply been given
to one of them. For that at least means that the patient who died for lack of a kidney had a
chance to acquire it. In other words, had some random event turned out differently than it
actually did, the dead patient would have lived. And that somehow makes the situation less
undesirable.
This desirabilistic dependency between what is and what could have been creates well
known paradoxes for the traditional theory of rational choice, as for instance formulated by
John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern [von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944] and
Leonard Savage [Savage, 1972]. The first example is just a simplified version of Maurice
Allais’ infamous paradox [Allais, 1953], [Allais, 1979], whereas the latter is an instance of a
decision theoretic problem identified decades ago by Peter Diamond [Diamond, 1967]. In
this chapter, which is based on a joint working paper with Richard Bradley [Bradley and
Stefa´nsson, 2015], I use a framework based on a combination of Richard Jeffrey’s decision
theory [Jeffrey, 1983] and Bradley’s semantics for conditionals [Bradley, 2012] to explore the
above dependency.
Section 4.2 explains the two paradoxes and why they cast doubt on a rationality postulate
known as Separability. Unlike expected utility theory, Richard Jeffrey’s decision theory
does not encode this Separability property. But as is explained in section 4.3, the lack
of counterfactual prospects in Jeffrey’s theory nevertheless means that it cannot represent
the preferences discussed by Allais and Diamond. To overcome this problem, section 4.4
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introduces counterfactuals into Jeffrey’s theory and section 4.5 then establishes that this
makes it possible to represent Allais’ and Diamond’s preferences as maximising the value
of a Jeffrey desirability function. In section 4.6 I explain what axioms must be added to the
multidimensional framework to obtain a standard expected utility representation.
There are three important results in this chapter that I would like to emphasise. Firstly,
as already mentioned, the chapter establishes that we can represent Diamond’s and Allais’
preferences as maximising Jeffrey-desirability if we extend Jeffrey’s framework to counter-
factuals in the way I suggest. Secondly, I show that contrary to what is standardly claimed,
the aforementioned preferences violate two, not one, axioms that are implied by standard
expected utility theory. Neither axiom is required for Jeffrey-desirability representation.
Finally, I explain why the aforementioned axioms imply certain very implausible epistemic
norms for counterfactual reasoning. So in addition to being inconsistent with preferences
that, I contend, are practically rational, the two axioms are inconsistent with epistemically
rational counterfactual reasoning. I believe that these results seriously undermine the claim
that expected utility theory is our best theory of practical rationality.
I omit proofs of some of the claims in this chapter. These proofs can however be
found in a joint working paper with Richard Bradley [Bradley and Stefa´nsson, 2015] (which
can be found online here: http://www.lse.ac.uk/ CPNSS/research/ currentResearchProjects/
ChoiceGroupworkingPapers.aspx).
4.2 Two Paradoxes of Rational Choice
The Allais Paradox has generated a great deal of discussion, both amongst philosophers and
behavioural economists and psychologists. The paradox is generated by offering people a
pair of choices between different lotteries, each of which consists in tickets being randomly
drawn. First, people are offered a choice between a lottery that is certain to result in the
decision maker receiving a particular prize, say £2400, and a lottery that could result in
the decision maker receiving nothing, but could also result in the decision maker receiving
either as much as or more than £2400. The situation can be represented as a choice between
the lotteries L1 and L2 below, where, for instance, L1 results in the decision maker receiving
a prize of £2500 if one of the tickets number 2 to 34 is drawn:
1 2 − 34 35 − 100
L1 £0 £2500 £2400
L2 £2400 £2400 £2400
Having made a choice between L1 and L2, people are asked to make a choice between lot-
teries L3 and L4:
1 2 − 34 35 − 100
L3 £0 £2500 £0
L4 £2400 £2400 £0
When presented with this pair of choices, many people choose, and strictly prefer, L2 over
L1 and L3 over L4. (See [Kahneman and Tversky, 1979] for discussion of an early experiment
of the Allais Paradox.) One common way to rationalise this preference, which I will refer
to as ‘Allais’ preference’, is that when choosing between L1 and L2, the possibility of ending
up with nothing when you could have received £2400 for sure outweighs the possible extra
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gain of choosing the riskier alternative, since receiving nothing when you could have gotten
£2400 for sure is bound to cause considerable regret (see e.g. [Loomes and Sugden, 1982]
and [Broome, 1991]). When it comes to choosing between L3 and L4, however, the desire to
avoid regret does not play as strong role, since decision makers reason that if they choose L3
and end up with nothing then they would, in all likelihood, have received nothing even if
they had chosen the less risky option L4.
Intuitively rational as it seems, Allais’ preference is inconsistent with the most common
formal theories of rational choice. (Assuming, that is, that the probabilities of each ticket
is the same in the two choice situations. That is, the probability of a ticket being drawn
from e.g. tickets 2-34 is the same in both choice situations.) Let us continue, throughout this
section, to think of the alternatives between which people have preferences as lotteries, with
the understanding that some lotteries result in the same consequence (or ‘prize’) in all states
of the world. According to the standard theory of rational choice, Expected Utility theory (EU
theory), all rational preferences can be represented as maximising the expectation of utility,
where the expected utility of a lottery L is given by:
EU(L) =
∑
siS
u(L(si)).P(si)
where S is a partition of the possible states, L(si) is the consequence of L if si happens to
be the actual state of the world, u a utility measure on consequences, and P a probability
measure on states.
In the usual manner let represent the relation ‘... is at least as preferred as ...’, and and
∼ the corresponding strict preference and indifference relations. (When more convenient, I
will use ≺ for the same relation, except of course in the other direction, i.e. representing ‘...
is less preferred than...’.) Then EU theory states that for any rational agent:
Li  L j iff EU(Li) > EU(L j) (4.1)
(When the above holds for a person’s preferences, we say that the EU function represents the
person’s preferences.)
The problem that the Allais Paradox poses to standard decision theory, is that there is
no way to represent Allais’ preference as maximising the value of a function with the EU
form. To see this, let us assume that in both choice situations the decision maker considers
the probability of each ticket being drawn to be 1/100. Then if Allais’ evaluation of the
alternatives is in accordance with the EU equation, Allais’ preferences implies that both:
U(£0) + 33U(£2500) + 66U(£2400) < 100U(£2400) (4.2)
and:
66U(£0) + 34U(£2400) < 67U(£0) + 33U(£2500) (4.3)
But the latter implies that:
34U(£2400) + 66U(£2400) = 100U(£2400)
< U(£0) + 33U(£2500) + 66U(£2400)
in contradiction with 4.2. Hence, there is no EU function that simultaneously satisfies
U(L1) < U(L2) and U(L4) < U(L3). In other words, there is no way to represent a person
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who (strictly) prefers L2 over L1 and L3 over L4 as maximising utility as measured by an
EU function. Since all rational preferences should, according to EU theory, be representable
as maximising expected utility, this suggests that either Allais’ preference is irrational or
EU theory is incorrect. (Hence the ‘paradox’: many people both want to say that Allais’
preference is rational and that EU theory is the correct theory of practical rationality.)
Another way to see that Allais’ preference cannot be represented as maximising the
value of an EU function, is to notice that (given the suggested and perhaps most natural
description of the lotteries) the preference violates a Separability axiom which a preference
needs to satisfy for it to be possible to represent it by an EU function. (This Separability
axiom is perhaps best known in the form of Savage’s Sure Thing Principle). The axiom implies
that when comparing two alternatives whose consequences depend on what state is actual,
rational agents only consider the states of world where the two alternatives differ. More
formally, a simple version of the axiom states that:
If:
s1 s2
Li x z
L j y z
then Li  L j iff x  y.
In the choice problem under discussion, this means that you only need to consider the
tickets that give different outcomes depending on which alternative is chosen. Hence, you
can ignore the fourth column, i.e. tickets 35-100, both when choosing between L1 and L2
and when choosing between L3 and L4, since these tickets give the same outcome no matter
which alternative is chosen. When we ignore this column, however, alternative L1 becomes
identical to L3 and L2 to L4. Hence, by simultaneously preferring L2 over L1 and L3 over L4,
the decision maker seems to have revealed an inconsistency in her preferences.
The second example discussed in last section generates a paradox similar to Allais’ if
we assume that there is nothing irrational about strictly preferring a lottery that gives the
patients an equal chance of receiving the kidney to giving the kidney to either patient
without any such lottery being used. If we call the patients Ann and Bob, and let ANN
represent the outcome where Ann receives the kidney and BOB the outcome where Bob
receives the kidney, then to represent the aforementioned attitude, which I will refer to as
‘Diamond’s preference’, as maximising the value of an EU function, it must be possible to
simultaneously satisfy:
U(ANN) < 0.5U(ANN) + 0.5U(BOB) (4.4)
U(BOB) < 0.5U(ANN) + 0.5U(BOB) (4.5)
But that is of course impossible: an average of the values U(ANN) and U(BOB) can never
be greater than both values U(ANN) and U(BOB).
Again, we can see the tension between Diamond’s preference and standard theories of
rational choice by noticing that it violates Separability (given the suggested and arguably
most natural description of the relevant alternatives). An implication of this axiom is that,
given the prospects displayed below, where E represents the outcome of some random event
(e.g. a coin toss), L  LA iff LB  LA and L  LB iff LA  LB. Hence, Diamond’s preference in
conjunction with Separability implies a contradiction.
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E ¬E
L ANN BOB
LA ANN ANN
LB BOB BOB
The fact that both Allais’ and Diamond’s preferences violate Separability (given this natural
description of the alternatives) without seeming irrational (as I argued in the introductory
chapter), casts doubt on Separability as a rationality postulate. Moreover, both preferences
suggest that the value of actual outcomes often depend on counterfactual ones, since the
two preferences violate Separability since the agents in question judge that outcomes in
mutually incompatible states are not desirabilistically independent. Both the desire to avoid
regret, as manifested in Allais’ preference, and the concern for giving each patient a ‘fair
chance’, which seems to be what underlies Diamond’s preference, have something to do
with counterfactuals. Regret, at least in the situation under discussion, is a bad feeling
associated with knowing that one could have acted differently, and that if one had, things
would have been better. And to say that even if Bob did not receive a kidney he nevertheless
had a chance, seems to mean that there is a meaningful sense in which things could have
turned out differently – for instance, a coin could have come up differently – and if they
had, Bob would have received the kidney. So both Allais and Diamond violate the formal
Separability requirement of standard decision theories since they judge that the value of
what actually occurs at least partly depends on what could have been.
Perhaps for the reason discussed above, some economists and philosophers have thought
that Separability as a requirement on preference is implied by an evaluative assumption we
call Ethical Actualism (EA). Informally put, EA is the assumption that only the actual world
matters, so that the desirability of combinations of what actually occurs and what could have
occurred only depends on the desirability of what actually occurs. In a well-known defence
of Separability, Nobel Laureate Paul Samuelson claims that it would be irrational to violate
Ethical Actualism,1 and since he thinks that EA implies Separability, he takes this to show
that it would be irrational to violate Separability. The Separability postulate Samuelson
was defending, which is implied by what we above called Separability, states that if some
outcome (A)1 is at least as good as (B)1 and (A)2 is at least as good as (B)2, then an alternative
that results in either (A)1 or (A)2 depending on whether a coin comes up heads or tails, is at
least as good as an alternative that results in (B)1 or (B)2 depending on how the coin lands.
Here is Samuelson’s informal justification of the axiom:
[E]ither heads or tails must come up: if one comes up, the other cannot; so there
is no reason why the choice between (A)1 and (B)1 should be ‘contaminated’ by
the choice between (A)2 and (B)2. ([Samuelson, 1952]: 672-673)
In other words, the reason an evaluation or ordering of alternatives should satisfy Separa-
bility, is that there should be no desirabilistic dependencies between mutually incompatible
outcomes; in other words, our preferences should satisfy Separability since our evaluation
of outcomes should satisfy ethical actualism.
Various philosophers and decision theorists have cited Samuelson’s remark favourably.
John Broome, who takes it to at least provide a “prima facie presumption in favour of
[Separability]”, rhetorically asks: “How can something that never happens possibly affect
1Samuelson does not really provide an argument for why it would be irrational to violate EA. Instead, he seems
to take it to be obvious, and in no need for a special explanation, that it would be irrational to violate EA.
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the value of something that does happen?” ([Broome, 1991]: 96). But intuitive as the link
between ethical actualism and Separability may be, the former does not (by itself) imply
the latter, nor vice versa, as I explain in 4.5.1. Indeed, as we shall see, both an axiom that
encodes ethical actualism and one that encodes Separability is required for expected utility
representation. So even if Samuelson and Broome are right about the intuitive appeal of
ethical actualism, that does not in any way establish that Separability is rationally required.
4.3 Jeffrey Desirability
Not all decision theories assume Separability. In particular the version of decision theory
developed by Richard Jeffrey makes do with a much weaker condition on preference, which
he calls Averaging. (See section 4.6 for a formal statement of Averaging.) In Jeffrey’s theory
the objects of both the agent’s beliefs and desires are propositions, with her degrees of belief
in the truth of propositions rationally required to be probabilities and her degrees of desire
for their truth required to be desirabilities, where:
“the desirability of a proposition is a weighted average of the desirabilities of the cases
in which it is true, where the weights are proportional to the probabilities of the cases”
([Jeffrey, 1983]: 78).
Let’s now explore whether we can represent Allais’ and Diamond’s preferences as maximis-
ing Jeffrey-desirability.2
As already discussed, Jeffrey defines both his desirability measure, Des, and his probabil-
ity measure, P, over a Boolean algebra of propositions from which the impossible proposition
has been removed.3 (In other words, the domain of Des and P is a set of propositions closed
under negation and the classical logical operators.) And the desirability of a proposition,
according to this measure, is a weighted average of the different ways in which the propo-
sition can become true, where the weights of each way is given by the probability of the
proposition coming true in that way rather than some other way.
Jeffrey takes a proposition to be a set of possible worlds. More precisely, if W is the universal
set of possible worlds, and Ω the set of subsets of W (i.e. the power set of W), then Jeffrey’s
desirability and probability measures are defined over Ω, and any subset of W, which I will
denote by (non-italic) uppercase letters (A, B, C, etc.), is a proposition according to Jeffrey.
We can thus think of each way in which A can be true as a world that is compatible with the
truth of A. Assuming for simplicity that there are finitely many mutually exclusive worlds
compatible with A,4 then the Jeffrey-desirability of a proposition is given by:
Des(A) =
∑
i
Des(wi).P(wi | A) (4.6)
Why should we accept this as a measure of the desirability of a proposition? As I men-
tioned in the first chapter, one way to see the appropriateness of this measure is to think of
desirability as news value; that is, a proposition A is desirable to an agent to the extent that it
would be valuable for her to learn that A is true. Intuitively, it seems that the desirability of
2The possibility of representing Allais’ preference as maximising desirability would probably not have impressed
Jeffrey himself, who was satisfied with Savage’s view that Allais’ preference reveals some sort of ‘error’ of judgement
([Savage, 1972]: 102-103; [Jeffrey, 1982]: 722).
3For the quasi-uniqueness of the Bolker-Jeffrey representation theorem for Jeffrey’s theory, the algebra has to be
non-atomic. That is, we must always be able to partition each element into smaller elements.
4If we want to assume infinitely many (non-atomic) worlds, we take the integral instead of the sum.
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learning the truth of A depends on how desirable are the different ways in which A could
be true and the probabilities that it comes true in any one of these ways rather than another.
There are, of course, also some formal justifications for this way of measuring the value
of propositions, one of which being that the measure is partition invariant. That is, if a propo-
sition A can be expressed as the disjoint disjunction of both {B1,B2,B3...} and {C1,C2,C3...},
then
∑
Bi∈A P(Bi | A).Des(Bi) =
∑
Ci∈A P(Ci | A).Des(Ci) (see e.g. [Joyce, 1999], Theorem 4.).
The same is not true of the expected utility equation: the same alternative will get assigned
different utilities depending on how we partition the state and outcome spaces. In fact,
unlike Jeffrey’s equation, the expected utility equation can only be used when the state and
outcome spaces have been partitioned finely enough to account for everything the agent
cares about. In other words, our partition needs to be such that given each alternative and
state, there is no uncertainty as to the utility value of the outcome associated with that
alternative-state pair. If we do not have such fine partitions, as ordinary decision makers
rarely (if ever) do, then different partitions will lead to alternatives being assigned different
values. Hence, when using expected utility theory to decide how to act, different partitions
may recommend different courses of action, as James Joyce points out ([Joyce, 1999], [Joyce,
2000]).
Another formal property of Jeffrey’s measure that is very important for the argument
below, is hat it does not imply the same (strong) separability property as the expected utility
measure. The reason Jeffrey’s theory does not imply the Separability axiom is that the con-
tingencies that affect how an alternative turns out are not assumed to be probabilistically
independent of the alternative itself. Recall that Separability as previously defined states
that:
If:
s1 s2
Li x z
L j y z
then Li  L j iff x y.
We should expect Separability to fail in the kind of circumstances where Jeffrey’s desirability
equation has practical implications that differ from the expected utility equation: namely
circumstances where there is a probabilistic dependency between the alternative that is
chosen and the facts of our world that affect what consequences the alternative has (i.e. the
way in which that alternative is actualised). For instance, if z is considered a more desirable
outcome than both x and z, and Li makes s2 more likely than does L j, then Li might be
preferred to – and be assigned a higher desirability than – L j even when the consequence x
is not preferred to y. In that case, Jeffrey’s equation can, but the expected utility equation
cannot, represent the preference in question.
Unfortunately, although Jeffrey’s theory does not imply Separability, which seemed to
be the property of expected utility theory that generated the tension between that theory
and the two preferences under discussion, Jeffrey’s theory is also in tension with the two
preferences. In fact, in the special case when there is probabilistic independence between
the proposition that is being evaluated and the different possible worlds that are compatible
with that proposition – as seems to be the case in Allais’ and Diamond’s examples – Jeffrey’s
theory becomes a non-conditional expected utility theory, and thus also entails Separability.
Moreover, given that we take the desirability of a lottery to be a weighted average of the
desirabilities of its possible prizes, as is standardly done when applying Jeffrey’s theory, it
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is evident that the theory cannot handle Allais’ and Diamond’s preferences. For instance,
given that a person conceptualises the four alternatives that generates the Allais paradox
in the way that is standardly assumed (that is, assuming that the first two tables in section
4.1 actually represent the way in which she sees the four alternatives), then (even if we now
think of the four alternatives as propositions) there is no Jeffrey desirability function that
assigns greater desirability to L2 than L1 and also a greater desirability to L3 than L4. The
same holds for the Diamond paradox: given standard assumptions, there is no desirability
function such that L gets assigned greater desirability than both LA and LB.
Let’s focus on the Diamond paradox to see why the above is true. For Diamond’s
preference to be compatible with Jeffrey’s theory, given the above assumption about how to
evaluate lotteries with Jeffrey’s theory, there has to be a function Des such that:
Des(ANN) < Des(ANN).P(ANN | L) + Des(BOB).P(BOB | L) (4.7)
Des(BOB) < Des(ANN).P(ANN | L) + Des(BOB).P(BOB | L) (4.8)
which implies that:
Des(ANN) < 0.5Des(ANN) + 0.5Des(BOB) (4.9)
Des(BOB) < 0.5Des(ANN) + 0.5Des(BOB) (4.10)
But again, an average of the desirabilities of ANN and BOB can never exceed the desirability
of both ANN and BOB.
This shows that there is more at play than just the failure of Separability in the explanation
of Allais’ and Diamond’s preferences. For the standard representation of the two problems,
and also the standard application of Jeffrey’s theory, implicitly builds in the aforementioned
assumption of ethical actualism. Without this assumption (but assuming that the desirability
of Ann or Bob getting the kidney is independent of the random event E), Jeffrey’s theory
just says that:
Des(L) = Des(ANN ∧ L).Prob(ANN | L) + Des(BOB ∧ L).Prob(BOB | L)
and nothing requires that Des(ANN∧L) = Des(ANN) or Des(BOB∧L) = Des(BOB).
So one way to accommodate Allais’ and Diamond’s preferences within Jeffrey’s frame-
work, is to describe the consequences differently from what is standardly done. To some
extent, this is Broome’s suggestion (although stated within Savage’s framework), which I
briefly discussed in the introductory chapter, and will discuss in more detail in chapter
6. However, solutions of this kind will be unsatisfactory if they involve introducing new
primitive consequences in the representation of the decision problem, without explaining
their relationship to the available actions. In particular, they must explain what it is about
the form of the lottery L that makes Des(ANN∧L) > Des(ANN). Moreover, to avoid triv-
ialising decision theory by making it allow that any possible choice is rational, we should
require that exercises of this kind, where new propositions (or consequences) are created to
make seemingly problematic preferences compatible with decision theory, adhere to some
independently plausible principles.
In the context of Jeffrey’s framework, avoiding these objections requires a specification
of the propositional structure of lotteries, and how they give rise to the attitudes of Allais’
and Diamond’s. I do so below by widening the domain of Jeffrey’s theory to include coun-
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terfactual propositions. And I show that the properties that generate Allais’ and Diamond’s
paradoxes, respectively regret and fairness, then emerge as a relationship between factual
and counterfactual conditional propositions. This is not an ad hoc solution to the problems
under consideration, I believe, since decision theorists should independently of these prob-
lems allow for the value dependencies one often finds between actual and counterfactual
outcomes.
But let me first briefly mention why introducing indicative conditionals to Jeffrey’s
theory (as e.g. done in [Bradley, 1998] and [Bradley, 2007b]) will not solve the problem
of representing Allais’ and Diamond’s preferences. An indicative conditional is generally
considered to be what Jonathan Bennett calls zero intolerant, as discussed in chapter 2,
“meaning that such a conditional is useless to someone who is really sure that its antecedent
is false” ([Bennett, 2003]: 45). In other words, we use indicative conditional sentences such
as A 7→ B to make statements about worlds where we think A might be true (where ‘might’
is understood epistemically, not merely logically or metaphysically). But A 7→ B provides no
information about a world where we know A to be false. Hence, it is ‘uselessness’ to someone
who is certain that A is false. So assuming for now that we can formulate desirability and
probability as a measure on sentences (which should be understood as derivative of the
propositions that make true the sentences in question), it is therefore plausible to assume,
as Bradley does, that Des(¬A∧ (A 7→ B)) = Des(¬A): if A is actually false, then A 7→ B makes
no desirabilistic difference. Thus the conditionals that generate the paradoxes discussed
in section 4.1 cannot be indicative conditionals, since the problems they generate consist
exactly in the fact that they have desirabilistic impact when their antecedents are believed
to be false.
What we need to do, therefore, is introduce counterfactual conditionals into Jeffrey’s
theory. Jeffrey himself tried to solve the problem of providing an account of counterfactuals,
but by his own account did not succeed.
(If I had, you would have heard of it. There’s a counterfactual for you.) In fact,
the problem hasn’t been solved to this day. I expect it’s unsolvable. ([Jeffrey,
1991]: 161)
I believe we need not be as pessimistic as Jeffrey in this respect. In fact, I think the account
discussed in last chapter is quite useful for the task at hand. In next section I use that account
to introduce counterfactuals to Jeffrey’s decision theory.
4.4 Counterfactuals
I will not, in this chapter, explain the multidimensional semantics in detail again.5 However,
it might be useful to remind the reader of the main terminology. A possible counteractual
world under the supposition that A is true, is just a way things might be, or might have
been, were A true.6 If world wA could be the case under the supposition that A, then we
say that wA is a possible counteractual A-world. If A is false, wA will be said to be strictly
counterfactual. But counteractual worlds are not always strictly counterfactual: if A is true
then wA may not only be a possible way things are under that supposition that A, but the
way things actually are.
5Some technical details about defining probability and desirability for the multidimensional framework, that
are not discussed here, can be found in [Bradley and Stefa´nsson, 2015].
6Keep in mind that in this chapter it is useful to think of the semantics in terms of propositions rather than
sentences, since we assume that the contents of agent’s desires and beliefs are propositions.
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Also recall that we now represent the basic possibilities by n-tuples of worlds, e.g.
ω = {w1,w2,w3, ...}, where by convention the first element (w1 in this case) always represents
a potential actual world, but the reminder potential counteractual worlds under different
suppositions. (In what follows, I will for convenience sometimes use ω as a variable for
such n-tuples; and sometimes as a variable for a maximally specific proposition that is only
true at one n-tuple.) And propositions are now taken to be sets of n-tuples of worlds. The
factual proposition A, for instance, is the set of all n-tuples where A is true at the first
element. Suppose now that, by convention, the second element in the n-tuples (world w2 in
the n-tuple above) always represents a potential counteractual world under the supposition
that A. Then the conditional proposition A → B is the set of all n-tuples where B is true in
the second element.7
In what follows W will be the set of possible worlds, Ω the set of subsets of W. To reduce
complexity, let {S1, ...Sn} ⊆ Ω represent a set of n suppositions, and I will sometime use
〈X,Y1, ...,Yn〉 to denote the proposition that X is the case and Yi is or would be if Si. Let z
represent the set of elementary possibilities, i.e. the set of all n-tuples, and Γ the set of subsets
of z; i.e. the set of multidimensional propositions.
4.4.1 Probability
Recall from last chapter that the multidimensional semantics is based on the observation
that an agent can be uncertain both about what is actually the case and about what is or
would be the case if some condition is or were true. One might be pretty sure that the match
is to be played tomorrow, for instance, but quite unsure as to whether it would be played
were it to rain. In what follows it is important to keep in mind that we have one probability
mass function measuring the probability that any world is actual, and one probability mass
function for each supposition, each measuring the probability that a world is counteractual
given that supposition.
These probability mass functions induce a probability measure, P, on the full set of
propositions. Recall from before that I usedP as a probability mass function on W measuring
the probability that each world is actual, and Q as a probability mass function on WA
measuring the probability that each world is counteractual under the supposition that A.
We define:
P0(A) 
∑
wi∈A
P(wi) (4.11)
And as we saw in last chapter, the multidimensional semantics entails that:
P1(A→ B) 
∑
wi∈B
Q(wi) (4.12)
So in our multidimensional possible world model, P0 serves as a measure of the agent’s
degrees of belief in the facts, Pi the agent’s degrees of belief in the counterfacts under the
supposition that Si. Finally P encodes the agent’s state of belief regarding both the facts and
the counterfacts, with P(〈X,Y1,...,Yn〉) measuring the joint probability that X is the case and
that Yi is or would be the case if Si. For P to serve as a measure of such joint probability in
7Note that this means that single worlds are truth makers for factual propositions. If w represents the actual
world and w is a member of A, then it is true that A. However, the truth value of ‘if A then B’ is determined by
whether the n-tuple that correctly represents both facts and counterfacts is a member of A→ B.
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the manner suggested it must be related to its marginals, P0, ... Pn, in accordance with the
Marginalisation condition discussed in last chapter.
Some much stronger probability principles than Marginalisation will play an important
role in the argument that follows, since it turns out that they are implied by expected utility
theory, as the theory is typically conceived, but are neither implied by Jeffrey’s original
theory nor the extension of it that I discuss below. The first condition requires probabilistic
independence between what is the case and what merely could have been, while the second
requires independence between counterfacts under mutually exclusive suppositions (recall
that the non-subscript variables represent what is or could be actual):
Fact-Counterfact Independence: If X ∩ Si = ∅, then:
P(〈X,Yi〉) = P(X).P(Yi)
Counterfact Independence: If Si ∩ Sj = ∅, then:
P(〈Yi,Yj〉) = P(Yi).P(Yj)
Both conditions are very demanding and it is not difficult to think of counterexamples.
Suppose I am meeting my partner and am almost certain that she said we should meet
either at location A or B, but I cannot remember which. If I go to A and discover that
she is not there, then I become quite certain that if I had gone to location B I would have
found her there. So what is actually true clearly influences the probabilities I assign to
the different counterfactual possibilities, in violation of Fact-Counterfact Independence.8
Similarly, suppose I am about to go to location A but am told by my friend that were I to
go to location B I would meet my partner. From that I can of course infer that if I go to
the location I intended then I won’t find my partner there. So the counterfacts under the
supposition that I go to one location are not probabilistically independent of those under
the supposition that I go to the other, in violation of Counterfact Independence.
It seems clear then that counterfactual reasoning does not typically satisfy these two
conditions. And rationality surely does not require that they be satisfied. In fact, certain
theories of rational decision-making assume that rational agents violate both principles. In
game theory with imperfect information, which is a theory about rational strategic decision-
making for agents who are uncertain about what moves other ‘players’ have already made,
it is for instance standardly assumed that a rational strategy for figuring out whether a
player P has made a particular move M, is to ask oneself what were to happen if P did not
make that move. If it turns out that not making move M would lead to a bad outcome for P,
then that might reasonably lead one to increase one’s credence in the proposition that P has
made move M. In other words, it is typically assumed in game theory that rational players
violate Fact-Counterfact Independence.
Nonetheless, as we shall see, the above principles are implied by Actualism and Separa-
bility (but not by Jeffrey’s theory). I believe that a good theory of practical rationality should,
if possible, avoid such implausible epistemic implications. Moreover, it seems particularly
problematic if a theory of rational individual decision-making contradicts an assumption
8Dorothy Edgington has pointed out to me that the following (often used) example might be more useful to
explain why Fact-Counterfact Independence does not generally hold. Suppose I am wondering if my friend has
gone out. I drive by her house, and see that the lights are not on. This increases my credence in the proposition
that she has gone out, since I reason that if she had not gone out, the lights would be on.
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that is standardly made in the theory of rational strategic decision-making. Hence, this
result casts doubt on the claim that Separability and Actualism is rationally required. I will
revisit this point in section 4.6.
4.4.2 Desirability and counterfactual value
Beliefs about counterfactual possibilities play an important role in our reasoning about
what we should do (as briefly discussed in chapter 2). So too do our evaluative attitudes
to counterfactual possibilities, for instance, through the regret we anticipate if we forego
opportunities that would have led to desirable outcomes. And just as our uncertainty about
what is the case can be different from our uncertainty about what would be the case if some
or another condition were true, so too can our assessment of how desirable something is
differ from our assessment of how desirable its truth is on the supposition of some condition
or other.
To reflect this we should introduce measures of value on both the facts and the counter-
facts in the same way that we introduced probability measures on both. The desirability
of possible actual worlds will be represented here by a utility function u0 on W, while the
desirability of possible counteractual worlds under the supposition that Si will be repre-
sented by a utility function ui on the set Wi induced by that supposition. Finally, the joint
desirability of worlds will be measured by a utility function, u, on n-tuples of worlds. For
example, u(〈w,w1, ...,wn〉) will measure the desirability that w is the actual world, that w1
is/would be the counteractual world on the supposition that S1, ..., and that wn is/would be
the counteractual world on the supposition that Sn. (See [Bradley and Stefa´nsson, 2015] for
a discussion of the relationship between the different utility measures.) For convenience,
let’s assume (as Jeffrey does) that the measures are all zero-normalised in the sense that:9∑
w∈W
u0(w).pw(w) =
∑
wi∈Wi
ui(wi).pi(wi) =
∑
ω∈z
u(ω).p(ω) = 0
From the function u we can determine a corresponding desirability function Des on all
propositions by defining the desirability of any α ∈ Γ to be the conditional expectation of
utility given α. Formally:
Des(α) :=
∑
ω∈α
u(ω).P(ω | α) (4.13)
As can be seen, Des is still a Jeffrey-desirability measure: all I have done is to replace the
single worlds that appear Jeffrey’s measure with n-tuples of worlds (which means that
Des is now defined over Γ rather than Ω). But now Des represents an agent’s preferences
for the truth of both facts and counterfacts by measuring, for any proposition of the form
〈X,Y1,...,Yn〉, the desirability that X is the the case and that Yi is/would be the case if Si is/were.
This concludes the extension of Jeffrey’s decision theory to counterfactuals.
4.5 Counterfactual-Dependent Preferences
One reason Allais’ and Diamond’s preferences cannot be represented as maximising the
value of an EU function is that the EU equation implies that given any fixed description of
the possibly outcomes of an alternative, the value of what actually occurs never depends
on what merely could have been. But for people with Allais’ preferences, the desirability of
9This may be a controversial assumption. But since I spent much of chapter 1 defending the assumption, I will
not discuss it further here.
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receiving nothing is not independent of whether or not one could have chosen a risk-free
alternative; whereas for people with preferences like Diamond’s, the desirability of either
patient receiving the kidney is not independent of what would have occurred had some
random event turned out differently. So both Allais’ and Diamond’s preferences, on this
interpretation, are dependent on the truth of counterfactuals. Moreover, the part that is
causing the violation of expected utility theory – and Jeffrey’s theory, when it includes the
actualism assumption that is usually made when applying the theory – can in both cases be
formalised as a relationship between a set of worlds, C, and a set of strictly counter-actual
worlds BA¯ where A¯ ∩ C = ∅. (I will use A¯ to denote the complement of set A.)
To make the above claim more precise, let’s look at Diamond’s preference first and
suppose that Diamond wants to use a coin toss to decide who receives the kidney. Let A
be the set of worlds where the coin comes up heads and A¯ the set of worlds where the coin
comes up tails. Let B be the set of worlds where Bob receives the kidney and B¯ the set of
worlds where Ann receives the kidney. We have thus made two simplifying assumptions.
Firstly, it might seem more natural to let A (A¯) be the set of worlds where the coin comes
up heads (tails) if tossed. But nothing is lost by this simplification. Secondly, we have
limited our attention to only situations where either Ann or Bob receives the kidney. But
what is distinctive about Diamond’s preference is what it has to say about situations where
a number of individuals have an equal claim to an indivisible good that some but not all
of them get. (Any kind of welfarism for instance condemns a situation where none of the
patients receive the kidney.) Hence, since we want to focus on the core of this preference, it
seems justifiable to limit our attention to situations where one of Ann and Bob receives the
kidney.
The part of Diamond’s preference that leads to violation of expected utility theory can
then be formulated thus:
〈A ∩ B, B¯A¯〉  〈A ∩ B,BA¯〉 (4.14)
In other words, Diamond prefers the proposition that the coin comes up heads and Bob
receives the kidney but Ann would have gotten it had tails come up, to the proposition that
the coin comes up heads and Bob receives the kidney and would also have gotten it had the
coin come up tails.
Let us then turn to Allais’ preferences. Now let A represent the set of worlds where Allais
chooses the risky option (which will be L1 or L3 depending on the context) and B the set of
worlds where Allais is not guaranteed to win anything. Unlike when representing Diamond’s
preference, we need a third (basic) set of worlds to represent Allais’ preferences, since the
worlds where Allais is not guaranteed to win anything are not necessarily the same as the
worlds where Allais wins nothing. And it is relative to a situation where Allais has won
nothing that the fact that he could have chosen a risk-free alternative makes a difference.
Let D denote the set of worlds where Allais wins nothing. Then the preference that causes
Allais to violate expected utility theory can be represented thus:
〈A ∩ B ∩D,BA¯〉  〈A ∩ B ∩D, B¯A¯〉 (4.15)
In other words, according to Allais, winning nothing after having made a risky choice is
made worse when it is true that had he chosen differently he would definitely have won
something.
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4.5.1 Preference Actualism and Separability
We have seen that both Diamond’s and Allais’ preferences exhibit a non-trivial sensitivity
to counterfactual states of affairs that is manifested in the violation of a condition that I will
call Preference Actualism: the requirement that preferences for prospects be independent of
the strict counterfacts. Formally:
Preference Actualism: For all sets of worlds A, B, C such that C ∩ A¯ = ∅:
〈C,BA¯〉 ∼ 〈C, B¯A¯〉
Preference Actualism is of course just a version of the doctrine of ethical actualism that was
informally introduced earlier on. In the appendix to [Bradley and Stefa´nsson, 2015], we
prove that preferences that violate Preference Actualism cannot be represented as maximis-
ing expected utility, given how expected utility is standardly defined (this will be further
discussed in section 4.6 below). And we formally show that a preference might violate
Preference Actualism without violating Separability, so this result does not simply follow
from the fact that Separability is a necessary condition for expected utility maximisation. To
see intuitively how Preference Actualism and Separability differ, consider again the choice
problem Diamond is faced with:
E ¬E
L ANN BOB
LA ANN ANN
LB BOB BOB
Recall that in this case, Separability tells us that L  LA iff LB  LA and L  LB iff LA  LB.
Suppose that according to Bill, LB  L  LA, in accordance with Separability. But contrary
to Preference Actualism, conditional on E being the case, Bob is not indifferent between L
and LA. Bill thinks that it is better if Bob receives the kidney than Ann, but in addition he
cares, even after the result of the lottery becomes apparent, about what chance his preferred
outcome had (before the lottery was over). Bill is an example of a person who violates
Preference Actualism while (in this case) satisfying Separability.
Carl is quite different from Bill. According to Carl, before he knows whether E takes
place or not, his preference is L  LA ∼ LB, in violation of Separability. However, the reason
for this preference is that Carl wants expected welfare to be distributed equally, where the
expectation is calculated according to Carls’ beliefs. So once Carl has learnt that E, he is
indifferent between L and LA, in accordance with Preference Actualism. Thus, Carl is an
example of a person who violates Separability while satisfying Preference Actualism. (This
example shows that those who share Diamond’s judgements due to ex ante egalitarianism,
do not necessarily violate Preference Actualism.)
Although Preference Actualism and Separability are logically independent, in the ab-
sence of further assumptions, it turns out that the two are logically equivalent given certain
assumptions that are either implicitly or explicitly part of standard formulations of expected
utility theory such as Savage’s [Savage, 1972], and which do seem to be satisfied in Allais’
and Diamond’s examples; in particular, Centring and an assumption about the probabilis-
tic independence of counterfacts under disjoint suppositions. (This is proved in [Bradley
and Stefa´nsson, 2015].) Hence, given the background of Savage’s framework, Allais’ and
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Diamond’s violation of Preference Actualism can be seen as explaining why they violate
Separability.
4.5.2 Preference Actualism and desirability maximisation
While expected utility maximisation (as EU is standardly defined) requires adherence to
Preference Actualism, the principle is not stated in any axiomatisation of the theory. There-
fore, one might worry that although Preference Actualism is also not part of the so-called
Bolker’s axiomatisation of Jeffrey’s theory, which I state in next section, the principle is nev-
ertheless implied by these axioms. But there is no need to worry, as can be seen by the fact
that we can construct a Jeffrey desirability measure that violates Preference Actualism. I will
work with a simple model based on the set W = {w1,w2,w3,w4,w5} of five possible worlds
and the corresponding set Ω of its subsets, including the events A = {w1,w2,w3}, A¯ = {w4,w5},
B = {w1,w2,w4} and B¯ = {w3,w5}. For present purposes we only need to focus on one suppo-
sition, namely the supposition that A is false. Then the set of elementary possibilities is given
byW = {w1,w2,w3,w4,w5} × {w4,w5}, and in particular, 〈A∩B, B¯A¯〉 = {〈w1,w5〉, 〈w2,w5〉} and
〈A∩B, BA¯〉 = {〈w1,w4〉, 〈w2,w4〉} (where the first element in each 2-tuple, i.e. in each pair,
represents a potential actual world, but the second element a counterfactual world in the
complement to A).
To induce the preferences required, we define a pair of probability and utility mass
functions, p and u, on this set of world pairs, by setting p(〈w4,w5〉) = p(〈w5,w4〉) = 0 and
assigning the values to remaining possibilities displayed in Table 2.
World Pairs Probability Utility
〈w1,w4〉 0.125 −1
〈w1,w5〉 0.125 1
〈w2,w4〉 0.125 −1
〈w2,w5〉 0.125 1
〈w3,w4〉 0.125 −1
〈w3,w5〉 0.125 1
〈w4,w4〉 0.125 0
〈w5,w5〉 0.125 0
Table 2: Probability-Utility Values
Let P and Des be pair of probability and desirability functions on the set of subsets of W
constructed from p and u in the manner previously outlined. It is easy to see that preferences
induced by Des will violate Preference Actualism. In particular, they will be such that:
〈A ∩ B, B¯A¯〉  〈A ∩ B,BA¯〉 (4.16)
But by construction they satisfy the standard preference axioms of Jeffrey decision theory.
So it is follows that preferences violating Preference Actualism, although not representable
as utility maximising, may nonetheless be desirability maximising.
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4.5.3 Modelling Allais’ and Diamond’s preferences
Strictly speaking, 4.14 does not fully represent Diamond’s preference in full. Recall that
Diamond’s preference consists in preferring a lottery (say a coin toss) that results in either
Bob or Ann receiving a kidney (alternative L) to giving the kidney to Ann without using a
fair lottery (LA) and also to giving the kidney to Bob without using a fair lottery (LB). This
is how Diamond might evaluate the ‘constant’ alternatives:
Des(LB) = Des(〈A ∩ B,BA¯〉)
Des(LA) = Des(〈A ∩ B¯, B¯A¯〉)
But since the lottery can turn out in more than one way, Diamond must, if he is to satisfy
Jeffrey’s equation, evaluate its desirability as a weighted sum of the ways in which it might
turn out, for instance:
Des(L) = 0.5Des(〈A ∩ B, B¯A¯〉) + 0.5Des(〈A¯ ∩ B¯,BA〉)
assuming that (he believes that) a fair coin is (properly) tossed to decide who receives the
kidney.
There is thus a Jeffrey-desirability function representing Diamond’s preference as long
as there is a function Des that simultaneously satisfies:
Des(〈A ∩ B,BA¯〉) < 0.5Des(〈A ∩ B, B¯A¯〉) + 0.5Des(〈A¯ ∩ B¯,BA〉) (4.17)
Des(〈A ∩ B¯, B¯A¯〉) < 0.5Des(〈A ∩ B, B¯A¯〉) + 0.5Des(〈A¯ ∩ B¯,BA〉) (4.18)
Since what motivates Diamond’s preference is his concern for fairness, he should be indif-
ferent between Bob and Ann actually receiving the kidney. Moreover, the value generated
by having used the lottery, or the disvalue generated by not having used the lottery, is
according to Diamond independent of whether Ann or Bob actually receives the kidney.
Hence, for Diamond:
0.5Des(〈A ∩ B, B¯A¯〉) + 0.5Des(〈A¯ ∩ B¯,BA〉) = Des(〈A ∩ B, B¯A¯〉) = Des(〈A¯ ∩ B¯,BA〉) (4.19)
Des(〈A ∩ B,BA¯〉) = Des(〈A ∩ B¯, B¯A¯〉) (4.20)
Therefore, to be able to represent Diamond’s preference as maximising Jeffrey-desirability,
all that is required is that there is a Jeffrey-desirability function such that:
Des(〈A ∩ B,BA¯〉) < Des(〈A ∩ B, B¯A¯〉) (4.21)
And in last section we saw that such functions exist.
The preference exhibited in 4.15 also only partly captures Allais’ preference. But again, it
is not hard to show that in Allais’ case all we need to establish is that there is a desirability
function such that:
Des(〈A ∩ B ∩D,B¯A¯〉) < Des(〈A ∩ B ∩D,BA¯〉)
And that is the only part of Allais’ preference that has the potential to cause trouble; and
indeed does cause trouble for EU theory. But an argument like the one provided above
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can just as well be made to show that we can represent Allais’ preference as maximising
desirability.
To sum up: we have now seen that when we use the multidimensional semantics to
extend Jeffrey’s desirability measure to counterfactual prospects, we can formally express
the desirabilistic dependencies that often exist between actual and counterfactual outcomes,
and, as a result represent Allais’ and Diamonds’ preferences as maximising desirability.
4.6 Representation Theorems
In this last section I turn to the question of what axioms a preference relation has to satisfy
to be representable as maximising desirability, and what additional axiom the relation has
to satisfy to be representable as maximising expected utility.
Here are the two most important axioms that are necessary for desirabilistic representa-
tion:
Averaging: If α⊥β then α  (α ∨ β)  β⇔ α  β
Impartiality: Suppose α ≈ β and that for some γ 0 α, β such that α⊥γ and β⊥γ, it is the case
that α ∨ γ ≈ β ∨ γ. Then for all such γ, α ∨ γ ≈ β ∨ γ.
Impartiality concerns the connection between an agent’s beliefs and her preferences, and,
in particular, is a preference test for equiprobability. Although this condition is far from
being obvious as a requirement of rationality (as Jeffrey admits [Jeffrey, 1983]: 147), I will not
discuss it here. Averaging is a weak version of Separability, and says that a disjunction of two
propositions can never be strictly preferred to each disjunct. This seems quite compelling
as a rationality requirement, at least when prospects described in sufficient detail, such that
they include, for instance, counterfactual properties.
Recall that we say that Des and P represent  just in case for any A, B: A  B ⇔
Des(A) ≤ Des(B). Ethan Bolker proved the following theorem, which as we show in [Bradley
and Stefa´nsson, 2015], also holds for the multidimensional framework developed in this
chapter:
Theorem 13 ([Bolker, 1966]). Let 〈Γ,⊆〉 be a complete, atomless Boolean algebra of prospects. Let 
be a complete, transitive and continuous relation on Γ−{⊥} that satisfies Averaging and Impartiality.
Then there exists a pair of desirability and probability functions, Des and P, respectively on Γ − {⊥}
and Γ that jointly represent .
(Let’s say that when the above holds, Des is a ‘Jeffrey representation’ of the preference
relation . If, however, an expected utility function EU represents , then we say that EU is
an ‘expected utility representation’ of .)
Before determining what additional axioms a preference relation between multidimen-
sional prospects has to satisfy to be representable as maximising expected utility, we need to
decide how to define expected utility in the multidimensional framework. Given how peo-
ple normally think of EU theory, a natural suggestion, that stays close to Savage’s original
theory, is to think of the prospects to be evaluated as vectors of the form 〈Y1,...,Yn〉, where
Yi is the consequence of 〈Y1,...,Yn〉 if state Si is actual, and define expected utility as follows:
Definition 3 (Expected Utility (EU)). A desirability function Des is an expected utility iff:
Des(〈Y1,...,Yn〉) =
n∑
i=1
Des(Yi | Si).P(Si)
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It should be noted that this definition of expected utility is more general than the usual one
in that it allows that the desirabilities of consequences be dependent on the state of the world
in which they are realised. In the event that state-independence holds, Des(Yi|Si) = Des(Yi).
Then if we let act f be the proposition 〈Y1, ..., Yn〉 and f (Si) = Yi, we obtain the familiar
Savage formulation of expected utility theory: Des( f ) =
∑n
i=1 Des( f (Si)).P(Si).
I have already mentioned, in various places, that Separability, in some form or another,
is necessary for expected utility maximisation. The following Separability property, which
is equivalent to Savage’s Sure Thing Principle (given the multidimensional framework), is
entailed by expected utility maximisation, as EU is defined above:
Separability: If H ∩ T = ∅, then 〈XH, ZT〉  〈YH, ZT〉 ⇔ 〈XH, Z′T〉  〈YH, Z′T〉
As we have seen, Diamond and Allais both violate Separability (given the most natural
description of the alternatives they are faced with). Recall also Preference Actualism from
before, which says that whenever C∩ A¯ = ∅, 〈C,BA¯〉 ∼ 〈C, B¯A¯〉. As we have seen, Diamond
and Allais also violate Preference Actualism.
As previously mentioned, Separability and Preference Actualism, while expressing a
similar intuition, are logically independent of each other except in the context of certain
further assumptions. It turns out moreover that both Preference Actualism and Separability
are necessary for an expected utility representation as EU was defined above (this is proved
in [Bradley and Stefa´nsson, 2015]):
Theorem 14 (Necessity). Assume Centring. For there to be an expected utility representation of
the preference relation  it has to satisfy Separability and Preference Actualism.
Theorem 15 (Sufficiency). Assume Centring. If there is a Jeffrey representation of preference
relation  that satisfies Separability and Preference Actualism, then there is an expected utility
representation of .10
Theorem 14 again shows that expected utility theory (as EU is defined above) is inconsistent
with both Allais and Diamond’s preferences (given how the relevant outcomes are usually
described). Given how reasonable these preferences are, I think we must accept that people
can be practically rational without satisfying the postulates of this version of expected utility
theory.
To see that this expected utility theory implies implausible epistemic requirements on
counterfactual reasoning, notice that Separability and Actualism respectively imply Coun-
terfact Independence and Fact-Counterfact Independence. This is formally shown [Bradley
and Stefa´nsson, 2015], but there is a very intuitive explanation of this implication. What
actually occurs cannot be desirabilistically independent of what could have occurred (as
Actualism claims) unless the latter contains no information about what the actual world
is like, and hence, no information about what is likely to be actual (as Fact-Counterfact
Independence states). Similarly, counterfacts under disjoint suppositions cannot be desir-
abilistically independent of each other (as Separability claims) unless counterfacts under
disjoint suppositions provides no information about each others, including probabilistic
information (as Counterfact Independence states).
As we have seen, these two independence conditions impose implausible epistemic
constraints on counterfactual reasoning. Hence, even if those who endorse Separability
10In [Bradley and Stefa´nsson, 2015] we actually prove a sufficiency theorem for an axiom that is slightly weaker
than Preference Actualism (but which togehter with Separability implies Preference actualism). The difference
won’t matter for the present argument.
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and Actualism somehow manage to avoid the problems posed by Allais and Diamond
(e.g. by refining their outcome space as Broome [Broome, 1991] suggests), their theory still
has implausible epistemic implications. I take it that a good theory of practical rationality
should not imply counterintuitive principles of epistemic rationality. Hence, I think this
provides evidence for the view that a good theory of practical rationality should neither
entail Actualism nor Separability.
Before concluding this chapter, I should point out that one could define expected utility
in the multidimensional framework quite differently from the way I define it above.11 Rather
than thinking of the prospects to be evaluated, i.e., the ‘acts’, as vectors of the form 〈Y1,...,Yn〉,
one could think of them as functions f from a set of coarse grained descriptions of facts and
counterfacts into the set z of n-tuples of worlds. In other words, the the consequences are
then thought of as n-tuples of worlds that represent both what is the case and what could
have been. Expected utility can then be defined thus:12
Definition 5 (Expected Utility* (EU*)). A desirability function Des is an expected utility* iff:
Des(f) =
n∑
i=1
Des(〈w1, ...,wn〉 | Si).P(Si)
EU* maximisation neither requires Separability nor Preference Actualism as I have defined
the two conditions. (In what follows, everything I say about EU* also holds for EU**, as
defined in last footnote, except that ‘n-tuples of worlds’ should be replaced by ‘n-tuples of
propositions’.) Formally, however, EU* maximisation does require a version of Separability
and Actualism. Unlike desirability maximisation, EU* maximisation requires that the n-
tuples of worlds be separable. The Actualism requirement of EU* maximisation is, however,
rather trivial: it simply requires that once one knows which n-tuple f results in, the other
n-tuples the prospect could have resulted in do not affect the desirability of f. The reason
this is a trivial requirement, is that the n-tuple that f actually results in itself expresses
what other ways f could have turned out. The type of Actualism that is required for EU*
maximisation could thus be thought of as a requirement that ‘only’ the modal and non-
modal facts determine the desirability of a prospect. But, I would claim, there are no facts
beyond the modal and non-modal facts. So this version of Actualism says that the only
thing that matters desirabilistically is everything there is.
EU* theory is not inconsistent with Allais’ and Diamond’s preferences. Nor does it entail
the implausible epistemic principles that I discussed above. Therefore, I would suggest that
one lesson of this chapter is that those who insist on using some version of (unconditional)
expected utility theory, rather than Jeffrey’s theory, should take the consequences to be n-
tuples of worlds (or n-tuples of propositions as defined in fn. 12), rather than singleton
worlds (or one-dimensional propositions). However, the problem remains that this theory
is partition dependent (as Richard Bradley and I further discuss in [Bradley and Stefa´nsson,
2015]).
11I thank Jim Joyce for pressing me on this issue.
12Alternatively, one could have a more coarse grained version of expected utility:
Definition 4 (Expected Utility** (EU**)). A desirability function Des is an expected utility** iff:
Des(f) =
n∑
i=1
Des(〈X1,...,Xn〉 | Si).P(Si)
where each Xi represents what is or would be the case if Si is or would be actual.
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4.7 Concluding Remarks
I have now completed the primary aim of this thesis: to develop a decision theory that allows
us to express desirabilistic dependencies between actual and counterfactual outcomes and
is consistent with Diamond’s and Allais’ preferences. The final two chapters build on this
result. In this chapter the focus was on the way in which a counterfactual can matter
desirabilistically in worlds in which its antecedent is (believed to be) false. As we will see
in chapter 5, there are other ways in which a counterfactual can have a desirabilistic impact,
not all of which concern a world in which the counterfactual’s antecedent is false. Jeffrey’s
desirability measure, extended to counterfactuals, provides natural measures for each of
these ways in which counterfactuals matter desirabilistically. In chapter 6, I apply this
discussion to moral philosophy. Diamond’s example illustrates that what could have been
is often highly relevant for the moral value of an actual outcome. I use this observation to
distinguish between modal and non-modal versions of consequentialism, and suggest that
while the best-known versions of consequentialism (e.g. classical utilitarianism and welfare
economics) belong to the latter category, some entrenched moral intuitions make the modal
version seem more attractive.
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Chapter 5
Desirability of Conditionals
5.1 Introduction
In last chapter we saw how we can extend Richard Jeffrey’s desirability measures to coun-
terfactuals, and as a result avoid certain well-known paradoxes in the theory of rational
choice. There are other and perhaps less paradoxical (or problematic) ways in which coun-
terfactuals, and conditionals in general, influence the desirability of factual propositions. A
conditional can, for instance, carry undesirable information by telling us that what we find
ceteris paribus desirable implies something we find undesirable, or by informing us that
some proposition we desire is unlikely to actualise. The aim of this chapter is to explore the
different ways in which a conditional can influence the desirability of actual outcomes; or,
to put it differently, the different ways in which conditionals can be carriers of desirability.
The chapter is structured as follows. In the next section, I discuss three ways in which
a conditional can be (un)desirable. Firstly, a conditional, A → B, may be (un)desirable
because it informs an agent about the consequences or implications, and hence the all things
considered desirability, of the factual proposition A. Secondly, the above conditional may
be (un)desirable because of the information it carries about the probability of A occurring.
Finally, the conditional may be (un)desirable because it tells the agent that had A occurred,
then B would also have occurred. For each of these, I discuss examples that I hope show how
common these desirabilistic impacts of conditionals are to ordinary, evaluative reasoning.
(As far as I can tell, all rational and reasonable ways in which a conditional can be desirable
or undesirable are special cases of these three.)
In the third section I show that measures for these different kinds of desirabilistic impacts
of conditionals can all be derived from a formula that measures the ‘total’ desirability of
a counterfactual. This formula is a natural application of Richard Jeffrey’s notion of news
value. The derived measures differ from each other in one very important respect: only
measures for the first two kinds of desirability can be reduced to measures of the desirability
of factual propositions. I discuss this difference in more detail in section 5.4, where I argue
that counterfactual desirability is primitive in the sense that it cannot be derived from the
desirability of factual propositions only.
Some of the conditionals I discuss are clearly counterfactuals, a few of them are clearly
indicatives, but for some of the conditionals it is more questionable how we should classify
them. And the first two ways in which a conditional can be desirable that I discuss apply
both to indicatives and counterfactuals, whereas the last applies only to counterfactuals.
However, as will become clear in section 5.3.1, it is safe to use the measure for counterfac-
tuals for all of these. The measure for counterfactuals is more general than the measure
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for indicatives, in the sense that when we use a measure for counterfactuals to measure
the desirability of an indicative conditional, certain assumptions that hold for indicatives
automatically transform the measure into the (more simple) measure that is appropriate for
indicatives. Hence, for the present purposes, we need not worry whether the conditionals I
discuss are counterfactuals or indicatives.
5.2 Three Kinds of Desirability
5.2.1 Factual, desirabilistic information
Example 1. After having taken his girlfriend to the airport, Bob briefly thinks that it would be nice
to see her again that same night. Soon however Bob realises that seeing his girlfriend that same
night would mean that she had missed her flight. Hence he comes to the conclusion that all things
considered, it is not desirable that he sees her again that same night.
Call the proposition that Bob sees his girlfriend ‘that same’ night A. Let B denote the
proposition that Bob’s girlfriend misses her flight. Bob finds A ceteris paribus desirable.
But when it occurs to him that A → B, he concludes that all things considered, A is not
so desirable. In cases like this I will say that the conditional in question carries (negative)
factual, desirabilistic information; or simply that it has (negative) factual desirability.
The next example is also an instance of a conditional carrying such information:
Example 2. A policy maker is considering whether to increase the minimum wage or not. She
prefers, ceteris paribus, to increase the minimum wage, but since she believes1 that if the minimum
wage is increased unemployment will rise, and considers protecting the current level of employment
to be more important than raising the minimum wage, she all things considered prefers to not raise
the minimum wage.
This type of desirability of conditionals is exemplified in a vast number of cases, that have
in common that the desirability of some factual proposition either increases or decreases
through the realisation of what is implied (or will be made true) by the proposition given
the truth of some conditional proposition. Moreover, as the second example shows, it is
because conditionals have desirability of this kind that they are indispensable to rational
decision making.
5.2.2 Probabilistic information
Example 3. After taking his friend to the airport, it occurs to Bill that it would be nice to see him
again that same night. However, Bill realises that if he were to see his friend that same might, then
that would mean that the latter had missed his flight. While Bill does not really care if the friend
misses his flight or not, he knows that the friend is not the type of person that is likely to miss a flight,
and that they are hence unlikely to see each other that night.
Call the proposition that Bill sees his friend ‘that same’ night A. Let B denote the proposition
that Bill’s friend misses his flight. In this example, it is not the case that the truth of the
conditional A → B makes A less all things considered desirable to Bill. However, the
1For the present purposes, it does not matter whether the conditionals that we will discuss are actually true
or not; all that matters is whether the agents in question believe them to be true. (However, I will sometimes be
talking about agents ‘knowing’ some conditionals to be true, which may indicate that they are true. But whether
or not they are true is not important.) The same holds below when I discuss the probabilistic information that a
conditional carries and the counterfactual desirability of a conditional.
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conditional carries information about the probability of the factual proposition A. In cases
like this I will say that the conditional A→ B carries (negative) probabilistic information.
The conditional in the next example carries information of similar sort:
Example 4. Professor K knows that her university desperately needs more government funding.
She also knows that of the political parties currently fighting in a government election, only the
Progressive Party (PP) has increasing government funding for universities on its agenda. In other
words, she knows that if the university gets more funding, then PP must have won the election.
Unfortunately for K, it is highly unlikely that PP wins the election.
This type of desirability of conditionals is also exemplified in a vast number of cases. Com-
mon to these cases is that the truth of a particular conditional makes a factual proposition,
that the agent in question either finds desirable or undesirable, either more or less likely to
occur.
5.2.3 Counterfactual desirability
The structure of the next example should by now be familiar:
Example 5. Alice is offered job E. Although the job is quite risky, and could lead to unemployment
after a few years, it is also very exciting and is on the top of Alice’s preference ranking over possible
jobs. Before she accepts the job, however, she is offered a less exciting job, S, that comes with a
guaranteed job security until retirement. She still prefers E over S, but nevertheless the fact that she
has been offered the job S lowers the expected value of E, since she reasons that if she accepts E and
then loses her job, she will think to herself ‘had I chosen S I would have been guaranteed a stable, long
term job’, which she predicts will make unemployment feel even worse.
Call the proposition that Alice chooses the more secure job A. Let B denote the proposition
that Alice is in employment. Then the truth of the conditional A→ B reduces, according to
Alice, the desirability the proposition ¬B that she ends up unemployed (which, given our
story, is only compatible with having chosen the more risky option, i.e. with proposition¬A).
In cases like this, I will say that the conditional carries negative counterfactual, desirabilistic
information; or simply that it has (negative) counterfactual desirability.
The counterfactual in the next example (which should also be familiar) has positive
counterfactual desirability.
Example 6. A hospital has only one kidney but two patients, Ann and Bob, who are in equal need of
a kidney, are equally deserving, have equal rights to treatment, etc. The head of the organ transplant
department decides to flip a fair coin to decide which patient gets the kidney. He finds this more
desirable than giving the kidney straight away to either patient. The reason is that if the coin toss
decides, then even if Ann (Bob) gets the kidney, there is a meaningful sense in which Bob (Ann)
could have gotten it; which, according to the department head, makes either outcome fair.
It is perhaps worth stressing that although I call this kind of desirability, unlike the other
two discussed above, counterfactual desirability, that does not mean that the conditionals we
discussed when explaining the other kinds of desirability cannot be called ‘counterfactual
conditionals’ as well. In the second example, of the policy maker who is considering whether
to raise the minimum wage or not, the relevant conditional is being used to decide what to
do, which according to many people make it a counterfactual (or subjunctive) conditional.
Moreover, in this particular case, we assumed that the policy maker prefers, given the truth
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of the conditional, not to raise the minimum wage. Hence, the antecedent will not become
true, which may provide even further justification for calling the conditional a counterfactual
conditional. However, the crucial difference between that example and those discussed in
the current section, is that when the policy maker is deliberating, she is considering the
conditional as being open; i.e., it has not yet been determined whether the antecedent will
become true or not. By deliberating with the conditional open, however, she comes to a
conclusion which turns the conditional into what we might call a ‘properly’ counterfactual
conditional – i.e., a conditional where it has already been determined that the antecedent is
false. In contrast, when e.g. Alice is deliberating about what difference the truth of A → B
makes to a situation where ¬A∧¬B, she is supposing that the antecedent is false, and from
that standpoint she evaluates the desirability of the conditional as a properly counterfactual
conditional.
The two examples of counterfactual desirability have in common that the truth of a
counterfactual increases or decreases the all things considered desirability of the negation
of the antecedent and/or the consequent. Counterfactual desirability of this sort is not
uncommon in both practical and normative reasoning, and poses a problem for expected
utility theory, as we saw in last chapter.2
5.3 A General Measure for the Desirability of Conditionals
5.3.1 News value of conditional
Recall that according to Jeffrey’s decision theory, the desirability of any proposition, A, is a
weighted average of the different (mutually exclusive) ways in which the proposition can be
true, where the weight on each way Ai that proposition A can be true is given by P(Ai | A).
Last chapter established that we can extend the theory to counterfactuals. As we have seen,
this means that we can measure the desirability of a counterfactual (which will of course
usually be done against the background of what factual propositions the agent in question
believes to be true). Given multidimensional theory of conditionals I have been discussing,
Des(A  B) then measures the desirability that B is true in the world that is counteractual
under the supposition that A.
To calculate the news value of a counterfactual, we need some partition of the ways
in which counterfactuals can be true. What counts as such a partition depends on the
semantics of conditionals. Things will be much simpler if we assume that both Strong and
Weak Centring holds for conditionals in general (respectively, A∧B implies that A→B is
true and A∧¬B implies that A→B is false). So for the present purposes, I will rely on the
following partition of the propositions compatible with A  B: {{A∧ B}, {¬A∧ B∧ (A 
B)}, {¬A ∧ ¬B ∧ (A  B)}}. Given this partition, the desirability of A  B is given by:
Des(A  B) = Des(A ∧ B).P(A ∧ B | A  B)
+ Des(¬A ∧ B ∧ (A  B)).P(¬A ∧ B | A  B)
+ Des(¬A ∧ ¬B ∧ (A  B)).P(¬A ∧ ¬B | A  B) (5.1)
The above equation is not always satisfactory, since what we are often interested in is how
valuable news it is that the conditional is true compared with the news that it is not true.
2Amartya Sen [Sen, 1985] discusses two additional examples where what (merely) could have been influences
the desirability of actual states of affairs.
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Equation 5.1 can be easily extended to measure that contribution:3
Des(A  B) −Des(A  ¬B) = Des(A ∧ B).P(A ∧ B | A  B)
−Des(A ∧ ¬B).P(A ∧ ¬B | A  ¬B)
+ Des(¬A ∧ B ∧ (A  B)).P(¬A ∧ B | A  B)
−Des(¬A ∧ B ∧ (A  ¬B)).P(¬A ∧ B | A  ¬B)
+ Des(¬A ∧ ¬B ∧ (A  B)).P(¬A ∧ ¬B | A  B)
−Des(¬A ∧ ¬B ∧ (A  ¬B)).P(¬A ∧ ¬B | A  ¬B) (5.2)
This measures the desirability that the truth of the conditional contributes, compared with
its falsity, to the possible states of the world compatible with the conditional. What have we
accomplished by this? As I try to show below, the different kinds of desirability exemplified
at the beginning of this paper can be measured by natural assignments of values to the
variables in equation 5.2.
Recall that above I said that no harm is done when the above measure for the desirability
of a counterfactual is applied to an indicative conditional. When the measure is applied to
such conditionals, then, given the assumptions about indicatives that I defended in chapter
2, formula 5.1 becomes considerably simpler. Firstly, recall that indicative conditionals are
usually taken to be zero-intolerant, which implies that A 7→ B tells us nothing about worlds
where A is false. But then A 7→ B cannot make any desirabilistic difference to worlds where
¬A is true, so Des(¬A ∧ (A 7→ B)) = Des(¬A). Secondly, setting aside McGee’s counterex-
ample (which I discussed in chapter 2), it is generally accepted that unlike counterfactual
conditionals, indicative conditionals are probabilistically independent of their antecedents.
In other words, P(A | A 7→ B) = P(A).
If we assume the above conditions for a conditional A 7→ B, then when we apply measure
5.1 to A 7→ B, it becomes:
Des(A 7→ B) = Des(A ∧ B).P(A) + Des(¬A).P(¬A) (5.3)
which is exactly Bradley’s formula for calculating the desirability of indicative conditionals
(see e.g. [Bradley, 1998]).
Given the discussion above and in previous chapters, it should be evident that that
the first assumption (i.e., that A 7→ B makes no desirabilistic difference in worlds where
¬A is true) does not hold for the conditionals that are involved in Allais’ and Diamond’
reasoning, as was discussed in last chapter. For according to that reasoning, the conditionals
in question do have a desirabilistic impact on worlds where their antecedent is false. We
have also seen, in chapter 2, that the assumption of probabilistic independence does not
in general hold for counterfactuals. Unfortunately, I also argued that some indicatives do
not satisfy probabilistic independence, which means that we cannot in general use equation
5.3 to measure the desirability of indicative conditionals. There is, however, no need to
worry about that here, since I will in general use the more complicated measure for all
conditionals. And of course, when applied to conditionals for which either or both of the
above assumptions hold, the measure automatically simplifies in the way that is appropriate
for the conditional in question.
3Throughout this chapter, I will assume the Conditional Excluded Middle, since it is implied by the theory of
conditionals I am using, but nothing of importance hangs on that assumption.
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5.3.2 Savage and the evaluation of conditionals
In last chapter we saw that introducing counterfactuals into expected utility theory has
undesirable consequences: it implies norms for epistemic reasoning about counterfactuals
that are clearly implausible. Focusing on Savage’s version of expected utility theory, I will
in this section discuss further reasons for why Jeffrey’s theory is more natural than Savage’s
if we want value functions to be defined over conditionals.
It is unclear how we could even talk about the goodness or badness of conditionals within
Savage’s framework. According to Savage, there are three elements of a decision problem,
and similarly three types of things that agents have attitudes about: acts, consequences, and
states of the world that determine the consequences of each act. And an agent has conative
attitudes towards consequences and acts, but cognitive attitudes toward states of the world.
The most natural way to make room for conditionals, within Savage’s framework, would be
to think of them as acts. But since an act, according to Savage, is a function from the set of
mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive states of the world into the set consequences,
we must then think of these acts as partitioning conditionals [Bradley, ms]. That is, we think
of an act as a prospect of the form A = (A1 → B1)(A2 → B2)...(An → Bn) where the Ais
are mutually incompatible and collectively exhaustive states of the world and the Bis are
maximally specific consequences. Then B j is, for instance, the consequence of act A if
state of the world A j occurs. In some cases this seems quite natural (in particular when
we are evaluating the goodness of indicative conditionals). For instance, imagine that I am
considering how desirable is the conditional that I get £100 if a fair coin comes heads up but
nothing if the coin comes tails up. Then it seems natural to represent the relevant ‘act’ as
(H→ £100)(¬H→ £0). The value of the conditional, given Savage’s framework, is given by
P(H).U(£100) + P(¬H).U(£0).
In other cases this method to evaluate the goodness of a conditional doesn’t work. Firstly,
in some cases the ‘states’ (antecedents) will not be probabilistically independent of the ‘acts’
(partitioning conditionals), as Savage’s theory requires. Recall the conditional from the third
example: ‘if I see my friend tonight (A), then he will have missed his flight (B)’. To evaluate
the goodness of this conditional, within Savage’s framework, we might think of it as the
partitioning conditional (A→ B)(¬A→ ¬B).4 But in this case it is not true that the ‘states’,
A and ¬A, are probabilistically independent of the ‘act’, (A→ B)(¬A→ ¬B).
Secondly, in some cases the ‘consequences’ (consequents) will not, on this approach, be
desirabilistically independent of the ‘states’ (antecedents), contrary to what Savage requires.
Consider the conditional: ‘if I work hard, then I will ace the exam; otherwise I will not’.
Let wh denote the antecedent and ace the consequent. To evaluate the goodness of this
conditional, within Savage’s framework, we might think of it as the ‘act’ (wh→ ace)(¬wh→
¬ace). The consequence ace is desirabilistically independent of the state wh if and only if
Des(ace | wh) = Des(ace), which means that Des(ace∧wh)−Des(wh) = Des(ace). Now imagine
someone who derives great pleasure from achievements that she know she ‘earned’, but not
as much pleasures from the achievements as such (i.e. Des(ace ∧ wh) > Des(ace)). However,
she finds working hard, in and of itself, not so desirable (i.e. Des(wh) < 0). We can think
of acing and working as ‘complementary goods’ from the perspective of this agent. In that
case, Des(ace ∧ wh) − Des(wh) > Des(ace). Hence, the ‘consequence’ is not desirabilistically
4We might want to partition the antecedent and consequent further to allow for the possibility that our friend
misses his flight but, nevertheless, does not come and see us.
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independent of what ‘state’ of the world brings it about.5
So it seems that we cannot really discuss the desirability of conditional propositions
within Savage’s framework by interpreting conditionals as acts, and acts as partitioning
conditionals. Perhaps we should then add conditionals as consequences? The problem with
this is that conditionals are usually neither desirable nor undesirable in and of themselves,
but rather undesirable or desirable given what else is true. In Savage’s theory, however, it is
assumed that consequences are maximally specific with regards to everything that matters
for their utility. Hence, we cannot simply add each conditional as one consequence, but, for
each conditionalα that we are interested in, we would need to have one consequence for each
possible but mutually incompatible combination of α and non-modal facts that are relevant
for the evaluation of α. Suppose that for conditional α there are only two contingencies that
effect its utility: a and¬a. As far as I can tell, the most plausible way in which we could assign
it a utility value, given Savage’s framework, would be to think of it as an act, despite what
was previously said, and its utilities as being given by: u(α(a)).P(a)+u(α(¬a)).P(¬a). But now
we have the same problem as before, since for many of the conditionals we are interested in,
the relevant contingency is not probabilistically independent of the conditional. Suppose,
for instance, that α is the conditional ‘if more money is printed, inflation will rise’. Then a
and ¬a might respectively be that the central bank has and has not decided to print more
money, which is clearly not probabilistically independent of α.
5.4 Specific Measures for the Desirability of Conditionals
Reasoning to a large extent involves supposing certain conditions to be true and trying
to establish what follows from the supposition. To evaluate the factual desirability of the
conditional A → B, for instance, we supposed that A, and ask ourselves, from this point
of view, how (un)desirable it is that the conditional is true rather than false. To evaluate
the counterfactual desirability of A → B, on the other hand, we suppose that ¬A, and ask
ourselves, from this point of view, how (un)desirable it is that the conditional is true. Thus
the factual desirability of A → B is measured by one particular update on the probability
function in equation 5.2 and the counterfactual desirability of A→ B by another update on
the probability function in 5.2. To evaluate the probabilistic information of A → B, on the
other hand, we do not start by any updating on a probability measure P, but rather try to
figure out what assuming the conditional, compared with its negation, means for P. Using
the above (Ramsian) observation, let’s now turn to deriving measures for the ways in which
a conditional can be (un)desirable.
5.4.1 Measure for factual desirability
In the first example, about Bob who was taking his girlfriend to the airport, we interpreted
A as the proposition that Bob sees his girlfriend that same night, and B the proposition that
she misses her flight. When Bob reasons about how desirable it would be to learn that he
sees his girlfriend that same night, he evidentially supposes A and tries to evaluate what
5It might of course seem unnatural to interpret working hard as a state of the world. But keep in mind that
the aim here is to see to what extent it is possible to formulate the conditional in question within Savage’s theory.
The above arguments were meant to show that Savage’s probabilistic and desirabilistic independence assumptions
make this task quite difficult. His reliance on a clean distinction between acts, states and consequences makes the
task even more difficult.
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follows.6 Now the change in the Bob’s attitude w.r.t. the overall desirability of A that takes
place once he realises the truth of A→ B can be measured by:
DesA(A→ B) −DesA(A→ ¬B) = DesA(A ∧ B) −DesA(A ∧ ¬B) (5.4)
which we get from 5.2 when we conditionalise on A (since in general we have P+α (α | β) = 1
and P+α (¬α | β) = 0).
Now recall from chapter 1 that I am assuming that the desirability of A under the
(evidential) supposition that B is given by: DesB(A) = Des(A | B) −Des(B). Hence:
DesA(A→ B) −DesA(A→ ¬B) = Des(A ∧ B) −Des(A ∧ ¬B) (5.5)
This, I suggest, measures the difference that the truth of the conditional makes, from the
perspective of Bob, to the overall desirability of seeing his girlfriend that same night. In
other words, this measures the factual, desirabilistic information that the conditional carries.
(And the same formula can measure the factual desirability of the conditional in example 2.)
It is perhaps worth stressing that while we have been talking about ‘changes’ in an
agent’s attitudes to the all things considered desirability of some proposition A that take place
when the agent realises what other propositions are implied by A (together with a true
conditional A→ B), this does not (necessarily) mean that there has been a change in attitude
to A in and of itself. We might have a preference change with respect to A and ¬A, since
by realising the truth of the conditional the agent’s preference for ¬A compared to A may
change. However, it may still be the case – and by assumption still is the case in examples
1 and 2 – that they would still prefer the alternative that they did prefer before learning the
truth of the conditional, had they not gotten (or realised) this new piece of information. In
other words, we should not represent the changes that take place in these cases by a new
conditional desirability function. Rather, we have an update on the old desirability function
that takes place due to changes in the beliefs of the agent in question.
5.4.2 Measure for probabilistic desirability
In the third example, about Bill and his friend, we denoted the proposition that Bill sees
his friend that same night by A, and used B for the proposition that the friend misses his
flight. I suggested an assumption to isolate the probabilistic desirability of the conditional:
we assume that Bill does not really care if his friend misses his flight or not. Hence, we
have Des(A ∧ (A → B)) = Des(A). We can then also assume that in a world where Bill
does not see his friend that same night, it makes no difference to Bill whether or not it is
true that if he had seen his friend the latter would have had missed his flight; nor does it
make a difference to Bill, in such a world, whether the friend actually has missed a flight or
not. Hence, Des(¬A ∧ B ∧ (A → B)) = Des(¬A ∧ ¬B ∧ (A → ¬B)) = Des(¬A ∧ (A → B)) =
Des(¬A ∧ (A → ¬B)) = Des(¬A). These equalities mean that equation 5.2 (which measures
6For my argument to go through, the supposition has to be evidential, since I am assuming that PA(A | A→ B) =
1, but for contrary-to-factual suppositions, we presumably have: PA (A | A→ B) = P(A | A→ B). When reasoning
about what to do, we therefore need to be very careful about how we partition the state space we are working with.
In particular, to avoid making suboptimal choices in Newcomb’s problem and similar choice situations where an
alternative is probabilistically, but not causally, related to good or bad outcomes, we could for instance partition
our state space into causally homogenous cells, and compare the alternatives cell-by-cell (as e.g. Nancy Cartwright
suggests [Cartwright, 1979]).
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the desirability of a conditional being true rather than false) is equivalent to:7
Des(A→ B) −Des(A→ ¬B) = Des(A).P(A | A→ B) −Des(A).P(A | A→ ¬B)
+ Des(¬A).P(¬A | A→ B) −Des(¬A).P(¬A | A→ ¬B) (5.7)
And this captures how (un)desirable it is, from the point of view of Bill, that the conditional,
A → B, is true rather than false. For given the above assumptions, the desirability of the
conditional in question, according to Bill, is entirely determined by, firstly, the desirability
of A (relative to ¬A) and, secondly, the impact the conditional has on the probability of A.
Strictly speaking, equation 5.7 measures more than what I above called the ‘probabilistic
information’ of a conditional, for it measures both the probabilistic information of A → B
and how good or bad it is that the conditional makes this probabilistic difference. To keep
things simple, I will occasionally refer to what equation 5.7 measures as the ‘probabilistic de-
sirability’ of the conditional A→ B. If we, however, wanted to measure just the probabilistic
information of A→ B for C, it seems most natural to use the ratio:
P(C | A→ B)
P(C | A→ ¬B) (5.8)
Similarly, if we imagine that professor K from the fourth example only cares about which
party wins the election to the extent that it influences whether or not her university gets
more funding, then we can also use equation 5.7 to measure how (un)desirable she finds the
truth of the conditional ‘if we get more funding, then PP must have won the election’.
5.4.3 Measure for counterfactual desirability
Recall that in the fifth example, we are assuming that having been offered the stable job,
S, reduces according to Alice the expected value of the more exciting job, E. For the fact
that she could choose a stable, long term job, makes the prospect of unemployment (which
is only compatible with choosing E) seem even worse. We used A for the proposition that
Alice accepts the more secure job S. Let ¬A denote the proposition that Alice accepts job E.
In other words, we assume that Alice is only considering these two jobs and will take one of
them. Let B be the proposition that Alice is employed. Then when Alice reasons about what
it would be like to find herself in a situation of unemployment after having turned down the
more secure job, she is supposing two things. Firstly, she is supposing that she has already
chosen job E over job S; that is, she is supposing that ¬A. Secondly, she is supposing that
she is unemployed; i.e. supposing that ¬B.
Combining these two suppositions with equation 5.2 gives us:8
7The above equalities in conjunction with equation 5.2 directly give us:
Des(A→ B) −Des(A→ ¬B) = Des(A).P(A | A→ B) −Des(A).P(A | A→ ¬B)
+ Des(¬A).P(¬A ∧ B | A→ B) −Des(¬A).P(¬A ∧ B | A→ ¬B)
+ Des(¬A).P(¬A ∧ ¬B | A→ B) −Des(¬A).P(¬A ∧ ¬B | A→ ¬B) (5.6)
From this we get equation 5.7, since in generalP(α ∧ β) + P(α ∧ ¬β) = P(α).
8Here I am assuming the definition of conditional desirability that I defended in chapter 1. On that definition,
Des¬A∧¬B(A → B) − Des¬A∧¬B(A → ¬B) = Des(¬A ∧ ¬B ∧ (A → B)) − Des(¬A ∧ ¬B) − [Des(¬A ∧ ¬B ∧ (A →
¬B))−Des(¬A∧¬B)] = Des(¬A∧¬B∧ (A→ B))−Des(¬A∧¬B∧ (A→ ¬B)). Incidentally, Jeffrey’s formula, which
I criticised in chapter 1, delivers the same result in this case.
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Des¬A∧¬B(A→ B) −Des¬A∧¬B(A→ ¬B) =
Des(¬A ∧ ¬B ∧ (A→ B)) −Des(¬A ∧ ¬B ∧ (A→ ¬B)) (5.9)
This measures the difference, according to Alice, that having been offered the stable job
makes to the desirability of being unemployed after having declined the offer; i.e. the
counterfactual desirability of the conditional in question, w.r.t. this particular situation.
Given the story we told and the situation that Alice is imagining, the value of equation 5.9
is negative: the truth of the (counterfactual) conditional in question makes the the situation
less desirable than the truth of its converse. Hence, since ¬A ∧ ¬B is one of the possible
outcomes of choosing option E (i.e. of ¬A), the conditional in question reduces the expected
value of this option.
Equation 5.9 also measures the desirability of the relevant (counterfactual) conditional
in the kidney example (which will be further discussed in next chapter).
The second part of equation 5.2 – Des(¬A∧ B∧ (A→ B)).P(¬A∧ B | A→ B) −Des(¬A∧
B ∧ (A → ¬B)).P(¬A ∧ B | A → ¬B) – also measures some sort of counterfactual desir-
ability. However, this is counterfactual desirability of a different kind than what we have
been discussing so far, since this time we are measuring what difference the counterfactual
makes to a situation where the antecedent is false but the consequent is true anyway. The
interpretation of this part of the equation is perhaps most straightforward in the example
of the policy maker (i.e. example 2). If she decides not to increase the minimum wage (¬A)
but unemployment nevertheless rises (B), then she might regret not having increased the
minimum wage. But this regret will presumably be much larger if it had been the case that
increasing the minimum wage would lead unemployment not to increase (i.e. if A → ¬B).
Hence, the conditional A→ B has positive counterfactual desirability, according to the pol-
icy maker, w.r.t. a situation where ¬A ∧ B. The conditional also has positive counterfactual
desirability, according to the policy maker w.r.t. a situation where ¬A ∧ ¬B. For if she does
not increase minimum wage, contrary to what she, ceteris paribus, desires, and the level of
unemployment stays the same, then (given the truth of A→ B) she can take comfort in the
thought that if she had increased the minimum wage, the unemployment level would have
risen. Hence, A→ B has overall positive counterfactual desirability to the policy maker, even
though we assumed that it has negative factual desirability.
The last point – that the same conditional can be regarded as either desirable or unde-
sirable depending on whether it is being evaluated as an open or ‘properly’ counterfactual
conditional – is worth emphasising. We just saw that in the second example the relevant
conditionals has negative factual desirability but positive counterfactual desirability. The
opposite seems to be true in the fifth example, of Alice who is offered a job. Before she has
decided whether to accept the secure job or not – i.e., when A → B, ‘if I choose the more
secure job then I will be guaranteed a stable, long term job’, is still an open conditional – she
might be glad to learn the truth of the conditional in question. But when she evaluates the
conditional under the supposition that the antecedent is false – i.e. when she evaluates the
desirability of A → B as a properly counterfactual conditional – and also supposes that the
consequent is false, then she finds the conditional undesirable, since it makes her regret not
having chosen the less risky alternative.
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5.4.4 Combining the measures
When I introduced the examples at the beginning of this chapter, I spoke as if in each example
the relevant conditional had only one of the three kinds of desirabilities we have discussed.
We could to isolate the first and the third kinds of desirability by having the agents in the
relevant examples suppose either the truth or falsity of the antecedents. And we managed to
isolate the second kind by assuming that the agents in those examples care about the truth
of of the antecedents but are indifferent between the truth and falsity of the consequents.
But it is of course possible, and will often be the case, that a conditional has all three kinds
of desirabilities at the same time; in which case we need the full equation 5.2 to calculate the
‘overall’ desirabilistic difference that the truth of the conditional makes (compared with its
falsity).
Let’s focus on Bob, in our first example, who has just taken his girlfriend to the airport.
The conditional that if he sees his girlfriend that night then she will have missed her flight,
A → B, carries negative factual desirabilistic information, we said, but presumably positive
counterfactual desirability, since if he doesn’t see his girlfriend he can take comfort in the
thought the she would have missed her flight if he did. It seems equally natural to assume
that the conditional in question carries some probabilistic information. For given the story
we told, i.e. that the girlfriend is trying to catch a flight, we may assume that the truth of
the conditional reduces the probability of the antecedent becoming true. Taken together,
then, the ‘total’ desirability of A→ B, for Bob, is the sum of, firstly, the factual, desirabilistic
information of A→ B, and, secondly, the counterfactual, desirabilistic information of A→ B;
weighted by the probabilistic information of A→ B.
5.5 More on Counterfactual Desirability
So far I have derived measures for different ways in which a conditional can be desirable
or undesirable, from Jeffrey’s original desirability measure. Before concluding this chapter,
I first discuss a fundamental difference between, on one hand, factual and probabilistic
desirability of a conditional, and, on the other hand, counterfactual desirability. I then
briefly discuss how others have treated what I call ‘counterfactual desirability’.
5.5.1 Primitiveness of counterfactual desirability
There is a fundamental difference, as we have seen, in the measures that I have proposed
for the different kinds of desirability of conditionals: counterfactual desirability is never
determined entirely by the desirability of factual propositions. (That is, the formula for
measuring counterfactual desirability has a counterfactual in the desirability measure on the
right hand side of the equality.) At first sight, it might seem regrettable that we cannot get
rid of conditionals in the formula we use to measure counterfactual desirability. However,
I think this is exactly as it should be, since this type of desirability fundamentally concerns
the relationship between what is and what would have been. Below I try to give an informal
argument for why this type of desirability is primitive, in the sense that the ‘goodness’ that this
relationship generates is not a function the goodness of the factual propositions involved.
On the other hand, the factual desirability of a conditional is always, and the probabilistic
desirability is sometimes, determined by the desirability of the factual propositions the
conditional in question carries information about.
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Let me first explain why factual desirability (or undesirability) of a conditional is not
primitive in the same way as counterfactual desirability. In these cases a conditional, A→ B,
has desirability because it tells us that A will not become true unless B does. The factual
desirability of a conditional is, thus, a function of the desirabilities of the factual propositions
that it carries information about. Once we know, for some particular agent i, the values of
Des(A ∧ B) and Des(A ∧ ¬B), we can infer the factual, desirabilistic information that A→ B
carries for i. Hence, we do not need to know the desirability of any conditionals – nor the
probability of conditionals – in order to establish the factual desirability of a conditional.
Counterfactual desirability, on the other hand, is primitive. The desirability or unde-
sirability of ¬A ∧ ¬B ∧ (A → B), cannot, in all cases, be inferred from the desirability of
factual propositions alone. Take the coin flip case, and assume that Bob got the kidney in a
world where the coin lands tails. (Let’s now denoted this proposition by ¬C ∧ ¬D.) Now
the desirability of ¬C ∧ ¬D ∧ (C → D), from the point of view of the health care official, is
not entirely determined by the desirability of ¬C∧¬D and the desirability of C→ D, taken
on their own; nor of course the desirabilities of C, ¬C, D and ¬D. For the desirability of the
conjunction, ¬C ∧ ¬D ∧ (C → D), is also partly determined by how much the department
head values fairness, which, as I will further argue in next chapter, in this particular case
fundamentally concerns a relationship between a factual proposition and a counterfactual.
One way to put it is that the conjunction and the counterfactual complement each other, in
the same way that chocolate complements coffee; and the desirability of the two, either
coffee-and-chocolate or the conjunction-and-counterfactual, cannot be determined by the
desirability of each item on its own.
Considering the case of Alice who is job-hunting leads to the same conclusion. Alice is
reasoning about what it would be like to find herself unemployed after having chosen the
more risky option (i.e. she is supposing that ¬A ∧ ¬B). She concludes that the truth of the
counterfactual conditional – that if she had chosen the more secure option she would still
be employed – makes the situation even less desirable than if the conditional had not been
true. Again the desirability of ¬A ∧ ¬B ∧ (A → B) is neither determined entirely by the
atomic, factual propositions involved when taken on their own; nor is it simply a sum of the
desirabilities of ¬A∧¬B and A→ B. When the two conjuncts are simultaneously (believed
by Alice to be) true Alice feels regret for not having taken the more secure job. And this regret
is neither due to ¬A∧¬B nor A→ B by themselves, but stems from an interaction between
the two. As I discuss in the introductory chapter, I am claiming that Alice’s feeling of regret
(assuming that it is reasonable) reflects, rather than causes, the badness of her situation.
And, to repeat, this badness does not reside in each conjunct, ¬A∧¬B nor A→ B, but stems
from an interaction between the two.
The probabilistic desirability of a conditional is not determined in all cases by the desir-
ability of factual propositions only. If for agent j, Des(¬A ∧ ¬B ∧ (A→ B)) , Des(¬A ∧ ¬B),
then whenever the conditional in question affects the probability of this complex proposi-
tion, ¬A ∧ ¬B ∧ (A → B), we need the value of Des(¬A ∧ ¬B ∧ (A → B)) to measure the
probabilistic desirability of A → B for j. There is, moreover, a different sense in which
probabilistic desirability cannot be reduced to factual proposition; namely, in the sense that
the probabilities cannot be so reduced. Fundamental to probabilistic desirability is the dif-
ference between (or the ratio of) P(C | A → B) and P(C | A → ¬B). And since this formula
cannot in general be reduced to the probability of factual propositions. This irreducibility of
the probabilistic effects of conditionals will not, unlike the irreducibility of the desirabilistic
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effects of counterfactual conditionals, be of much concern to the rest of this thesis.
To sum up: counterfactual desirability fundamentally concerns the relationship between
factual and counterfactual propositions. Hence, we have an intuitive justification for the
result in 5.4 that counterfactual desirability cannot, unlike factual desirability, be reduced to
the desirability of factual propositions.
5.5.2 Others on ‘counterfactual desirability’
Although, to the best of my knowledge, nobody has systematically discussed what I am
calling ‘counterfactual desirability’, the paradoxes that I claim are generated by counterfac-
tual desirability have been widely discussed, in particular Allais’. In this section I will (very
briefly) explain how the main solutions to the Allais paradox differ from mine. Maurice
Allais himself used the idea of complementarity to explain and justify what I have called
the ‘Allais’ preference’ ([Allais, 1979], pp. 88-92). But unlike what I suggest above, Allais
did not seem to have had in mind that a counterfactual proposition complements a factual
proposition. Rather, Allais’ idea seems to have been that states of the world – i.e. states that are
not under the agent’s direct control – complement each other. That is, it seems that Allais’
idea was that an outcome in one possible state of the world, conditional on an act, cannot be
evaluated independently of what happens in other possible states of the world, conditional
on that same act. Therefore he thought that it is a mistake to require, as Separability does,
that when we compare two acts we ignore the states of the world where the two acts generate
the same outcome.
My explanation of the Allais preference (and of Alice’s reasoning) is more general than
Allais’. I agree that what happens in one state of the world, conditional on one act, cannot
always be evaluated independently of what happens in other states of the world, conditional
on the same act, as e.g. the coin-flip and kidney example illustrates. However, I also claim
that what happens in one state of the world, conditional on one act, cannot be evaluated
independently of what happens in some (perhaps the same) state of the world, conditional
on some other feasible act. And that, it seems to me, is what explains the Allais preference
(and Alice’s reasoning). For the relevant difference between, on one hand, ending up with
nothing in the first of Allais’ choice situations, and, on the other hand, ending up with
nothing in Allais’ second choice situation, crucially depends on the availability of a risk free
prospect (i.e. certain act) in the first but not the second situation.
Here is another way to state the difference between my suggestion and Allais’. Let’s
partition the states of strictly counterfactuals worlds into set W¬A and WA, where the former
is the set of possible but counterfactual worlds that differ from the actual world in ways that
are not under the control of a particular agent i, while the latter is the set of possible but
counterfactual worlds that differ from the actual world in ways that are under i’s control.
My claim is that the counterfactuals that matter to i’s evaluation of factual prospects are not
limited to the worlds in WN but also concern worlds in WA, contrary to what Allais seems
to suggest.
Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky make another famous attempt at explaining the
Allais preference. Their explanation is that people tend to “overweight outcomes that
are considered certain, relative to outcomes which are merely probable” ([Kahneman and
Tversky, 1979], p. 265). Recall from last chapter that if subjects have the option of choosing a
risk-free prospect, the extra 33% chance at £2500 is normally not considered worth an extra
1% risk of getting nothing; but when comparing two risky prospects, the same extra chance
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of getting £2500 is considered to be worth the same increase in the risk of getting nothing.
I think that it is a mistake to explain the Allais preference by saying that people overweight
outcomes that are certain.9 People are presumably right when they think that if they give
up the risk-free prospect and then are unlucky enough to end up with nothing, they will
feel regret for not having chosen the prospect that would have guaranteed them something.
But if people are right in their estimation of how they will feel in such a situation, and their
preference reflects this estimation, then Kahneman and Tversky are wrong to claim that
people overweight the outcomes of the risk-free prospect.
The main disagreement I have with Kahneman and Tversky’s treatment of the Allais
paradox, however, is that their response does not explicitly refer to the importance of
counterfactuals. Hence, their characterisation of the Allais preference, and the ‘prospect
theory’ they offer as an alternative to expected utility (EU) theory, does not allow for a
unified treatment of the different violations of EU theory that are all caused by what I call
‘counterfactual desirability’. In particular, their theory cannot account for the preference for
flipping the coin, in the kidney example, in the same way that they account for the Allais
preference.
Graham Loomes and Robert Sugden provide an analysis of the Allais preference that
comes closer to mine, because they directly refer to the importance of regret over what could
have been [Loomes and Sugden, 1982]. Moreover, like myself, and unlike Kahneman and
Tversky, they do not explain this preference by some sort of mistake on the behalf of the
decision maker (see last fn.). However, their explanation of the Allais preference is less
general than mine, in that it cannot account for e.g. the preference for tossing the coin in the
kidney example. Their ‘regret theory’ is design to deal with cases of rejoice and regret, where
what actually occurs is more or less desirable than what could have been; in other cases
their theory does not differ from EU theory. In example 6, however, what could have been is
neither more nor less desirable than what actually occurs (we assumed that the health care
official is indifferent between which patient actually receives the kidney). Their theory is,
therefore, no different from EU theory when it comes to dealing with such cases.
Here is a more precise way of making the above point. Lommes and Sugden’s modified
utility is given by
mki j = ci j + R(ci j − ckj) (5.10)
where c is a ‘choiceless’ utility function (representing the utility an agent derives from an
outcome without having chosen it), i refers to the act chosen, j to the actual state of the world,
and k the act that could have been chosen. R is what they call a ‘regret-rejoice’ function, that
measures how much regret or rejoice the agent feels when the value of ci j − ckj respectively
negative or positive. When ci j − ckj = 0, however, R(ci j − ckj) = 0. Hence, ‘modified utility’
does not differ from standard Savage or von Neumann-Morgenstern style utilities when
there is no difference in the value of what is and what could have been.
Moreover, both Loomes and Sugden’s regret theory and Kahneman and Tversky’s
prospect theory moreover allow for violations of transitivity (which says that if A is pre-
ferred to B and B to C then A should preferred to C). As we saw in last chapter, however, the
theory that I develop to account for Allais’ preference (and Diamond’s preference) does not
allow for violations of transitivity. Since I take transitivity to be a requirement of rationality,
9As this talk of overweighting certain outcomes shows, Kahneman and Tversky do not, (unlike e.g. Allais) try to
rationalise Allais’ preference. In fact, they claim that departures from the standard axioms of decision theory, like
those often exhibited in the Allais choice situation, “must lead to normatively unacceptable consequences” (ibid,
277).
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I think that unlike mine, neither regret theory nor prospect theory should be thought of as
a theory of rational choice.
The closest treatment of ‘counterfactual desirability’ to mine is perhaps Broome’s [Broome,
1991]. In some sense, he offers a unified treatment of what I call ‘counterfactual desirability’,
and hence his theory deserves a special treatment. In the Allais example, Broome adds ‘dis-
appointment’ to the outcome of ending up with nothing after having given up the risk-free
prospect; and he adds ‘treated unfairly’ to the outcome where a patient does not get a kidney
without having lost in a lottery. Thus, if we translate Broome’s solution to the propositional
language I am working with, then Broome’s solution is to add to the factual propositions in
question some other factual propositions, i.e. that the agent feels disappointment or that the
patient is treated unfairly.
The primary benefit of my solution over Broome’s (as I further discuss in next chapter),
is that it explicitly models the desirabilistic relationships between actual and counterfactual
outcomes that seem to be at the heart of Diamond’s and Allais’ preferences. Another
weakness of Broome’s treatment, relative to mine, is that formally it is not at all clear how
the factual propositions Broome adds to the relevant outcomes are related to the other
factual propositions involved. In the Allais paradox, for instance, he simply adds (as a
primitive) the proposition that the agent feels disappointment to the proposition that the
agent gets nothing after having turned down the risk-free prospect.10 Hence, if we now let
A represent the proposition that Allais chooses the risk-free prospect, B the proposition that
Allais wins nothing, and C the proposition that Allais feels disappointed, Broome makes
Allais’ preference compatible with expected utility theory by pointing out that Des(¬B ∧ C)
may be different from Des(¬B). But that means that formally, C need not be related to A and
B.11
Yet another disadvantage of Broome’s treatment, which I will discuss further in next
chapter, is that his treatment does not really explain why Allais’ and Diamond’s preferences
have generated these well-known paradoxes for decision theory. Broome adds regret and
fairness as primitive properties to the outcome space. I, on the other hand, enrich the set
of prospects to include counterfactual prospects, such that the regret and fairness emerges
as a relationship between factual and counterfactual propositions. As I explain in next
chapter, decision theorists (and economists) have traditionally been unwilling to accept that
counterfactual outcomes can affect the value of actual outcomes. Since fairness and regret
in the examples I have been discussing fundamentally concern such a relationship between
what is and what could have been, I think that my solution explains why Diamond’s and
Allais’ preferences have historically generated these problems for decision theory.
5.6 Concluding remarks
In this chapter I showed how measures for the three ways in which a conditional can be
(un)desirable can be derived from Richard Jeffrey’s general desirability measure. I take
it that the most important lesson of this chapter, is that unlike factual (and sometimes
10That is, this is how we would describe what Broome does in a propositional framework like Jeffrey’s.
11Broome himself might be happy with that, since perhaps he thinks that there need not be any systematic
relationships between the facts, the counterfacts and an agents regrets. (I thank James Joyce for pointing this out.)
Nevertheless, many people would, I think, claim that the type of regret that we are considering is irrational (or at
least unreasonable) if, for instance, the agent believes that she could not have done otherwise, or believes that the
actual outcome is the best possible outcome that she could reasonably expect. To state and discuss conditions like
these, we need to be explicit about what the relationship is between the added variable and the other outcomes in
our model.
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probabilistic) desirability of conditionals, counterfactual desirability is not determined by
the desirability of factual propositions. Focusing on the kidney allocation example, I will use
this observation in next chapter to construct what I call Modal Consequentialism, and suggest
that it satisfies some entrenched moral intuitions better than Non-Modal Consequentialism
(such as classical utilitarianism and welfare economics).
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Chapter 6
Fairness and Counterfactuals
6.1 Introduction
Consequentialists hold that the moral value of an alternative is determined by its conse-
quences. This position allows for a variety of different views, for instance depending on
how narrowly we define consequences, and the way in which the values of different conse-
quences are combined when evaluating the overall value of an alternative. This chapter
explores two views within this broad consequentialist school. One view, which I call non-
modal consequentialism (NMC), claims that the moral value of an alternative is determined
by its non-modal consequences and that there should be no interaction between consequences
in different states of the world. The second view, which I call modal consequentialism (MC),
claims that the moral value of an alternative is determined by both its modal and non-modal
consequences and that consequences in different states of the world can interact (in a sense
explained below).1,2
I will use the kidney example, which should be familiar by now, to explore the difference
between modal and non-modal consequentialism. The main features of the example to keep
in mind, for the present purposes, is that we are imagining a situation where a hospital has
only a single kidney but two patients, Ann and Bob, who are in equal need of the kidney,
have equal rights to treatment, etc. (More generally, we assume that in every respect that
you find relevant for the decision of who should receive the kidney, Ann and Bob’s situation
is exactly symmetric.) To make the example even more clear, let’s now imagine that Ann
and Bob do not know that there is one kidney but two needing patients, nor will they know
why they got the kidney if they do, or why they didn’t if they don’t.
According to what I call the Fair Chance View (FCV), we should toss a fair coin, or
hold some other lottery that gives each patient a 0.5 chance of winning, to decide whether
Ann or Bob receives the kidney. Below I show that unlike modal consequentialism, non-
modal consequentialism is not consistent with the FCV. But existing versions of modal
consequentialism do not, I contend, respect the intuition behind the FCV either. The main
aim of this chapter is to show that the multidimensional decision theory developed in
1This distinction has, to my knowledge, not yet received any attention. Phillip Pettit has recently argued that
some goods, such as love and friendship, make modal demands, in that they should persist through changes or after
events that will (in all likelihood) never actualise. (Pettit discussed this in his 2011 Uehiro Lecture at the University
of Oxford.) Similarly, my discussion establishes that fairness often makes modal demands, in that its requirements
concern what happens not only in the actual world but also in merely possible worlds. But as far as I am aware,
Pettit does not discuss the aforementioned distinction within consequentialism.
2A related distinction is that between ex post and ex ante consequentialism; the former judging the moral value
of alternatives by their actual consequences, the latter by their expected consequences. As we shall see, there are
situations where ex post and ex ante consequentialists may be in agreement as to what action to perform, but modal
and non-modal consequentialists disagree.
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chapter 4 is a modal-consequentialist theory that does better in this regard.
The next section defines the Fair Chance View and the two versions of consequentialism
more precisely. In section 6.3, I use Leonard Savage’s [Savage, 1972] classical decision theory
to show the contradiction between the FCV and non-modal consequentialism, and remind
the reader why Separability could be seen as the main culprit. Section 6.4 briefly discusses
a modal-consequentialist theory that does not satisfy Separability. Although this theory can
be made consistent with a preference for tossing a coin in situations like the one described
above, it does not, I argue, satisfy the intuition behind the FCV. John Broome [Broome, 1991]
has famously shown that we can, given the right description of alternatives (in particular
their consequences), make Separability compatible with the preference for tossing a coin. As
I explain in section 6.5, the resulting theory is modal, but nevertheless violates the intuition
behind the FCV. Finally, in section 6.6 I try to provide further motivation for the decision
theory developed in chapter 4, by showing that it is a version of modal consequentialism
that satisfies the intuitions behind the FCV. In section 6.7 I discuss some advantages the new
theory has over other versions of modal consequentialism.
6.2 The FCV and Two Forms of Consequentialism
Most people seem to have the intuition that in circumstances like those described in the
example discussed above, we should hold a lottery to decide how to distribute the good in
question. To justify this intuition from a consequentialist point of view, we need to show
that the consequences3 of holding the lottery are better than the consequences of giving the
kidney to either Ann or Bob without holding such a lottery. There may be many different
consequentialist justifications of the discussed intuition. But the one I will focus on is the
following: A consequence (or situation) where Ann has received the kidney as a result of
a lottery is (strictly) morally better than a consequence where Ann has received the kidney
without ‘winning’ it in a lottery, because in the former case Bob had a chance. I take this
common justification to follow from the more general Fair Chance View:
Fair Chance View (FCV). Suppose n individuals are in equal need of an indivisible good m < n
of which we are about to distribute, and that the individuals are identical in every other respect that
is morally relevant to the decision of who should receive a good. Then a situation (or consequence)
where m of these individuals receive the good but all n individuals had an equal chance of receiving
the good is (strictly) morally better than a situation where m of these individuals receive the good and
it is not true that all n individuals had an equal chance of receiving the good.
Giving people a (or an equal) chance of getting a good, in situations like the one under
discussion, is valuable in and of itself, according to the FCV as I understand it, rather than
merely instrumentally valuable. (I will assume also that on this view, a situation where
any individual in question has received the good in question is fair just in case a lottery
was used to determine who was to receive a good.) I will not attempt to make a normative
assessment of the view, nor address the many and deep philosophical issues surrounding
it. For instance, I will set aside questions about whether the view requires that we distribute
equally objective chances of receiving the good, or whether an equal distribution of subjective
probabilities suffices (and if so, subjective probabilities of whom). Instead, I will try to capture
this common view a bit more formally. The main thing to notice, for the present purposes, is
the relation between chance and counterfactuals. What does it mean to say that even though
3In what follows, I will talk of ‘consequences’, ‘outcomes’ and ‘situations’ interchangeably.
114
Ann actually got the kidney, Bob had a chance of receiving the kidney? It means that things
could (in some meaningful sense) have turned out differently, and if they had, Bob would
have received the kidney.4 Using the possible world framework for counterfactuals, we can
express this by saying that a situation (in world w) where Ann has received the kidney is
made morally better by the ‘existence’ of a possible world w′ that only differs from w in that,
firstly, a lottery turns out differently from the way it does in w, and, secondly, Bob receives
the kidney.
As already indicated, one claim to be defended in this chapter is that unlike modal
consequentialism, non-modal consequentialism is incompatible with the Fair Chance View.
Before defending this claim, let me define the two views a bit more precisely. Above I said
that according to consequentialism, the moral value of an alternative is determined by its
consequences. But this description may be somewhat misleading. To be more precise, let us
say, using the terminology developed in [Broome, 1991], that according to consequentialism
in its most general form, the value of an alternative is determined by how it distributes
consequences across locations. In Broome’s view, there are three dimensions of these locations
to consider: different states of the world, different people, and different times. (As we will
see, we should add counterfactual dimensions to this list.) To keep things simple, I will
assume that each location in both the dimension of time and people is valued equally (as is
the case according to most forms of utilitarianism). Hence, for the present purposes, I define
consequentialism, in its most general form, as the claim that the value of an alternative is
determined by how it distributes consequences across different states of the world.
This characterisation is compatible with different forms of consequentialism, for in-
stance depending on how consequences in different states of the world are weighted in the
calculation of the overall value of an alternative.5 But more importantly for the present pur-
poses, consequentialism, thus characterised, comes in different forms depending on, firstly,
whether we allow that modal properties matter for the moral value of the consequence in
each (or some) state; and, secondly, whether we allow for the possibility that, when evalu-
ating the overall value of an alternative, the contributions that consequences in some states
make depends on consequences in some other states.
What I call ‘non-modal consequentialism’ is a strict version of consequentialism, in that
it neither allows that modal properties can be of moral importance nor for interactions
between consequences in different states of the world:6
Non-Modal Consequentialism. The moral value of an alternative is determined by how it dis-
tributes non-modal consequences across different states of the world, and consequences in different
mutually incompatible states of the world make independent contributions to the overall value of an
alternative.
From a general consequentialist theory (as described above) we get non-modal consequen-
4The claim that Bob had an equal chance can just as naturally be captured in terms of counterfactuals. For it
simply means that the counterfactual outcome where Bob receives the kidney was just as likely (when the lottery
took place) as the actual outcome of the lottery.
5According to ex ante consequentialists, for instance, the consequence in each state of the world is weighted by
the probability of that state being actual. Accord to ex post consequentialists, however, consequences in all states
except the actual one get weighted by 0.
6Where exactly to draw the line between the modal and non-modal properties of our world is a difficult question,
which I will not directly address. But I take it that chances, counterfactuals and dispositions are clearly part of the
modal properties of the world, whereas the “spatiotemporal arrangement of local qualities” ([Lewis, 1994]: 474) is
part of the non-modal properties of the world. In any case, I think that solving the problem of how to demarcate
the modal from the non-modal is more important for those who claim that only one of these types of properties
is of moral relevance, than for those (like myself) who admit that both modal and non-modal properties are of
importance.
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tialism when we add the following principles:
First Principle of NMC. The moral value of a consequence in a particular state
of the world is fully determined by the non-modal properties of that consequence.
Thus in each state of the world, only the actual consequence in that state is of
moral significance.
Second Principle of NMC. If alternative A has different consequences depending
on whether state of the world s1, s2, s3, etc., turns out to be actual (where s1, s2,
s3, etc., are mutually incompatible), then for any of these si, the value that the
consequence in si contributes to the overall moral value of A is independent of
the consequence in any s j , si.
I will call a consequentialist theory modal if it violates either the first or the second principle
of NMC. Here is what the two principles have in common, which justifies calling a theory
that violates either of these modal. If a theory does not satisfy the first principle, then the
value of consequences in one state of the world may depend on what occurs in other states
of the world, but if a theory does not satisfy the second principle, then the contribution that a
consequence in one state of the world makes towards the overall value of an alternative may
depend what occurs in other states of the world. Violations of both principles thus imply
that there is some sort of value dependency between what occurs in different, mutually
incompatible states of the world.
The first principle of NMC is a version of Actualism, which I discussed in chapter 4, but
now stated as a moral principle for consequentialist ethics.
The second principle of NMC is related to Separability, that was discussed in chapter
4. Separability is usually discussed as a property of preferences – or, in a moral context,
a property of what we might call ‘betterness judgements’.7 Let’s remind ourselves what
Separability requires (in a single-dimensional framework). We can represent each alternative
A by an n-tuple, e.g. A = 〈a1, a2, ...an〉, where the ais are the possible consequences of A. Now
take the alternative A and create two new alternatives: Ab created by replacing ai in the
original alternative with b and Ac created by replacing ai with c. Do the same for alternative
D: create Db by replacing di in the original alternative with b and Dc by replacing di with c.
A betterness judgement (or preference) is separable just in case for any manoeuvre like the
one just described, Ab is better than (or preferred to) Ac if and only if Db is better than (or
preferred to) Dc.
Decision theorists typically start with an ordering of alternatives, or a set of properties
of orderings, and then show what kind of value functions can represent such an ordering
(or an ordering with those properties). But it can be useful to start with a property of a
valuation and see what ordering properties it implies. Let us suppose that when a non-
modal consequentialist orders a set of alternatives according to ‘betterness’, she first finds
out the moral value of each alternative, in accordance with the two principles of NMC,
and then orders the alternatives according to moral value. (Moreover, let us restrict our
attention to alternatives where both probabilistic and causal independence holds between
the alternatives and the states of the world.) Then since moral value, according to her,
7A ‘betterness judgement’, as I am using the term, is an overall comparative judgement. Hence, it is (formally)
very much like preference. But to emphasise that the judgement in question may be objective (if some version of
moral realism is true) I will often talk about betterness judgments rather than preferences. When talking about the
requirements of decision in general, I will however talk about preferences.
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satisfies the second principle of NMC, her betterness judgement satisfies Separability and
Actualism.
One might wonder whether the distinction in consequentialist ethics that I have been
making is really important. Surely everyone accepts that modal properties are morally
important, someone might say. So what is the point of discussing this distinction between
modal and non-modal consequentialism?8 On a closer look, it is apparent that not everyone
accepts the import of modal properties. According to classical utilitarianism, for instance,
one should always choose the act that maximises the total amount of pleasure over pain:
‘the greatest happiness for the greatest number’, as it is often put. Of course, people might
feel (psychological) pleasure and pain due to what could have been. But contrary to what
e.g. the FCV claims, the truth of a counterfactual is in itself of no moral importance according
to classical utilitarianism; all that matters is how people feel about their actual situation.
Economists and decision theorists have traditionally also been very reluctant to accept
that what could have been matters for the (rational) evaluation of actual outcomes. In a
classical defence of the ‘Independence Axiom’, found in one form or other in most decision
theories (and implied by Separability as previously defined), Nobel laureate Paul Samuelson
argues for formal Separability as captured by the second principle of NMC, based on an
intuition like the one expressed by the first principle of NMC. In chapter 4, I explained
Samuelson’s reasoning (and cited Broome’s approval of it). The upshot is that Samuelson
and Broome think that because there should be no desirabilistic dependencies between
mutually incompatible outcomes (as the first principle of NMC states), an evaluation or
ordering of alternatives should satisfy Separability (as the second principle of NMC states).
A similar attitude is suggested by Leonard Savage’s reaction to the Allais Paradox.
Rather than explaining away the paradox by making attitudes to non-modal properties of
gambles part of the description of the outcomes, as many people have done since (albeit
usually by calling them something like ‘global’ rather than ‘modal’ properties of gambles),
he insisted that the common ‘Allais preference’ is simply irrational ([Savage, 1972]: 102-103).
But that arguably implies that it is irrational to care about the relationship between actual
outcomes and what could have been (as I have already argued). Hence, since Savage wanted
to formulate a theory of rational choice, he must have been taking himself to be formulating
a theory that was non-modal.9
Finally, it might be worth mentioning that certain consequentialist theories should be
classified as ‘modal’ for reasons that have nothing to do with what they say about the fair-
ness of lotteries. These include John C. Harsanyi’s [Harsanyi, 1977] and Richard Arneson’s
[Arneson, 1990] views. Both authors claim (roughly) that e.g. social policies should maxi-
mally satisfy people’s hypothetical preferences, i.e. those preferences that people would have
in ideal circumstances. What is true in a counterfactual world therefore makes a difference
to the moral value of outcomes and alternatives in the actual world. Although I will focus on
the fairness of lotteries in this chapter, it should become clear that the framework developed
in chapter 4 (and discuss again in section 6.6) also provides a formal model in which to state
and explore claims made by theories like Harsanyi’s and Arneson’s.
8I thank an anonymous referee for Economics and Philosophy for pressing me on this issue.
9Peter Hammond also famously defines consequentialism in a way that, in effect, makes what I am calling
‘non-modal consequentialism’ a non-consequentialist theory (see e.g. [Hammond, 1987], [Hammond, 1988]).
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6.3 Non-Modal Consequentialism vs. Fair Chance
I will focus on Savage’s version of decision theory to show why a non-modal consequentialist
theory is incompatible with the Fair Chance View.10 Recall that according to Savage’s theory,
the value of an alternative A, denoted by U(A), is given by:11
EU(L) =
∑
siS
u(A(si)).P(si)
where S is a partition of the possible states, A(si) is the consequence of A if si happens to be
the actual state of the world, u a utility measure on (maximally specific) consequences, and
P a probability measure on states.
Savage’s equation satisfies the second principle of non-modal consequentialism, i.e. the
Separability property. In decision theoretic jargon, Savage’s utility function is additively
separable: the value of each alternative is a weighted sum of the values of each of its possible
consequences. Hence, the value that u(si(A)) contributes towards the overall value of A is
independent of any s j(A). But, crucially, for Savage’s theory to be an appropriate formal-
isation of non-modal consequentialism, we need to assume that each si(A) is a non-modal
consequence.
To relate the above characterisation of non-modal consequentialism back to the example
of Ann, Bob and the kidney, let L be a lottery that gives Ann and Bob an equal chance of
receiving the kidney (depending for instance on whether a fair coin lands heads up or tails
up), and A (B) the alternative of giving the kidney to Ann (Bob) without holding a lottery.
Then the Fair Chance View implies the following betterness judgement, which I will refer
to as the Fair Chance Judgement (FCJ): A ≺ L, B ≺ L (where we now interpret ‘.. ≺ ...’ as ‘... is
worse than ...’). Then given that Savage’s theory is an appropriate formalisation of NMC,
the latter is only compatible with the FCV if the following inequalities can simultaneously
be satisfied: ∑
si∈S
u(si(A)).P(si) <
∑
si∈S
u(si(L)).P(si) (6.1)
∑
si∈S
u(si(B)).P(si) <
∑
si∈S
u(si(L)).P(si) (6.2)
where each si(α) is a non-modal consequence.
Now let ANN (BOB) represent the consequence where Ann (Bob) receives the kidney. Then
A (B) is certain to have ANN (BOB) as consequence, but L will either result in ANN or BOB.
Thus we can represent A (B) by ANN (BOB), and L by the n-tuple 〈ANN,BOB〉. There do not
seem to be any modal properties built into the description of these consequences, so non-
modal consequentialists should be happy with this representation of the three alternatives.
But now the non-modal consequentialist runs into trouble, as we saw in chapter 4. For
according to NMC, the value of the three alternatives is then given by: U(A) = u(ANN),
U(B) = u(BOB) and U(L) = u(ANN)0.5 + u(BOB)0.5. But obviously, u(ANN)0.5 + u(BOB)0.5
can never be greater than u(ANN) and also greater than u(BOB).
The above tension clearly has something to do with Separability; in particular, the
10As I hope will become evident, my argument does not depend on any features special to Savage’s version of
decision theory. In particular, dropping the assumption of Savage’s that states of the world are causally and/or
probabilistically independent of alternatives (or acts, as Savage calls them) does not affect the argument.
11I assume here that the possible consequences of each alternative are at most countably infinite. Otherwise we
would take the integral rather than the sum.
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additively separable form of Savage’s utility function. If the above is the right description
of the alternatives, then if the value of an alternative is a probability weighted sum of the
values of its possible consequences, then the value of L can never be greater than the value
of both A and B. In next section I discuss an attempt to make the FCV compatible with
consequentialism by dropping Separability, thus violating the second principle of NMC.
But the above tension can also be attributed to the way in which the alternatives have
been described. In sections 4 and 5 I discuss two attempts – one old and one novel – to
make the FCV compatible with consequentialism by describing the alternatives (and their
consequences) in a way that violates the first principle of NMC. (The new attempt also
violates the second principle of NMC, as we have seen.) Perhaps unsurprisingly, I will
argue that only my new solution – the one that I discussed in chapter 4 – succeeds in making
consequentialism compatible with the intuition behind the FCV.
6.4 Consequentialism Without Separability
Suppose we calculate the values of the three alternatives as follows:
U(A) = u(ANN).r(P(>)),
U(B) = u(BOB).r(P(>)),
U(L) = u(ANN).r(P(S)) + u(BOB).r(P(¬S))
where> is a tautology and r a risk function of a risk seeking agent – i.e. an agent who prefers a
gamble with an expected value of x to a risk-free alternative the value of whose consequence
is x – and {S,¬S} is a partition of the possible states of the world into two equiprobable
events.12 Then it might be possible to represent the judgment that L is better than both A
and B as maximising risk-weighted utility; if, for instance, we allow for the possibility that
u(ANN).r(P(S)) + u(BOB).r(P(¬S)) is greater than both u(ANN).r(P(>)) and u(BOB).r(P(>)).
And given how I have characterised consequentialism, i.e. as the view that the value of
an alternative is determined by how it distributes consequences across states of the world,
risk-weighted utility theory is a consequentialist theory.
This solution satisfies the first principle of NMC. For the consequences of the lottery,
thus described (ANN and BOB), do not contain modal properties. But this solution is still
incompatible with non-modal consequentialism, since it violates the second principle of
NMC. To see this, notice that alternative A can be reformulated as the ‘lottery’ that has ANN
as consequence in both the S-states and ¬S-states. Hence, for the risk-weighted solution
to work, r has to allow for the possibility that u(ANN).r(P(S)) + u(BOB).r(P(¬S)) is greater
than both u(ANN).r(P(S)) + u(ANN).r(P(¬S)) and u(BOB).r(P(S)) + u(BOB).r(P(¬S)). But for
that to be possible, we need to assume that the function r is sensitive to global features of
alternatives; i.e. that r is such that the contribution that u(ANN) makes towards the overall
value of an alternative partly depends on what other consequences the alternative can have.
Hence, this solution violates the second principle of NMC.
Should modal consequentialists be happy with this solution? There are, in my view,
two related reasons for seeking an alternative way of making consequentialism compatible
with the FCV. Firstly, it seems to me that the Fair Chance View is an example of a more
general phenomenon where what could have been is important for the evaluation of the
12This could be seen as a variant of Lara Buchak’s Risk-Weighted Expected Utility Theory [Buchak, 2013], albeit
with some important differences. (For instance, the way in which she defines r means that it is always the case
that r(P(>)) = P(>) = 1, and that the expected utility of a lottery can never exceed the utilities of all of its possible
prizes, contrary to what I am assuming here.)
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desirability of what actually occurs (as I have already explained). Unlike the above solution,
the one I developed in chapter 4 (and discuss again in section 6.6) explicitly models this
relationship between what is and what could have been. Secondly, the above solution
suggests that accepting the FCV has something to do with being risk seeking. More precisely,
this way of making consequentialism compatible with the FCV suggests that the reason
consequentialism as formalised by Savage seems incompatible with the FCV, is that that
formalisation places certain restrictions on attitudes towards risk. But those who accept my
first objection will agree that the problem with Savage’s framework, from the perspective of
the FCV, is not so much the theory’s restriction on risk attitudes, but rather its insensitivity
to the desirabilistic relationships between what is and what could have been.
6.5 Broome’s Redescription Strategy
Contrary to my suggestion in section 6.3, many people will undoubtedly have the intuition
that the consequence where Ann (Bob) receives the kidney as a result of the lottery L is
not the same consequence as Ann (Bob) receiving the kidney as a result of the risk-free
alternative A (B). The former consequence is fair whereas the latter is not, which must
mean that these are not the same consequences. Hence, it seems, the consequences of A,
B and L were not properly described in last section. Similarly to what Broome ([Broome,
1991]: ch. 5) suggests, we should perhaps write the fairness directly into the description
of the outcomes of the lottery; such that, for instance, L has ANN&Fair, BOB&Fair as its
two possible consequences, but A (B) has ANN (BOB) as the only possible consequence.
And then the trouble we saw in section 6.3 disappears, since there are many (additively
separable) functions EU that simultaneously satisfy:
EU(A) = u(ANN) < EU(L) = u(ANN&Fair).0.5 + u(BOB&Fair).0.5 (6.3)
EU(B) = u(BOB) < EU(L) = u(ANN&Fair).0.5 + u(BOB&Fair).0.5 (6.4)
Broome’s solution thus makes a preference for tossing the coin in the example discussed at
that start of the paper compatible with consequentialism without giving up Separability (i.e.
without violating the second principle of NMC). But the solution clearly violates the first
principle of NMC. Assuming that the FCV is part of our conception of fairness, then when
we start refining our consequence set to include consequences that have ‘fairness’ written
into their description, for examples like the one I have been discussing, we are in effect
creating dependencies between consequences in different mutually incompatible states of
the world. The consequence ANN&Fair for instance implicitly refers to what could have
been, in the sense that a necessary condition for ANN&Fair to be a possible consequence of
some alternative C, is that BOB&Fair is also (at least considered to be) a possible consequence
of C.13 For given the FCV, C can only result in ANN&Fair if C is some sort of lottery or random
choice mechanism that has BOB&Fair as consequence in some state of the world. Hence,
given that the moral value of the consequence of the lottery is, on Broome’s suggestion,
partly a function of this modal property, his suggestion violates the first principle of NMC.14
13That is, assuming that C is the initial choice of who should receive the kidney, rather than for instance the act
of giving the kidney to Ann after she has won it in a lottery.
14I should emphasise that violating the first principle of NMC does not necessarily entail a departure from
orthodox decision theory. (I thank Jim Joyce for pressing me on this issue.) Many economists and philosophers
with welfarist inclinations seem to typically adhere to the first principle of NMC in their application of expected
utility theory; i.e., in the way in which they conceptualise consequences. But formally, expected utility theory does
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The implicit reference to what could have been is precisely the reason Broome’s preferred
description of the consequences runs into troubles with (what he calls) the Rectangular Field
Assumption (RFA). RFA is a technical assumption of many of the traditional decision theoretic
representation theorems, such as Savage’s, needed (given the other assumptions of these
theorems) to construct from an agent’s preferences a value function that is unique up to
positive affine transformation. Recall that an alternative can be represented by an n-tuple
of consequences, e.g. A = 〈a1, a2, ..., an〉, where ai is the consequence of (choosing) alternative
A if state of the world si happens to be actual. Given any set of alternatives that an agent’s
preferences are defined over, each state has associated with it a set of possible outcomes.
Call that set for the i-th state Ci. Then take the product of all of these sets: C1 × C2 × ... × Cn.
Now the RFA states that any n-tuple created by picking consequences from some or all of
the sets in the product is an alternative in the agent’s preference ordering. That is, if we go
through the sets, from C1 to Cn, and pick arbitrary consequences from some or all of these
sets, then the resulting n-tuple of consequences is an alternative in the agent’s preference
ordering.
Going back to our example, we could for instance pick two consequences: ANN and
ANN&Fair. The resulting alternative would then be the ordered pair 〈ANN, ANN&Fair〉.
This is an alternative where Ann gets the kidney in any state of the world; but, in addition,
if some state turns out to be actual, then Ann gets the kidney fairly! But that is, of course,
conceptually impossible on the Fair Chance View. For given this conception of fairness,
either Ann or Bob can only receive the kidney fairly if some random mechanism was used to
determine who was to receive the good. But whenever such a random choice mechanism is
used, it will not be the case that the same patient receives the kidney in all states of the world.
In other words, an outcome is fair only if it is not true that that same patient receives the
kidney in all states of the world. Another way to put this, is that given Broome’s description
of consequences, the RFA requires that it be possible that a lottery that is unfair results in a
consequence that is fair. It seems clear that this requirement goes again the intuition behind
the FCV. Hence, it is not at all clear that Broome’s ‘re-description strategy’ makes the FCV
compatible with Savage’s consequentialist framework.15
I should emphasise that the tension with the Rectangular Field Assumption is not the
main reason I think we should seek alternative ways of making the Fair Chance View com-
patible with consequentialism. Not all decision theoretic representation theorems require
the RFA,16 and there are well known problems with the assumption that have nothing to
do with fairness. The main problem I have with Broome’s solutions, is rather that unlike
the solution suggested in next section, Broome’s fails to make explicit the desirabilistic de-
pendency between actual and counterfactual outcomes that seems at the heart of the FCV.
not require adherence to the principle. (As we will se below, however, violation of the first principle of NMC is
in tension with – but not, strictly speaking, inconsistent with – a technical assumption of some expected utility
theories.)
15It may be worth stating the RFA in the terminology of Savage’s framework. Here, the assumption is that any
function from the state space S we are working with to the consequence set C, is an act in the agent’s preference
ordering. Assume that H and T (standing for e.g. coin comes up heads and coin comes comes up tails) are two events
that partition the state space. Then if C contains both ANN and ANN&Fair, the function
f ∗(si) =
ANN if si ∈ T,ANN&Fair if si ∈ H.
should be an act in the agent’s preference ordering. This is an act that has the consequence that Ann receives the
kidney in any state of the world, and moreover receives it fairly if a state if H happens to be actual.
16In particular, the Bolker-Jeffrey theorem for Jeffrey’s decision theory does not contain the Rectangular Field
Assumption. Broome’s solution can easily be reformulated for Jeffrey’s framework. Moreover, the representation
theorem for expected utility theory that we prove in [Bradley and Stefa´nsson, 2015] does not rely on the assumption.
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Examining the tension between Broome’s solution and the RFA nevertheless does serve an
important role in the present argument, since it illustrates the difficulty in dropping the first
principle of non-modal consequentialism while holding on to Savage’s framework. The
reason the RFA creates trouble for Broome is that some consequences as Broome describes
them refer, as we have seen, to what occurs in states of the world in which they themselves
do not occur, and thus cannot be combined with any arbitrary consequence as the RFA
requires. In other words, the tension with the RFA stems from Broome’s violation of the first
principle of NMC.
6.6 A New Version of Modal Consequentialism
I now finally turn to formulating a version of modal consequentialism that satisfies the
intuition behind the Fair Chance View better than the theories already discussed. The
framework is the same as the one I developed in chapter 4, but here I will focus on its
application to the notion of fair chance.
Recall that according to Jeffrey’s theory, the desirability of any particular proposition,
A, is a weighted average of the desirabilities of the different (mutually exclusive) ways in
which the proposition can be true, where the weight on each way wi that proposition A
can be true is given by P(wi | A). Hence, as we have already seen, one way of formulating
Jeffrey’s desirability measure is as follows:
Des(p) =
∑
wi∈A
P(wi | A).Des(wi) (6.5)
Jeffrey’s evaluation of propositions is clearly consequentialist, given how I have charac-
terised consequentialism. The possible ways in which a proposition can come true can be
understood as the possible consequences of the proposition coming true, and we can interpret
that which determines the way in which a proposition comes true (if it comes true) as a
‘state’ of our world. Representing the Fair Chance Judgement as maximising the value of
a Jeffrey-desirability function is, therefore, one way of showing that the Fair Chance View
is compatible with consequentialism. However, someone who evaluates propositions ac-
cording to Jeffrey’s equation will not always satisfy Separability (as I explained in chapter
4).
Although Jeffrey’s theory violates Separability, the theory as Jeffrey himself interpreted
it – i.e. as a version of non-modal consequentialism (where Des is defined over only factual
propositions) – nevertheless runs into the same problem we have seen with Savage’s: there is
no pair of desirability and probability functions relative to which the Fair Chance Judgement
can be represented as maximising desirability. Recall however that I mentioned in chapter 4
that it could be argued that the consequences of the lottery should be formulated as ANN∧L,
in which case there are pairs of desirability and probability functions relative to which the
Fair Chance Judgement can be represented as maximising desirability. But ANN ∧ L is not
a non-modal consequence: in effect, this description of the consequence has built into it
that the consequence in question had 0.5 chance of occurring (since L is the proposition that
either ANN or BOB will occur will equal chance).
Making Jeffrey’s theory compatible with the Fair Chance Judgement by including the
lottery in the description of the consequences moreover suffers, in my view, from the same
problem as Broome’s suggestion, namely that it does not make explicit the importance of
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counterfactuals for the Fair Chance View. As we saw in chapter 4, we can, however, represent
the FCJ (which I then called Diamond’s preference) as maximising desirability once we have
extended Jeffrey’s decision theory to counterfactuals. And representing the judgement with
that framework does make explicit the importance of counterfactuals. I will not go through
all the details again. However, I will provide a slightly different argument from the one
presented in chapter 4, to show that the extended theory can represent the FCJ. The reason
for going through this again is that I will now show that the representation satisfies certain
moral intuitions that I ignored in chapter 4.
Let us now focus on a model with only four worlds, w1 to w4, and suppose this is how
worlds and sentence match up:
B ¬B
A w1 w2
¬A w3 w4
Now let A express the proposition (A) that the coin comes up heads and ¬A the proposition
that the coin comes up tails. Let B express the proposition (B) that Ann receives the kidney
and ¬B the proposition that Bob receives the kidney. (Recall from chapter 4, page 87, the
simplifying assumptions already made.)
To represent the Fair Chance Judgement in a multidimensional model, we need to work
with two suppositions: the supposition that A and the supposition that ¬A. But actually,
we only need to consider two dimensions at a time, since the FCJ only orders alternatives
according to what is actually true and what would be true under a contrary-to-factual sup-
position. That is, the judgement for instance is that a situation where the coin comes up
heads and Ann receives the kidney, is made better or worse depending on whether Ann
also receives the kidney under the (contrary-to-factual) supposition that the coin comes up
tails. But it says nothing about whether the desirability of this situation depends on what
is true under the (matter-of-factual) ‘supposition’ that the coin comes up heads. Hence, for
a situation where A is true at the actual world, we need not represent the ‘counter’-world
under the supposition that A; and similarly for the situation where ¬A is true. So although
semantically we are now working with a three-dimensional model, we only need to worry
about two dimensions at a time.
Let θ denote the world we need not consider at each time. If A is actually true, then
θ is the ‘counter’-world under the supposition that A (which is the second world as I am
setting up the n-tuples) but if ¬A is actually true, then θ is the ‘counter’-world under the
supposition that ¬P (which is the third world as I am setting up the n-tuples). The following
is thus the space of possible situations17 we need (call this whole space of situationsW):
Actuality Possible Situations
w1 〈w1, θ,w3〉 〈w1, θ,w4〉
w2 〈w2, θ,w3〉 〈w2, θ,w4〉
w3 〈w3,w1, θ〉 〈w3,w2, θ〉
w4 〈w4,w1, θ〉 〈w4,w2, θ〉
I will assume that it makes no difference, according to the FCV, whether Ann or Bob actually
receives the kidney, provided that one of them does, since by assumption their situation is
symmetric in all ways that are relevant for the decision of who should receive the kidney.
17To emphasise to consequentialist nature of the theory, I will in this section call each n-tuple a situation.
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Hence, the fair situations are equally good when Ann actually receives the kidney as when
Bob actually receives the kidney and similarly for the unfair situations. The FCJ thus orders
the situations into two equivalence classes, where every situation from the ‘Good’ class is
better than every situation from the ‘Bad’ class; but any two situations within the same class
are equally good:
Bad Good
〈w1, θ,w3〉 〈w1, θ,w4〉
〈w2, θ,w4〉 〈w2, θ,w3〉
〈w3,w1, θ〉 〈w3,w2, θ〉
〈w4,w2, θ〉 〈w4,w1, θ〉
What is common to the (‘bad’) situations in the left column is that the person who actually
receives the kidney would also have received it had the coin come up differently. In the
situations in the right column, however, whoever actually receives the kidney would not
have received it had the coin landed differently.
The Fair Chance Judgement can now be formulated as follows:18
〈w1, θ,w3〉 ∼ 〈w2, θ,w4〉 ∼ 〈w3,w1, θ〉 ∼ 〈w4,w2, θ〉
≺ 〈w1, θ,w4〉 ∼ 〈w2, θ,w3〉 ∼ 〈w3,w2, θ〉 ∼ 〈w4,w1, θ〉 (6.7)
and the FCJ can be represented by a function V that satisfies:
V(〈w1, θ,w3〉) = V(〈w2, θ,w4〉) = V(〈w3,w1, θ〉) = V(〈w4,w2, θ〉)
< V(〈w1, θ,w4〉) = V(〈w2, θ,w3〉) = V(〈w3,w2, θ〉) = V(〈w4,w1, θ〉) (6.8)
There will certainly be many functions satisfying 6.8 (and thus representing 6.7): any ordinal
utility function, defined over a set of world-triples, can represent this ordering. So to some
extent, we have reached the goal of making the FCV compatible with (modal) consequen-
tialism. For we have found a way of showing that there is a function whose assignment of
values to situations corresponds to whether the FCV deems the situation fair. And we do not
have to worry about clashes with the Rectangular Field Assumption, since the assumption
is not needed for the existence of such a function.
I have however not yet shown that there is a Jeffrey desirability function that represents
6.7. But we can do so by construction. Let V and P assign values to the basic situations
(i.e. the ordered triples) inW. The functions extend to any proposition α, i.e. to any set of
situations, according to the following rules (recall that α could be factual or conditional):
V(α) =
∑
〈wi,w j,wk〉∈α
V(〈wi,w j,wk〉).P(〈wi,w j,wk〉 | α) (6.9)
18Each triple in 6.7 is a (maximally specific) proposition, and in fact a conjunction of a factual and a counterfactual
proposition. 〈w4,w2〉 for instance is the proposition that ¬A ∧ ¬B ∧ A  ¬B, 〈w4,w1〉 the proposition that
¬A ∧ ¬B ∧A  B, etc. Hence, 6.7 is equivalent to:
(A ∧ B ∧ ¬A  B) ∼ (A ∧ ¬B ∧ ¬A  ¬B) ∼ (¬A ∧ B ∧A  B) ∼ (¬A ∧ ¬B ∧A  ¬B)
≺ [(A ∧ B ∧ ¬A  ¬B) ∼ (A ∧ ¬B ∧ ¬A  B) ∼ (¬A ∧ B ∧A  ¬B) ∼ (¬A ∧ ¬B ∧A  B)] (6.6)
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P(α) =
∑
〈wi,w j,wk〉∈α
P(〈wi,w j,wk〉) (6.10)
Then by construction, V is a Jeffrey desirability function: the desirability of a proposition,
according to this function, is a weighted average of the desirabilities of the different ways
in which the propositions can come true (i.e. the different situations compatible with the
proposition), where the weights are given by the appropriate conditional probabilities.
Now let’s see whether this function can represent the Fair Chance Judgement, as formu-
lated in 6.7. Recall the two equivalence classes of propositions (sets of n-tuples) induced by
the FCJ. Let us call the ‘good’ equivalence class G and the ‘bad’ equivalence ¬G. We can
stipulate that:
1. ∀〈wi,w j,wk〉 ∈ G : V(〈wi,w j,wk〉) = 1
2. ∀〈wl,wm,wn〉 ∈ ¬G : V(〈wl,wm,wn〉) = −1
Then it is clear that V represents the FCJ, as formulated in 6.7: for any two basic situations,
〈wi,w j,wk〉 and 〈wl,wm,wn〉, we have: if 〈wi,w j,wk〉 ∼ 〈wl,wm,wn〉 according to FCJ, then
V(〈wi,w j,wk〉) and V(〈wl,wm,wn〉) are both either -1 or 1; but if 〈wi,w j,wk〉 ≺ 〈wl,wm,wn〉
according to FCJ, then V(〈wi,w j,wk〉) = −1〈V(〈wl,wm,wn〉) = 1. So we have constructed a
Jeffrey desirability function that represents the FCJ.
G and ¬G are also propositions (sets of n-tuples of worlds), and by the above stipulation:
V(G) = 1 and V(¬G) = −1. But for any arbitrary proposition α:
V(α) = V(G).P(G | α) + V(¬G).P(¬G | α) = P(G | α) − P(¬G | α) (6.11)
Up to now I have been focusing only on propositions that are either completely fair or
completely unfair; i.e. propositions that are either subsets of G or ¬G but do not overlap the
two sets. And I have formulated the FCJ as only having something to say about propositions
that are either completely fair or unfair. In that respect, what I have done so far in this chapter
adds nothing to what was already accomplished in chapter 4. Notice, however, that we can
easily construct propositions that overlap the two sets G and¬G. Let’s call such propositions
‘mixed’. m = {〈w1, θ,w3〉, 〈w1, θ,w4〉} is a mixed proposition, for instance, since the first of
its elements is an unfair situation but the second is fair. Intuitively, a proposition like m is a
biased lottery. In 〈w1, θ,w3〉 Ann gets the kidney no matter how the coin lands. So since this
situation is possible given m, but no situation that gives Bob a greater chance than Ann is
possible given m, m is biased towards Ann.
Now take any two mixed propositions m1 and m2: suppose each is a set of two triples,
one of which is an element of G but the other of ¬G. According to V, as I have constructed
it, V(m1) ≤ V(m2) just in case P(G | m1) ≤ P(G | m2). It is natural to think of P(G | mi) as
measuring how unbiased mi is: if P(G | mi) = 1 then mi is not at all biased but if P(G | mi) = 0
then mi is maximally biased. So the more (less) biased a proposition is, the lower (higher)
value V assigns to it. Although I have said nothing about how the Fair Chance View judges
biased lotteries, this is exactly what we should want.19 For any mixed propositions m1 and
m2, the former should be better than the latter, on this view, if and only if it is less biased; but
if they are equally biased, then they should be equally good (or bad). So the function I have
constructed does not only capture the intuition that a situation where Ann (Bob) receives
the kidney is fair only if Bob (Ann) had a chance; it also captures the intuition that situations
19In fact, this needs to hold for the FCJ to satisfy continuity.
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where they both had an equal chance at receiving the kidney are more fair than situations
where their chances were unequal.
6.7 Implications of the New Solution
The framework developed in chapter 4, and again in last section, has the advantage over the
other modal consequentialist theories I have been discussing that it explicitly models the
desirabilistic relationship between what is and what could have been, which seems at the
heart of the Fair Chance View. In addition, it has the following advantage over Broome’s
suggestion for how to make consequentialism compatible with the preference for tossing
the coin. Broome’s solution consists in adding a primitive fairness property to the outcome
space. My suggested solution, however, consists in enriching decision theory to include
counterfactual prospects in such a way that the fairness property emerges as a relationship
between actual and counterfactual outcomes. Thus, I contend, my solution better explains
what orthodox decision theory lacks when it comes to capturing common intuitions about
fair distribution of chances, such as the intuition underlying the FCV.
Broome might of course complain that I have myself added some primitive variable
to decision theory, namely the (counterfactual) supposition operator. But those who are
already motivated by the Fair Chance View, or more generally recognise that what could
have been is often important for the evaluation of actual outcomes, hopefully agree that this
extra complexity is more than offset by the benefit of being able to formally represent the
desirabilistic dependency between facts and counterfactuals.
Using the multidimensional framework to represent the Fair Chance Judgement has the
interesting implication that the extra value generated by the truth of the relevant counter-
factual does not supervene on the non-modal facts. The table representing the ‘goodness
partition’, for instance, has each actual world in both the ‘Good’ and the ‘Bad’ column. The
situations 〈w1, θ,w3〉 and 〈w1, θ,w4〉 for instance share all non-modal facts and differ only
in what would be true if ¬A were. But the latter is fair whereas the former is not, which
suggests that fairness does not supervene on non-modal facts. More generally, if the multidi-
mensional semantics, formulated as Bradley suggests (i.e. without the added supervenience
constraints that I discussed in chapter 3), is the correct semantics for counterfactuals, then
counterfactuals don’t supervene on non-modal facts.20 But then if the moral value of a
situation partly depends on what counterfactuals are true, as the FCV states, then the moral
value of a situation does not supervene on its non-modal facts (contrary to what Broome
claims [Broome, 1991]: 114-115).
The non-modal consequentialist will without a doubt point out that the failure of fairness
to supervene on non-modal facts is merely an artefact of our model. And she might argue
as follows. This failure of counterfactuals to supervene on non-modal facts, according to the
multidimensional semantics, is a reason for looking for a different semantics for counterfac-
tuals, if we want to insist that fairness is partly determined by what counterfactuals are true.
According to the best known semantics for counterfactuals, i.e. the Stalnaker-Lewis seman-
tics ([Stalnaker, 1968], [Lewis, 1986a]), counterfactuals do supervene on (and are implied
by) factual propositions.21 Let f1 be the set of factual propositions that (on this semantics)
20The same is true given Hannes Leitgeb’s recent semantics for counterfactuals ([Leitgeb, 2012a], [Leitgeb,
2012b]).
21Assuming that both the possible worlds that serve as truth makes for counterfactuals and the relevant similarity
relation is entirely determined by the facts of the actual world, as Stalnaker and Lewis seem to do.
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imply the counterfactual ¬A  B and f2 the set of factual propositions that imply the
counterfactual ¬A  ¬B. What really explains our judgement that V(A ∧ B ∧ ¬A  ¬B)
can be different from V(A ∧ B ∧ ¬A  B), the non-modal consequentialist might argue, is
the fact that for us, V(A ∧ B ∧ f2) might be different from V(A ∧ B ∧ f1). To put the point
less abstractly, although the truth of a particular counterfactual is one difference between
a situation where Ann receives the kidney fairly and one where Ann receives the kidney
unfairly, what really makes the moral difference is the set of factual propositions that implies
the relevant counterfactual.
I do not want to argue against the view that counterfactuals and other modal facts
supervene on non-modal facts. However, there are various arrangements of non-modal
facts that can make true the particular modal facts we are interested in. For instance, there
are various ways of making it true that Ann and Bob have an equal chance of receiving the
kidney. Many of these arrangements of non-modal facts are equally good, from a moral
perspective. And what makes them morally good, is the fact that they all entail the relevant
modal fact; in the case we are considering, the fact that Ann and Bob have an equal chance.
In other words, the reason all these different arrangements of non-modal facts are morally
good is that they entail this particular modal fact.
Moreover, and more generally, we should make a distinction between facts that carry
value and facts on which the carriers of value supervene.22 Even if it is true, as Humeans
claim (and I tend to agree), that all facts supervene on the non-modal facts, that does not,
by itself, mean that these non-modal facts are the carriers of value. Perhaps the following
analogy will help. Every intrinsic (as opposed to relational) property of a painting is
determined by how the atoms that make up the painting are arranged. Hence, the aesthetic
qualities of the painting supervene on this arrangement of atoms. These aesthetic qualities,
most people think, carry some value, over and above that which is carried by the atoms that
make up the painting. Similarly, whether or not Bob could have received the kidney may be
determined by the non-modal facts of our world. But that does not mean that this particular
counterfactual carries no value over and above these non-modal facts.
6.8 Concluding Remarks
Decision theorists and economists have historically ignored the role counterfactuals often
play when intuitively rational people evaluate the desirability actual outcomes or states of
affairs. As I have explained in this thesis, this has made their decision theory inconsistent
with seemingly rational preferences. Moreover, I hope to have shown that given a plausible
theory of counterfactuals, we can extend Richard Jeffrey’s theory to counterfactual prospects,
in a way that makes it possible to accommodate the aforementioned preferences.
22I thank Wlodek Rabinowicz for suggesting this wording.
127
Bibliography
[Adams, 1975] Adams, E. W. (1975). The Logic of Conditionals. D. Reidel Publishing Company.
[Allais, 1953] Allais, M. (1953). Le comportement de l’homme rationnel devant le risque:
Critique des postulats et axiomesde l’ecole Americaine. Econometrica, 21(4):503–546.
[Allais, 1979] Allais, M. (1979). The foundations of a positive theory of choice involving risk
and a criticism of the postulates and axioms of the american school. In Allais, M. and
Hagen, O., editors, Expected Utility Theory and the Allais Paradox: Contemporary Discussions
of Decisions under Uncertainty with Allais’ Rejoinder.
[Arneson, 1990] Arneson, R. J. (1990). Liberalism, distributive subjectivism, and equal op-
portunity for welfare. Philosophy and Public Affairs, 19(2):158–194.
[Bennett, 2003] Bennett, J. (2003). A Philosophical Guide to Conditionals. Clarendon Press.
[Bolker, 1966] Bolker, E. D. (1966). Functions resembling quotients of measures. Transactions
of the American Mathematical Society, 124(2):292–312.
[Bovens and Rabinowicz, ms] Bovens, L. and Rabinowicz, W. (ms.). The anatomy of regret:
Taxonomy and measurement. Unpublished manuscript.
[Bradley, 1998] Bradley, R. (1998). A representation theorem for a decision theory with
conditionals. Synthese, 116(2):187–229.
[Bradley, 1999] Bradley, R. (1999). Conditional desirability. Theory and Decision, 47(1):23–55.
[Bradley, 2000] Bradley, R. (2000). A preservation condition for conditionals. Analysis,
60(3):219–222.
[Bradley, 2002] Bradley, R. (2002). Indicative conditionals. Erkenntnis, 56(3):345–378.
[Bradley, 2007a] Bradley, R. (2007a). A defence of the ramsey test. Mind, 116(461):1–21.
[Bradley, 2007b] Bradley, R. (2007b). A unified Bayesian decision theory. Theory and Decision,
63(3):233–263.
[Bradley, 2011] Bradley, R. (2011). Conditionals and supposition-based reasoning. Topoi,
30(1):39–45.
[Bradley, 2012] Bradley, R. (2012). Multidimensional possible-world semantics for condi-
tionals. Philosophical Review, 121(4):539–571.
[Bradley, ms] Bradley, R. (ms). Decision Theory with a Human Face.
[Bradley and List, 2009] Bradley, R. and List, C. (2009). Desire-as-belief revisited. Analysis,
69(1):31–37.
128
[Bradley and Stefa´nsson, 2015] Bradley, R. and Stefa´nsson, H. O. (2015). Counterfactual
desirability. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.
[Broome, 1991] Broome, J. (1991). Weighing Goods. Basil Blackwell.
[Buchak, 2013] Buchak, L. (2013). Risk and Rationality. Oxford University Press.
[Cartwright, 1979] Cartwright, N. (1979). Causal laws and effective strategies. Nouˆs,
12(4):419–437.
[Chalmers and Ha´jek, 2007] Chalmers, D. J. and Ha´jek, A. (2007). Ramsey + Moore = God.
Analysis, 67(2):170–172.
[Cross, 2009] Cross, C. B. (2009). The problem of counterfactual conditionals. Erkenntnis,
70(2):173–188.
[Diamond, 1967] Diamond, P. (1967). Cardinal welfare, individualistic ethics, and interper-
sonal comparison of utility: Comment. Journal of Political Economy, 75(5):765–766.
[Edgington, 1995] Edgington, D. (1995). On conditionals. Mind, 104(414):113–128.
[Ferguson, 2013] Ferguson, B. (2013). The Paradox of Exploitation: A New Solution. PhD thesis,
London School of Economics and Political Science.
[Fitelson and Ha´jek, ms] Fitelson, B. and Ha´jek, A. (ms.). Declarations of independence.
Unpublished manuscript.
[Foley, 1992] Foley, R. (1992). The epistemology of belief and the epistemology of degrees
of belief. Americal Philosophical Quarterley, 29(2):111–121.
[Frigg and Hoefer, 2010] Frigg, R. and Hoefer, C. (2010). Determinism and chance from a
Humean perspective. In Dennis Dieks, Wenceslao Gonzalez, S. H. M. W. F. S. and Uebel,
T., editors, The Present Situation in the Philosophy of Science, pages 351–271. Springer.
[Frigg and Hoefer, ta] Frigg, R. and Hoefer, C. (ta.). The best Humean system for statistical
mechanics. Erkenntnis. Forthcoming.
[Gibbard, 1981] Gibbard, A. (1981). Two recent theories of conditionals. In Harper, W. L.,
Stalnaker, R., and Pearce, G., editors, Ifs: Conditionals, Belief, Decision, Chance, and Time. D.
Reidel Publishing Company.
[Gibbard and Harper, 1981] Gibbard, A. and Harper, W. L. (1981). Counterfactuals and two
kinds of expected utility theory. In Harper, W. L., Stalnaker, R., and Pearce, G., editors,
Ifs: Conditionals, Belief, Decision, Chance, and Time. D. Reidel Publishing Company.
[Gundersen, 2004] Gundersen, L. B. (2004). Outline of a new semantics for counterfactuals.
Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 85(1):1–20.
[Ha´jek, 2003] Ha´jek, A. (2003). What conditional probability could not be. Synthese 137,
137(3):273–323.
[Ha´jek, ms] Ha´jek, A. (ms). Most Counterfactuals are False.
[Ha´jek and Hall, 1994] Ha´jek, A. and Hall, N. (1994). The hypothesis of the conditional
construal of conditional probability. In Probability and Conditionals: Belief Revision and
Rational Decision. Cambridge University Press.
129
[Ha´jek and Pettit, 2004] Ha´jek, A. and Pettit, P. (2004). Desire beyond belief. Australasian
Journal of Philosophy, 82(1):77–92.
[Hammond, 1987] Hammond, P. (1987). Consequentialism and and the Independence ax-
iom. In Munier, B., editor, Risk, Decision and Rationality. Springer.
[Hammond, 1988] Hammond, P. (1988). Consequentialist foundations for expected utility
theory. Theory and Decision, 25(1):25–78.
[Harper, 1981] Harper, W. L. (1981). A sketch of some recent developments in the theory
of conditionals. In Harper, W. L., Stalnaker, R., and Pearce, G., editors, Ifs: Conditionals,
Belief, Decision, Chance, and Time. D. Reidel Publishing Company.
[Harsanyi, 1977] Harsanyi, J. C. (1982/1977). Morality and the theory of rational behaviour.
In Sen, A. and Williams, B., editors, Utilitarianism and Beyond. Cambridge University
Press.
[Hoefer, 2007] Hoefer, C. (2007). The third way on objective proabability: A sceptic’s guide
to objective chance. Mind, 116(463):449–496.
[Hume, 1740] Hume, D. (2000/1739-1740). A Treatise of Human Nature. Oxford University
Press.
[Jackson, 1991] Jackson, F. (1991). Conditionals. Oxford University Press).
[Jeffrey, 1982] Jeffrey, R. (1982). The sure thing principle. Philosophy of Science, 2:719–730.
[Jeffrey, 1983] Jeffrey, R. (1990/1983). The Logic of Decision. The University of Chicago Press
(paperback edition).
[Jeffrey, 1991] Jeffrey, R. (1991). Matter-of-fact conditionals. Proceedings of the Aristotelian
Society, Supplementary Volumes, 65:161–183.
[Joyce, 1999] Joyce, J. M. (1999). The Foundations of Causal Decision Theory. Cambridge
University Press.
[Joyce, 2000] Joyce, J. M. (2000). Why we still need the logic of decision. Philosophy of Science,
67:S1–S13.
[Joyce, 2002] Joyce, J. M. (2002). Levi on causal decision theory and the possibility of
predicting one’s own actions. Philosophical Studies, 110(1):69–102.
[Kahneman and Tversky, 1979] Kahneman, D. and Tversky, A. (1979). Prospect theory: An
analysis of decision under risk. Econometrica, 47(2):263–292.
[Kaufmann, 2004] Kaufmann, S. (2004). Conditioning against the grain: Abduction and
indicative conditionals. Journal of Philosophical Logic, 33(6):583–606.
[Kyburg, 1961] Kyburg, H. E. (1961). Probability and the Logic of Rational Belief. Wesleyan
University Press.
[Leitgeb, 2012a] Leitgeb, H. (2012a). A probabilistic semantics for counterfactuals. Part A.
The Review of Symbolic Logic, 5(1):26–84.
[Leitgeb, 2012b] Leitgeb, H. (2012b). A probabilistic semantics for counterfactuals. Part B.
The Review of Symbolic Logic, 5(1):85–121.
130
[Levi, 2000] Levi, I. (2000). The Foundations of Causal Decision Theory by James M. Joyce.
The Journal of Philosophy, 97(7):387–402.
[Lewis, 1976] Lewis, D. (1976). Probabilities of conditionals and conditional probabilities.
Philosophical Review, 85(3):297–315.
[Lewis, 1980] Lewis, D. (1980). A subjectivist’s guide to objective chance. In Jeffrey, R. C.,
editor, Studies in Inductive Logic and Probability. University of California Press.
[Lewis, 1981] Lewis, D. (1981). Causal decision theory. Australasian Journal of Philosophy,
59(1):5–30.
[Lewis, 1983] Lewis, D. (1983). New work for a theory of universals. Australasian Journal of
Philosophy, 61(4):343–377.
[Lewis, 1986a] Lewis, D. (1986a). Counterfactuals. Blackwell (revised edition).
[Lewis, 1986b] Lewis, D. (1986b). Probabilities of conditionals and conditional probabilities
II. Philosophical Review, 95(4):581–589.
[Lewis, 1987] Lewis, D. (1987). Introduction. In Philosophical Papers, Vol. 2. Oxford University
Press.
[Lewis, 1988] Lewis, D. (1988). Desire as belief. Mind, 97(387):323–32.
[Lewis, 1994] Lewis, D. (1994). Humean supervenience debugged. Mind, 103(412):473–490.
[Lewis, 1996] Lewis, D. (1996). Desire as belief II. Mind, 105(418):303–313.
[Loewer, 2001] Loewer, B. (2001). Determinism and chance. Studies in History and Philosophy
of Science Part B 32, 32(4):609–620.
[Loomes and Sugden, 1982] Loomes, G. and Sugden, R. (1982). Regret theory: An alterna-
tive theory of rational choice under risk. The Economic Journal, 92:805–824.
[Makinson, 1965] Makinson, D. C. (1965). The paradox of the preface. Analysis, 25(6):205–
207.
[McGee, 1985] McGee, V. (1985). A counterexample to modus ponens. The Journal of Philos-
ophy, 82(9):462–471.
[McGee, 2000] McGee, V. (2000). To tell the truth about conditionals. Analysis, 60(1):107–111.
[Nozick, 1969] Nozick, R. (1969). Newcomb’s problem and two principles of choice. In
Rescher, N., editor, Essays in Honor of Carl G. Hempel. Reidel.
[Pettit, 1991] Pettit, P. (1991). Decision theory and folk psychology. In Bacharach, M. and
Hurley, S., editors, Foundations of Decision Theory: Issues and Advances. Basil Blackwell.
[Price, 1989] Price, H. (1989). Defending Desire-as-Belief. Mind, 98(389):119–127.
[Rabinowicz, 2002] Rabinowicz, W. (2002). Does practical deliberation crowd out self-
prediction? Erkenntnis, 57(1):91–122.
[Ramsey, 1929] Ramsey, F. P. (1990/1929). General propositions and causality. In Mellor,
D. H., editor, Philosophical Papers. Cambridge University Press.
131
[Samuelson, 1952] Samuelson, P. A. (1952). Probability, utility, and the independence axiom.
Econometrica, 20(4):670–678.
[Savage, 1972] Savage, L. (1972). The Foundations of Statistics. Dover Publication (revised
edition).
[Sen, 1985] Sen, A. (1985). Rationality and uncertainty. Theory and Decision, 18:109–127.
[Skyrms, 1981] Skyrms, B. (1981). The prior propensity account of subjunctive conditionals.
In Harper, W. L., Stalnaker, R., and Pearce, G., editors, Ifs: Conditionals, Belief, Decision,
Chance, and Time. D. Reidel Publishing Company.
[Skyrms, 1994] Skyrms, B. (1994). Adams conditionals. In Eells, E. and Skyrms, B., editors,
Probability and Conditionals: Belief Revision and Rational Decision. Cambridge University
Press.
[Smith, 1994] Smith, M. (1994). The Moral Problem. Wiley-Blackwel.
[Spohn, 1977] Spohn, W. (1977). Where Luce and Krantz do really generalize Savage’s
decision model. Erkenntnis, 11(1):113 – 34.
[Stalnaker, 1968] Stalnaker, R. (1968). A theory of conditionals. In Rescher, N., editor, Studies
in Logical Theory. Blackwell.
[Stalnaker, 1970] Stalnaker, R. (1970). Probability and conditionals. Philosophy of Science,
64-80(1):23–42.
[Stalnaker, 1981] Stalnaker, R. (1981). A defence of the conditional excluded middle. In
Harper, W. L., Stalnaker, R., and Pearce, G., editors, Ifs: Conditionals, Belief, Decision,
Chance, and Time. D. Reidel Publishing Company.
[Stalnaker, 1984] Stalnaker, R. (1984). Inquiry. MIT Press.
[Stefa´nsson, 2014a] Stefa´nsson, H. O. (2014a). Desires, beliefs and conditional desirability.
Synthese, 191(16):4019–4035.
[Stefa´nsson, 2014b] Stefa´nsson, H. O. (2014b). Fair chance and modal consequentialism.
Economics and Philosophy, (forthcoming).
[Stefa´nsson, 2014c] Stefa´nsson, H. O. (2014c). Humean supervenience and multidimen-
sional semantics. Erkenntnis, (forthcoming).
[Stefa´nsson, 2014d] Stefa´nsson, H. O. (2014d). A Lewisian trilemma. Ratio, 27(3):262–275.
[Stefa´nsson, 2014e] Stefa´nsson, H. O. (2014e). Review of Lara Buchak’s Risk and Rationality.
Economics and Philosophy, 30(2):252–260.
[van Fraassen, 1980] van Fraassen, B. (1980). Critical notice: Ellis, Rational Belief Systems.
Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 10(3):497–511.
[von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944] von Neumann, J. and Morgenstern, O. (2007/1944).
Games and Economic Behavior. Princeton University Press.
[Williams, 2010] Williams, R. G. (2010). Defending conditional excluded middle. Nouˆs,
44(4):650–668.
132
[Williams, 2012] Williams, R. G. (2012). Counterfactual triviality: A Lewis-impossibility
argument for counterfactuals. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 85(3):648–670.
133
